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1.1.Background of The Study 
In the world today most of the religious clashes, confusions and conflicts according to 
Douglas Pratt, are born from unexamined conflicting religious ideologies and unresolved 
mutual misunderstandings and thinking.
1
 If an ideology can simply be understood as a set 
of beliefs, values and opinions which shape the way a person or group of persons act, 
behave, interpret and understand the world, then unexamined conflicting ideologies that 
precipitate religious conflicts need to be examined and clarified. Conflicts between 
religions as a consequence of ideological differences are well known phenomena in our 
world today. For instance, the 1994 tribal conflict in Ghana between the Konkombas and 
Chumburus (largely Christian) on one the hand and the Dagombas, Nanumbas and Gonjas 
(largely Muslim) on the other is a sad story to recount. This tribal conflict which arose as a 
result of disagreements between two people from the different tribes, metamorphosed into 
a religious conflict between Christians and Muslims in the area and led to the death of 
thousands of people. Tsikata and Wayo report that 2,600 lives were lost, not counting those 
unregistered and the properties involved.
2
 Peace, which is an essential value of every 
meaningful religion was thrown overboard for war. The recent religious conflicts in 
Nigeria, Sudan, Iraq and Indonesia are but few examples. Religious conflicts have 
devastating effects on life, property and development.  
Overcoming the ideological differences that trigger religious conflicts in our world 
today through interreligious dialogue is therefore a dire necessity. As Pratt puts it, “for 
dialogue to proceed in the hope, if not expectation, of a productive outcome, then the 
misapprehensions of the past, together with the prejudice of the present, must be addressed 
                                                          
1
 Douglas Pratt. The Challenge of Islam: Encounters in Interfaith Dialogue. 2005, p189-190 
2
 Tsikata Dzodzi & Sein Wayo. “Identities, Inequalities and Conflicts in Ghana.” 2004, p46 
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in a climate of mutual and reciprocal correction”.
3
 If interreligious dialogue is to succeed 
in this area, then there is the need for the development of constructive theological 
paradigms of dialogue which can creatively engage Christians and Muslims in dialogues 
where shared religious experiences and theological exchanges can lead to the dialogue of 
life and the dialogue of common action.  
Within the context of Christian-Muslim relations, “Christology” is one of the most 
contentious theologico-doctrinal constructs that places the two religions in diametrical 
opposition to each other. Whereas Muslims believe that Jesus was only a “prophet of 
Allah”, Christians maintain that Jesus Christ is the “Son of God”. Islam has constantly 
refuted this Christian perspective on Christology both in the Qur’an (Surah 4: 171) and the 
Hadiths as blasphemy. For the Christian Church, the Islamic perception of Jesus Christ as a 
“prophet of Allah” is heretical and must be condemned. Consequently, the contours of 
their relations have been one of claim and counterclaim. As a result, Gaudeul intimated 
that Islam and Christianity shared the same universe at a point, “but mentally they lived in 
different worlds and, as time went on, the mental universe of each society grew more 
impervious to the thinking, the values... and indeed the whole universe of the other”.
4
  
Today, dialogue between the two religious traditions has helped to establish 
openness between them to some extent. Islam is no longer exclusively perceived as a 
“Christian heresy”, but a religion in its own right.
5
 Despite the Qur’anic rebut of the 
Christian believe in Jesus Christ as the “Son of God” (Surah 4:171), there is growing 
openness between Christians and Muslims about the need for dialogue as a means of 
establishing mutual understanding between the two religions on Christology. These 
dialogues are possible because the Qur’an has its own narratives about Jesus Christ which 
could be brought in conversation with the Christian accounts of him. Besides, Jesus Christ 
plays distinctive roles within Christianity and Islam as the “Son of God” and the “prophet 
of Allah” respectively. His distinct identity and significance in these two traditions 
                                                          
3
 Pratt, Douglas. The Challenge of Islam. 2005, p191 
4
 Jean-Marie Gaudeul. Encounter and Clashes: Islam and Christianity in History. 1990, p191 
5
 “The Church has high regard for Muslims. They worship God, who is one, living and subsistent, merciful 
and almighty, the creator of heaven and earth, who has also spoken to men” (Nostra Aetate #3). 
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presents him both as bridge and barrier between them. We shall argue that it is the subject 
of dialogue which helps clarify this dialectic of bridge and barrier.  
It must be admitted that though significant scholarly work has been done in this 
area,
6
 most of these do not specifically addressed the subject of Christology as a context 
for Christian-Muslim dialogue for the promotion of common values. For instance, Mark 
Beaumont’s work on Christology in Dialogue with Muslims focuses on the critical analysis 




 centuries. Beaumont 
acknowledges the contentious nature of Christian-Muslim relations within these two 
epochs, due to the Christian belief in the divinity of Christ and the Islamic denial of it.
7
 He 
asserts that these denials brought about three forms of Christian reactions. Firstly, Islam 
was regarded as a false ideology which had to be silenced by an aggressive policy of 
propagating Christian truths without considering the views of Muslims. Secondly, 
Christians distanced themselves from Muslims to avoid any communication with them. 
Thirdly, the Church attempted to “take Muslims seriously as people of good faith whose 
views on Christ need to be understood and related to in genuine attempts to make sense of 
Christian faith to them”.
8
  
Beaumont’s approach therefore follows this third response; the interest to avoid 
defiant proclamation and complete indifference by presenting the Christian Christ in a way 
that Muslims will understand.
9
 However, does not dialogue build on mutual sharing with 
the goal to mutually understand the dialogical other? What about presenting an “Islamic 
Christology” in ways that Christians will understand? Beaumont’s work lacks this side of 
the dialogue. 
In his work on “The Portrait of Jesus in the Qur’an”,
10
 Hans Kung underscores the 
fact that the Qur’anic portrayal of Jesus as a prophet must be understood independently 
                                                          
6
 See Kung et al. Christianity and World Religions; Paths to Dialogue. 1993, p109-127; Jacques Dupuis. 
Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue. 2002; Mahmoud Ayoub. A Muslim View of 
Christianity: Essays on Dialogue. 2007, p187-243; Mona Siddiqui. Christians, Muslims & Jesus. 2013; Leirvik, 
Oddbjørn.  The Image of Jesus Christ in Islam. 2010. 
7
 Mark Beaumont. Christology in Dialogue with Muslims. 2005, p1, 7-8 
8
 Mark Beaumont. Christology in Dialogue with Muslims. 2005 p2 
9
 Ibid, p2 
10
 Hans Kung et al. Christianity and World Religions; Paths to Dialogue. 1993 
4 
 
from all Christian sources and interpretations and situated within the Qur’an’s overall 
theological vision. According to Kung, “from whatever source the information about Jesus 
maybe derived, all the texts have been unmistakably stamped by Muhammad’s intensive 
prophetic experience of the one God”.
11
 So the Qur’anic portrayal of Jesus should be 
interpreted against the stand-point of the Qur’an and not from the New Testament or the 
council of Nicaea. He emphasizes that Christians should not try to either co-opt 
Muhammad or Muslims as “anonymous Christians” against the Muslim self-understanding 
of the uniqueness of their Islamic identity.
12
  
Whereas Kung’s views here are considered laudable, he however advocates a 
Christology from below as the best approach to Christian-Muslim dialogue. For Kung, a 
functional Christology i.e. one “from below” that sees Jesus as elevated to a position of 
divine authority should be the theme of modern Christology rather than an ontological 
Christology i.e. one “from above”. As Beaumont puts it, Kung considers that “the 
incarnation was an apostolic overlay of the much more modest claims of Jesus of Nazareth, 
who was proclaimed son of God only after his death and resurrection”.
13
 Consequently, 
Kung argues that the Gospels reveal Jesus not as a man who promoted his “own person, 
role or dignity, but God’s kingdom, God’s name, God’s will, which man is to fulfill 
through service to his fellow men and women”.
14
 In this way, Kung forgets that just as the 
image of Jesus in Islam needs to be understood within the overall context of Muhammad’s 
religious experience, so also the Christian perspectives on Christology have to be 
understood against the background of the overall experience of Jesus by the Apostles who 
believed in him as the “Son of God” and “Saviour of the World”. Christian-Muslim 
dialogue on Christology must not forget this tradition-specific understanding of Jesus 
Christ. 
In his 1972 scholarly essays on “The Dialogical Relationship between Christianity 
and Islam”,
15
 Hassan Askari (an Indian Shiite writer) also presents an interesting 
                                                          
11
 Ibid, p110 
12
 Hans Kung et al. Christianity and World Religions; Paths to Dialogue. 1993, p110 
13
 Beaumont, Mark. Christology in Dialogue with Muslims. 2005, p191 
14
 Hans Kung et al. 1993, p116 
15
 Hasan Askari. “The Dialogical Relationship between Christianity and Islam” in the Journal of Ecumenical 
Studies. vol. 8 (1972) 
5 
 
contribution to the debate on Christian-Muslim dialogue on Jesus Christ. Here, Askari sees 
Christ as a “common sign” for both Christians and Muslims.
16
 As a sign, Jesus directs both 
Muslims and Christians to the true God they seek to serve. As a person, he reveals the deep 
relational character of religion, liberating man from his dead circle of monological religion 
and restores unto him his genuine dialogical relation.
17
 Thus, Askari suggests that dialogue 
between Christianity and Islam is the best way to solve their monological impasse. Though 
he acknowledges that the process may involve anxiety and pain, he nonetheless believes 
that it is the best way for them to come to better understandings of God.  
Askari’s approach to Jesus Christ as a “common sign” between Christians and 
Muslims appears to be laudable. However, careful thought on such an appeal reveals that it 
attenuates the Christian understanding of the identity of Jesus Christ. To say that Jesus is a 
“sign directing Christians and Muslims to God” means that Jesus Christ is not God in 
himself, because a “sign” always points to something beyond itself. But for Christians, 
Jesus Christ is a concrete manifestation of God and hence points to himself as the 
revelation of God to humanity. This side of the Christian story must not be missed when 
engaging in Christian-Muslim dialogue. 
In his book The Muslim Jesus: Sayings and Stories in Islamic Literature, Tarif 
Khalidi (a Palestinian historian and professor of Arabic and Islamic studies) researched 
into the Muslim Jesus, compiling stories and sayings associated with him in Islamic 
tradition which he designated as the “Muslim gospel”.
18
 In his own view, “the totality of 
this Gospel is the story of a love affair between Islam and Jesus...a unique record of how 
one world religion chose to adopt the central figure of another, coming to recognize him as 
constitutive of its own identity”.
19
 In this “Muslim Gospel”, Khalidi further asserts that the 
wealth of tradition found in Islamic literature about Jesus indicates a deep religious and 
theological reality that Islam and Christianity have in complementarity. However, the big 
question here is: will Muslims accept Khalidi’s claim that Jesus is a central figure in 
Christianity whom they have adopted? In Islamic faith consciousness, Jesus is part of the 
                                                          
16
 Hasan Askari. “The Dialogical Relationship between Christianity and Islam.” 1972, p483 
17
 Ibid, p486. See also Oddj rn Leirvik. Images of Jesus Christ in Islam. 2010,p12 
18
 Tarif Khalidi. The Muslim Jesus: Sayings and stories in Islamic Literature. 2001, p3) 
19
 Tarif Khalidi. The Muslim Jesus: Sayings and stories in Islamic Literature. 2001, p5-6 
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line of prophecy. To see him as an adopted prophet might pose some challenges to 
dialogue. 
Mahmoud Ayoub’s contribution to the Christological discourse cannot be 
overlooked. According to Ayoub, earlier research on the subject of Jesus in Islam has been 
comparative and usually judgemental, the yardstick being the New Testament account of 
the life, teaching and significance of Jesus, the Christ. “Useful as this research may have 
been for the wealth of information it had uncovered on Christian-Muslim relations, it had 
often harboured old prejudices and fostered new hostilities”.
20
 For Ayoub, enough work 
has been done on the comparative study of Jesus in Islam in response to questions of 
similarities and differences. “It is [now] time for both Christian and Muslim scholars to go 
beyond this cataloguing on points of difference and similarities and drawing on old 
conclusions”.
21
 For Ayoub, “to go beyond” such comparative lines demands that the 
Islamic view of Jesus Christ is respected and accepted as authentic to the tradition of 
Islam. This is because, “no matter how different the Qur’anic and later Islamic view of 
Jesus may be, it is nonetheless the view which Muslims have to struggle with and 
understand and which Christians must take as Muslim views and accept as such”.
22
 
From the above scholarly contributions, one can first of all assert that while much 
of the scholarly work on Christology in Christian-Muslim dialogue has been treated 
tangentially in the effort to explore the wider perspectives of the world religions and the 
possibilities of dialogue among them, some scholars who even focus on Christology proper 
tend to undermine the Islamic view or more so, jettison the Christian believe in Jesus 
Christ (Reductionist Christologies) for the purpose of dialogue (Tariq Khalidi or Kung 
1993). Secondly, other scholarly approaches to Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology 
focus either on the Christian presentation of Christ to Muslims (Beaumont 2005) or the 
Muslim views about Jesus and Christianity (Ayoub 1976 & 2007). As it were, most of 
these works fail to provide an equal platform where each tradition narrates its own story 
about the life and mission of Jesus Christ and how these narratives could lead to the 
promotion of common values. 
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In consequence, this study intends to make a contribution to Christian-Muslim 
dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning where interlocutors share and learn from 
each other on their respective narratives about the life and mission of Jesus Christ. This 
form of dialogue is kick started by the interlocutors’ interest in dialogue. With a “good-
will-to-dialogue” as the starting point, if one desires to learn from the other concerning 
their narratives about the life and mission of Jesus as it pertains to their tradition, one must 
first of all be open to listen to these stories. On the part of the other too, if they are to be 
able to authentically communicate these narratives, they must know and be committed to 
these narratives. In this way, we shall argue that commitment and openness are necessary 
conditions for dialogue as an exercise in learning.  
Furthermore, we understand that learning has a transformational dimension to it 
because in learning, the learners acquire something new which they previously did not 
know. Hence, if Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology is structured on dialogue as an 
exercise in learning, then the question is: what can Christians and Muslims learn from each 
other’s narratives about Jesus Christ? In other words, what values does the Qur’anic Jesus 
(the prophet of Allah) inspire within Islam as a religion, and what might Christians learn 
from these values? What values does Jesus Christ (the Son of God) inspire in Christianity 
and what might Muslims learn from these values? Do these values provide or point to 
common contexts for Christian-Muslim dialogues of life and dialogues of common action? 
These are the questions that will occupy our attention in this exercise. 
However, for dialogues of this nature to succeed, they need to be constructed 
within the context of a theological approach with a hermeneutic framework which support 
learning between diverse traditions. Christianity and Islam have different belief-systems 
whose meanings can only be measured by their internal coherence. Hence, one system 
cannot be used as a standard of measurement for the truthfulness of another. This is why 
dialogue between them on Christology must be structured on learning from the belief-
systems of the other. Thus, we shall argue that “comparative theology” is that theological 
approach which supports this form of learning. Understood as the correlation of theological 
themes, concepts and methods between different religious traditions for the purpose of 
understanding and learning, comparative theology also emphasizes commitment to the 
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home tradition, openness to learn from the other and respect for the issues undergoing 
comparison.  
In this way, not only does comparative theology support the claims on dialogue as 
an exercise in learning, its approach to dialogue also suggests the kind of hermeneutic 
framework which supports its work of comparison. Here, we shall propose Paul Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of the self as that which supports this theological task. Our particular 
attention will be drawn to Ricoeur’s notions of “attestation” and “narrative identity”. 
Ricoeur defines attestation as the assurance of being oneself acting and suffering or the 
assurance of existing in the mode of selfhood. To the question: “what knowledge does the 
self have about itself?” attestation responds to this question by affirming that the self is the 
being that is certain that it is both an agent and a patient. Knowing very well the 
contentious nature of Christology between Christianity and Islam, we shall argue that when 
Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology is structured on attestation as the mutual 
sharing of testimonies about the identity and mission of Jesus Christ, it may hold prospect 
for positive and constructive dialogues. 
On the question of “narrative identity”, Ricoeur proposes two modes of identity: 
Idem identity and ipse identity. While idem identity constitutes the mode of personal 
identity that defines “sameness” or the permanent features of one’s identity 
(sedimentation), ipse identity defines the self-constancy needed in keeping one’s promise 
(innovation). However, it is narrative identity which holds these two modes of identity 
together in the person. Understood in a religious sense, narrative identity constitutes the 
dialectic interaction between one’s belief-systems and the promise to remain faithful to 
them. Ricoeur then affirms that in narrating the story of our lives (narrative identity), we 
realise that others contribute to our narratives and we theirs i.e. we are subjects in others’ 
stories and others are subjects in ours. For instance, we are our parents’ child, our partner’s 
partner, our friends’ friend – and they are characters in our narratives.
23
  
On the basis of this interconnectedness between the self and the other through 
narrativity, we shall argue that Christology is both a bridge and barrier to Christian-
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Muslim relations: a bridge because Christianity and Islam share some common themes 
about life and mission of Jesus Christ such as: the virginal conception, the miraculous 
powers of Jesus, the Ascension and Second Coming: a barrier because Jesus is understood 
as a “prophet of Allah” in Islam but as the “Son of God” in Christianity. Thus, the question 
is: what could Christians learn from the Muslim prophet, and what might Muslims learn 
from the Christian son of God? A dialogue of this nature needs to be guided by what we 
call “appropriate dialogical attitudes” (i.e. commitment, openness, respect for the other and 
the principle of equality). Here, Ricoeur’s work on the ethical and moral implications of 
narrative identity would serve as the context for reflecting on these dialogical attitudes.  
What could be the motivations for relying on Paul Ricoeur as our competent guide? 
Paul Ricoeur is a philosopher of mediation who never gives up on the space-between. As a 
consequence, his hermeneutic philosophy takes on a “tensive” style which pays attention to 
the tensions which occur in human experiences and encounters. To mediate these tensions, 
he weaves together heterogeneous discourses to form composite ones in which new 
meanings are formed without diminishing their specificity and difference.
24
 Thus, the 
terms maintain their differences at the same time as a “common ground” is formed: teasing 
out a unity of continuity in discontinuity and similarity in difference.
25
  
From this hermeneutic methodology, we shall assert that both Islam and 
Christianity possess symmetrical and dissymmetrical narrative discourses on Christology 
to which every dialogical enterprise must be attentive. As Marianne Moyaert puts it, in the 
context of religious pluralism Ricoeur would ask: “how can we bring people who belong to 




Though Ricoeur was sensitive to issues of interreligious violence, religious 
diversity and the encounter between the religious, he never really engaged in a systematic 
debate on these issues. So, by recourse to his hermeneutics, the purpose is to see how 
                                                          
24
 See Kim Atkins. “Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005).”  
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ricoeur/ (17/04/2015) 
25
 Kim Atkins. “Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005).”  
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ricoeur/  (17/04/2015)  
26
 Marianne Moyaert. “Absorption or Hospitality.” 2010, p75 
10 
 
Ricoeur’s work provides the context for systematic reflections on the challenges presented 
by the encounter between people from diverse religious backgrounds like Christianity and 
Islam. We acknowledged that Ricoeur is a Christian philosopher whose works on theology 
are well known, but his philosophical writings here do not rely so much on his theological 
concepts, but rather focus on the human person and understanding the human situation. 
This explains why his works on The Rule of Metaphor, From Text to Action, Oneself As 
Another and the three volumes of Time and Narrative are appreciated by Christians and 
non-Christians alike. In this way, by taking Ricoeur as our competent guide, it is hoped 
that Christians and Muslims would find themselves at home with his unique style. 
1.2.  The Statement of the Problem 
Douglas Pratt cites Charles Kimball as asking the questions: why do Christianity and Islam 
often clash so vigorously through the centuries? What informs the mistrust that pervades 
the history of Christian-Muslim relations and skews attempts to relate more constructively 
today?
27
 For Pratt, the reason for this phenomenon is partly because “Islam and 
Christianity are pre-eminently religions of belief. Each has struggled to define its own 
orthodoxy against variant heterodoxies and heresies from within and each has a history of 
self proclamation as universal truth against any other claimant of truth from without”.
28
  
Thus, Christology represents one of such theologico-doctrinal problematics 
between Christianity and Islam. This stems from the fact that Christianity professes Jesus 
Christ as the “Son of God” and saviour of the world. As Walter Kasper puts it, “the 
assertion that ‘Jesus is ‘the Christ’ is the basic statement of Christian belief and 
Christology is no more than the conscientious elucidation of that proposition”.
29
 Against 
this Christological understanding is the Islamic view of Jesus as a “prophet or messenger 
of Allah” without divine attributions. As Muhammad Ata ur-Rahim puts it, “Jesus was a 
prophet who had been sent to the people of this earth; that he was a messenger whose 
guidance and teaching were a reaffirmation and extension of the guidance which the 
prophets before him had brought and were a preparation for the guidance which the 
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prophet coming after him would bring”.
30
 This Islamic depiction of Jesus is bereft of 
divine attributes.  
As a consequence, the above context presents the challenges of “claim and counter” 
in Christian-Muslim dialogical relations on Christology. How to properly approach this 
problematic to allow fruitful and beneficial dialogues between Christians and Muslims on 
Christology is our point of concerns – a task which many scholars have continued to 
wrestle. Since both religions have struggled to define their orthodoxy against variant 
heterodoxies and heresies and view themselves as the sole possessors of exclusive truths 
about Jesus against other claimants to the contrary, how can one engage these traditions in 
effective, constructive and beneficial dialogues on Christology? This is the task we shall 
face head on in this study. 
1.3. The Purpose of The Study 
When one critically examines the creedal elements of Christianity and Islam – especially 
those that relate to Jesus Christ, one discovers that both communities of faith share certain 
theological affirmations and beliefs. For instance, doctrinally Islam and Christianity are 
monotheistic religions – believing in the one true God, but understanding Him differently 
(e.g. the Tawhid versus the Holy Trinity). The Qur’an and the Synoptic Gospels also 
appear to reflect common christological themes such as the Immaculate Conception (Surah 
3:35-41), the Virginal Conception of Jesus (Surah19:16-21), the miraculous powers of 
Jesus Christ (Surah 5:109-110), the Ascension (Surah 4:157-158) and the Second Coming 
(Surah 43:57-67). Despite the fact that the Qur’an denies any attempt to give divine 
interpretations to these realities, it could be said that Islam and Christianity seem to have 
something more to say about Jesus Christ than any other world religion in the world.  
Consequently, the purpose of the thesis is to draw an interreligious hermeneutic framework 
of dialogue that would constructively engage the two faith communities in dialogue as an 
exercise in learning. While mutual learning is the motivation for engaging in this form of 
dialogue, its primary goal is how dialogue as learning from and about the other might lead 
to the discernment and promotion of common values inspired by Jesus Christ. As we 
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indicated earlier, the questions which will be of prime concern here are: what values does 
the Qur’anic Jesus (the prophet of Allah) inspire within Islam as a religion and what might 
Christians learn from these values? What values does Jesus Christ (the Son of God) inspire 
in Christianity and what might Muslims learn from these values? 
1.4. The Research Questions 
The thesis focuses on Christology in Christian-Muslim dialogue. It acknowledges that 
Christology is a theological problematic for Christian-Muslim engagements in the past and 
present. It asserts that a carefully constructed approach to dialogue can turn Christology 
from being a contentious dialogical subject to being a subject for genuine Christian-
Muslim eirenical relations. Thus, it will be guided by the following research questions: 
1.4.1. What theological and hermeneutic approach to dialogue is appropriate for 
constructive Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise in 
learning?  
1.4.2. How can this form of dialogue on Christology lead to the discovery and 
promotion of common values inspired by Jesus Christ? 
1.5. The Organization of the Study 
The thesis focuses on Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning. 
It relies on comparative theology as its approach to dialogue as an exercise in learning. 
Here, not only does comparative theology involve crossing over to another’s tradition to 
learn its concepts, doctrines, beliefs and practices, but it also encourages the commitment 
of oneself to the home tradition. Hence, through this form of comparative theological 
exercise, we hope to achieve three goals of dialogue: knowing oneself better, knowing the 
other more authentically and living with the other more creatively.   
To achieve the above end, the thesis is designed on the framework with two major 
parts. Part one focuses on the introduction to the thesis, its comparative theological 
approach and hermeneutic methodology. Part two addresses the Tradition-Specific 
understandings of Christology in Christianity and in Islam which serves as the basis for 
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undertaking comparative theological exercises on some similar Christological themes and 
concepts in Islam and Christianity. The purpose is to understand them in their original 
religious contexts. Since dialogue here is intended as an exercise in learning, the question 
then would be: what can Christians and Muslims learn from each other in this work of 
comparison? The response to this question sets the context for the teasing out of common 
values for Christian-Muslim dialogues of life and of common action. 
 In this way, the thesis begins with chapter one as an introduction which addresses 
issues relating to the background of the study, the statement of the problem, the purpose of 
the study, the research questions, the organizational structure and delimitation of the thesis. 
Chapter two reviews and dismisses the traditional paradigms of dialogue as inadequate 
because of their lack of attention to the alterity of the other. It then presents the case of 
comparative theology as capable of traversing the pitfalls of the traditional models of 
dialogue. The Chapter proceeds from there to address the hermeneutic understructure of 
comparative theology by recourse to the Ricoeurean hermeneutics of the self. Here, we 
shall argue that the intersubjective dimension of narrative identity re-engages the self and 
the other in contexts where they are considered irreconcilably divided.  
Chapter three shall focus on the ethical and moral implications of narrative identity 
for dialogue as an exercise in learning. Here, Ricoeur’s “little ethics” provides the 
framework for critical reflections on the challenges of interreligious dialogue such as 
commitment, openness, respect for the other and equality. We shall argue that for 
Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning to succeed, it must 
begin from their tradition-specific understandings of the life and mission of Jesus Christ. It 
is from these tradition-specific perspectives of Christology that learning can take place. 
Hence, chapter four shall address these traditions-specific perspectives.  
It is noted that Christology in Christianity covers a vast array of theological issues 
which cannot be contained in a rather limited space in this section. Thus, the temptation 
may be to attempt a summary. But such summaries may turn out to do less justice to this 
all-important theological subject at the heart of Christian faith and theology. Aware of this 
difficulty, dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning still demands that Christians 
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share their story about the life and mission of Jesus Christ to their Muslim partners, despite 
the enormity of the subject concerned.  
Thus, for the Christian-Tradition-specific perspective on Christology, we shall 
focus on the Christology of the NT Gospels, particularly on the story Mark tells about the 
life and mission of Jesus Christ in his Gospel. Our particular focus shall be a “theological 
interpretation”
31
 of Mark’s identification of Jesus Christ as the “Son of God” and the “Son 
of Man”. These reflections are intended to affirm the fact that the two-nature classical 
Christology of the Christian church represents the authentic Christian perspective on the 
identity of Jesus Christ. For Christian faith and theology, Jesus Christ is both God and 
man, one person, two natures, consubstantial with God the Father. It is this Christian 
commitment to Christology which must be brought to the dialogical table. 
 From the Islamic plane too, we shall argue for the case of an “Islamic 
Christology”. Thus, chapter four also justifies the view that though “Christology” seems to 
be heavily loaded with Christian theological overtones; there are justifiable grounds on 
which “Islamic Christology” is established. This is because the Qur’an, the Hadiths and 
Tafsir literature contain narratives that concern the events leading to and about the birth, 
the mission and final end of Jesus, the Messiah and Son of Mary. Hence, an “Islamic 
Christology” will concern itself with discourses that relate to the mission and final end of 
Jesus the prophet of Allah. 
Having understood the Christian and Islamic perspectives on Christology and the 
Traditions that inspire these different perspectives, chapter five then focuses on comparing 
some Christological titles and themes in Islam and in Christianity. Some of these 
christological themes and titles include: Messiah, Word of/from God, Spirit of/from God, 
Son of God, the Trinity, the Death and Resurrection, the Virginal Conception, the 
Ascension and Second Coming of Jesus among others. Through these critical correlations, 
we shall demonstrate how Christology is both bridge and barrier to Christian-Muslim 
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relations. We shall also demonstrate how the critical correlations of these themes and titles 
disclose the varying significant place Jesus occupies in each tradition. 
Chapter six will then focus on rendering further reflections on the above context of 
“Jesus-significance” in Islam and in Christianity and how these might suggest certain 
values within each tradition. It is this context of Jesus-significance which paves the way 
for the teasing out of common values such as “interreligious prayer and Submission to 
God”, “peace and peaceful co-existence” and “Solidarity with the Poor and Marginalized”. 
These will be proposed as the context for Christian-Muslim dialogues of life and of 
common action.  
Finally, chapter seven is the conclusion to the thesis. Here, it provides a bird’s eye-
view of the Christological issues anticipated and fulfilled from the start of the dialogical 
journey. It also evaluates the work and recommends areas for further study. It must be 
stated here that the entire framework of the thesis is viewed as a “dialogical journey” – a 
journey that is not embarked upon for its own sake, but in response to God who invites 
both Muslims and Christians to commitment to His will. Thus, this “dialogical journey” is 
characterized by a Christian-Muslim conversation on how each understands Jesus Christ 
and how this understanding facilitates their fundamental call to be submitted to the will of 
God and to promote human flourishing.  
1.6. The Delimitation of the Study 
The thesis specifically focuses on Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise 
in learning because of the apparent contentions between them on the subject. Though there 
are other alternative approaches to Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology such as 
Mark Beaumont’s presentation of Christ to Muslims or Ayoub’s Image of Jesus in Early 
Shi’i Muslim Literature, we choose to engage the literature from the perspective of 
dialogue as an exercise in learning. For us, if dialogue is to be geared towards mutual 
understanding and enrichment, then it has to be viewed as an exercise in learning from and 
about the other. 
As we indicated earlier on, Christology covers a wide range of theological issues in 
Christian theology. On the one hand, one finds oneself in an impossible task in the attempt 
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to comprehensively address the theological issues (Soteriology and Eschatology) which 
have direct bearings to the identity and mission of Jesus Christ in this limited space. Thus, 
to present a Christian tradition-specific perspective on Christology which is succinct and 
orthodox, we propose a theological reading of the Christology of the New Testament (NT) 
Gospels – particularly the Gospel of Mark. While Markan Christology is no less limited, 
the hope is that a focus on how Mark uses the “Son of God” and “Son of Man” motif to tell 
his story about the life and mission of Jesus Christ might present an authentic Christian 
story about Jesus Christ.  
Furthermore, the numerous literatures on Christian Christology gives the 
impression that the concept Christology is only characteristic of Christian theology i.e. the 
understanding that only Christian theology can provide the appropriate articulation of the 
identity and mission of Jesus Christ. Christology may cover a central place in Christian 
faith and theology, but it also finds a unique place in Islam when understood as “the study 
of the identity and mission of Jesus Christ”. In this way, our use of the concept “Islamic or 
Qur’anic Christology” is intended to capture the story Islam has to share about the identity 
and mission of Jesus Christ within its own religious context. 
We must however not fail to indicate that we undertake these investigations as 
Christians, and specifically Roman Catholic Christians. Though one may find traces of our 
allegiance to the Roman Catholic faith in the work, especially when it comes to presenting 
the Christian perspectives on Christology, this could be viewed as underscoring the kind of 
commitment that is necessary for the work of comparative theology and dialogue as an 
exercise in learning. We do this with “the conviction that it is perfectly possible for 
persons of faith to maintain their own integrity while learning how to relate responsibly 
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                                                           CHAPTER TWO 
2. THE HERMENEUTICS OF COMPARATIVE THEOLOGY AND DIALOGUE 
AS AN EXERCISE IN LEARNING 
2.1. The Introduction   
According to Raymond Brown, “Christology” basically concerns the evaluation of Jesus in 
respect of who he was and the role he played in the divine plan of God.
33
 While Christian 
theology construes Jesus Christ as the “Son of God” and “Saviour of the world”, Islamic 
theology conceives him as a “prophet of Allah”. These divergent ways of conceptualizing 
the identity and mission of Jesus Christ presents Christology as a theological challenge 
which has continued to vex Christian-Muslim relations at the theological and practical 
levels.  For instance, whereas Christian theology views the incarnation, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ as essentially part of Christology, Islam dismisses these claims 
leaving Christians with an image of Jesus that is far removed from the New Testament 
presentation of him. The result is a history of “claim and counterclaim” in Christian-
Muslim relations leading to the mutual dismissal of the other’s viewpoints.  
In the light of the above contentions the question one would ask is whether 
Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology is possible. While some scholars assert that 
dialogue on the person of Jesus is impossible,
34
 we shall argue that Christology holds 
greater prospects for positive and constructive Christian-Muslim dialogue through the 
understanding of dialogue as an exercise in learning. Understood within the context of 
comparative theology, we shall argue that dialogue as “an exercise in learning from and 
about the other” needs to be guided by what Ricoeur calls attestation – a kind of sharing of 
mutual testimonies concerning one’s tradition-specific understanding of the identity and 
mission of Jesus Christ. Here, this mode of sharing is defined by the interest to listen to, to 
learn from and understand the other’s viewpoint about Jesus Christ. In this way, dialogue 
as an exercise in learning offers a unique kind of encounter which is far removed from the 
argumentations and confrontations that often characterize the traditional models of 
dialogue. 
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It must be said that the motivation for approaching Christian-Muslim dialogue from 
this perspective is informed by the growing dissatisfaction in the three traditional 
paradigms of dialogue (exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism), especially in respect of 
their inadequacies in preserving the integrity of the identity of the religious other. Today, 
there is a growing awareness and acceptance of the reality of religious plurality and the 
context of otherness, stimulated by the repeated calls for the preservation of the identity 
and integrity of both the self and other in dialogue. As we shall see, the three traditional 
paradigms seem to fall short in this respect. Thus, the lack of adequate paradigms has 
prompted the need for new approaches which engage the religions in dialogue which 
respect and preserve the integrity of the other.  
It is in response to the above dialogical need that we turn to comparative theology 
as the appropriate theological context for approaching Christian-Muslim dialogue on 
Christology as an exercise in learning and to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics on narrative identity 
as providing the appropriate hermeneutic framework for reflecting on the challenges 
presented by dialogue among the religions. Our interest in the hermeneutics of Ricoeur is 
informed by the fact that Ricoeur is a philosopher of mediation who never gives up on the 
“space-between”, but constantly seeks to negotiate or explore this space to allow some 
degree of interrelationship. For instance, when one considers the conflict between the 
philosophies of the exalted cogito and its demolition, whereas Descartes asserted that the 
self is the ultimate source of truth (the exalted cogito); Nietzsche countered this with the 
claim that knowledge of the self is an illusion (the shattered cogito). In mediating this 
tension Ricoeur presents attestation (a wounded cogito) as a new form of certainty 
different from Descartes’ exalted cogito and Nietzsche’s demolition of it. Attestation lies in 
equidistance between the exalted cogito and its demolition; a cogito capable of self belief.  
By negotiating the tension between the “exalted cogito” and the “shattered cogito”, 
Ricoeur does not only examines this space but tries to see the relationship which this space 
supports.
35
 We consider this hermeneutic confidence essential for fostering new kinds of 
relationships between Christians and Muslims through dialogue as an exercise in learning. 
Marianne Moyaert affirms that when confronted by the problem of religious plurality, 
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Ricoeur’s questions would be: “how can we bring people who belong to different religious 
traditions together? How can we tear down some of the walls between different ‘language’ 
communities? How can we overcome the threat of incommensurability?”
36
  
Thus, it could be said that with the standoffs in Christian-Muslim dialogue on 
Christology, we hope to follow Ricoeur’s lead in exploring the question: how can we 
explore Christology as a context of learning in Christian-Muslim relations? It must 
however be said here that though Ricoeur was sensitive to issues of religious diversity and 
interreligious violence, he did not engage in a systematic debate on these issues. 
Consequently, his hermeneutic inputs here are not intended as providing direct answers to 
the problem of interreligious dialogue. They only provide the appropriate context for 
thorough reflections on the challenges of interreligious dialogue. 
Our focus here shall therefore be on Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self as we find it 
in Oneself As Another
37
 and many of his other works which support the claims we make 
here. In Oneself As Another, Ricoeur divides personal identity into idem, ipse and narrative 
identities. While idem-identity expresses an aspect of personal identity which emphasizes 
sameness, unchangeability and sedimentation, ipse-identity expresses a different aspect of 
personal identity that is concomitant with the self-maintenance attained through promise-
keeping. These two aspects of personal identity are held together in dialectic unity in the 
same person through narrative identity.  
Ricoeur demonstrates that whereas idem and ipse identities constitute the identity 
of the self, narrative identity shows that there is no solipsistic self. Our identities are 
different, yet interconnected in some sense. In other words, our narratives are essentially 
interwoven with others’ narratives such that we discover that in narrating the stories of our 
lives; we find that we are characters in other’s narratives.
38
 So, through our encounter with 
others, we facilitate the articulation of their narratives and they ours. This intersubjective 
character of narrative identity would serve as the common ground for engaging the other in 
dialogue. Here, the argument shall be that when Christians and Muslims engage in 
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dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning, it could be the greatest point of 
disclosure to a world of knowledge which may contribute to positively transforming their 
interrelationships. 
As we shall see, comparative theology focuses on correlating the theological 
themes, doctrines, concepts and practice between two religious traditions in order to learn, 
understand and be enriched by them. Thus, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self facilitates 
the task of comparative theology in his ability to mediate the yawning gap between the self 
and the other to allow some degree of interrelationship. In this way, Ricoeur’s “mediated 
space-between” conceptually sets the context for the possibility of dialogue between 
people of different religious traditions who do not necessarily share the same theological 
and religious viewpoints on a particular subject.  
Comparative theology also involves the crossing-over to another’s tradition to learn 
and understand texts, doctrines and practice. These forms of crossings raise questions 
regarding the epistemology validity and the ethical allowability for such crossings (i.e. 
intratextual problems). Here, while acknowledging the problem of intratextuality, Ricoeur 
nonetheless proposes translation as means of understanding texts due to linguistic barriers 
and cultural differences. Thus, we shall argue here that while religious texts cannot be fully 
understood by believers from other traditions, translation nonetheless reduces their degree 
of incomprehensibility. This is effectively done through dialogue as an exercise in 
learning.  
2.2. Understanding the Meaning of Interreligious Dialogue  
In the face of religious diversity and ideological conflicts among the religions today, many 
have proposed the need for more interreligious dialogues and cooperation among the 
religions. This necessity for dialogue today is aptly captured by Hans Kung’s famous 
statement: there will be “no peace among the nations without peace among the religions. 
No peace among the religions without dialogue between the religions. No dialogue 
between the religions without investigations of the foundations of the religions”.
39
 Not 
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only does dialogue provide the space for the various religions to converse together and to 
get to know one another in an atmosphere of openness and mutual sharing but it also has 
the potential to ameliorate the tensions that exist among the religions. To achieve these 
laudable goals, there is the growing need for clarity on what interreligious dialogue is all 
about, its concerns and goals and the processes it needs to take to achieve these goals.  
Thus, the discourse below is a brief consideration of the views of some scholars on 
the definition and goals of interreligious dialogue. The interest here is to find the 
appropriate gateway into the hermeneutic issues that characterise the concept and to clearly 
define the form and goal of dialogue we propose for Christian-Muslim conversations on 
Christology. It must be stated rather prematurely here that for interreligious dialogue to be 
successful, it must be characterised by one’s commitment to the home tradition and respect 
for the religious other as an equal partner. However, before this assertion can be 
substantiated, let us briefly consider some of the definitions of interreligious dialogue as 
proposed by some scholars.  
John V. Taylor
40
 defined interreligious dialogue as the “sustained conversation 
between parties who are not saying the same thing and who recognize and respect 
contradictions and mutual exclusions between their various ways of thinking”.
41
 For 
Taylor, the object of this form of dialogue “is understanding and appreciation, leading to 
further reflection upon the implication for one’s own position on the convictions and 
sensitivities of the other traditions”.
42
 Taylor’s view that the goal of this “sustained 
conversation” is “understanding and appreciation” of the views of the religious other which 
lead to further reflection on one’s own religious views is very significant for interreligious 
learning. If interreligious dialogue leads the dialogical partners to the appreciation of each 
other’s religious traditions, then we could say that dialogue is all the more worth pursuing.  
For Jason Barker, interreligious dialogue is “a formal process in which 
authoritative members of at least two religious communities come together for an extended 
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and serious discussion of the beliefs and practices that separate the communities”.
43
 
Though we know that dialogue is both formal and informal, Barker’s definition seems to 
limit dialogue to its formal aspect which only engages scholars and religious authorities. 
However, dialogue equally takes place among grassroots and can be informal. So it has 
both a formal and informal dimension.  
For Leonard Swidler, interreligious dialogue is “a conversation between two or 
more persons with differing views, the primary purpose of which is for the participants to 
learn from each other so that both can change and grow”.
44
 For Swidler, “the very fact that 
I learn that my dialogue partner believes ‘this’ rather than ‘that’ changes my attitude 
toward that person; and a change in my attitude is a significant change and growth in 
me”.
45
 In other words, we enter into dialogue with the other so that we can learn, change 
and grow and not so that we can force change on the other. Here, one can say that 
Swidler’s attention to the goal of dialogue as “learning, changing and growing” is a 
significant contribution to the understanding of interreligious dialogue.  
On the question of the goals of dialogue, Swidler suggests three goals for 
interreligious dialogue: (1) “to know oneself ever more profoundly, (2) to know the other 
ever more authentically (3) to live ever more accordingly”.
46
 Here, one finds that dialogue 
is oriented not just towards learning about but also towards learning from the other which 
leads to a better understanding of oneself. However, the success of this form of dialogue 
presupposes some degree of respect and openness to the other.  
From the definitions above one finds some hermeneutic issues that speak to the 
heart of the interreligious dialogue project. These issues include the understanding of 
dialogue as: a conversation, a form of learning, directed towards mutual understanding and 
growth and enrichment. If we understand a conversation as a form of interaction between 
people or groups of people on a subject matter (whether formal or informal), then we could 
say that dialogical conversations need to be non-confrontational and non-debative. They 
also need to be inspired by what Gadamer calls “the good-will to dialogue” – the good-will 
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to learn from and about the other. As Gadamer observed, “it belongs to every true 
conversation that each opens up himself to the other, truly accepts his points of view as 
valid... What is to be grasped is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can be 
at one with each other on a subject”.
47
 This kind of conversation is what dialogue as an 
exercise in learning demands. 
Having considered the above views on the subject, we therefore define 
interreligious dialogue as “the constructive and positive conversation between people of 
different religious traditions, on issues of religious significance, for the purpose of mutual 
learning and enrichment.” This definition reveals two key definitive concepts that will 
guide our discourse on dialogue. These are the process of dialogue as a “constructive and 
positive conversation” and the goal of dialogue as “mutual learning and enrichment”. 
While we conceive mutual learning and enrichment as the intended goals of dialogue 
proposed here, the process itself raises multifarious questions and challenges especially 
when it comes to understanding across different religious traditions like Christianity and 
Islam.  
Catherine Cornille notes that these questions relate to: the im-possibility of crossing 
religious boundaries to learn and understand the meanings of particular teachings and 
practices in their original religious context, the allowance for such crossing and the 
dynamics and ethics that this entails.
48
 As Panikkar also puts it; “to cross the boundaries of 
one’s culture without realizing that the other may have a radically different approach to 
reality is today no longer admissible. If still consciously done, it would be philosophically 
naïve, politically outrageous and religiously sinful”.
49
 It is therefore in the light of the 
above concerns for the identity and integrity of the religious other that we share the 
opinion of scholars that the three traditional paradigms of dialogue lack the adequate 
response to the question of otherness. This inadequacy is not only evident in terms of their 
failure to understand and appreciate the other’s tradition but also, each in a way loses touch 
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with the home tradition.
50
 Let us undertake a succinct overview of these traditional 
paradigms of interreligious dialogue bringing out their respective inadequacies. 
2.2.1. Exclusivism as a Paradigm of Dialogue 
According to Pratt, religious exclusivism “amounts to the material identification of a 
particular religion with the essence and substance of true universal religion, thereby 
excluding all other possibilities to the claim”.
51
 Soteriologically, exclusivists hold that 
believers of other religions can only be saved when they convert to their religion. 
Whereas this evaluation of other religions is said to be very common with the Abrahamic 
religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), its Christian context was more defined by the 
axiom extra ecclessiam nulla salus (outside the Church, there is no salvation).
52
 
Theologically, the basis of this axiom suggests that Jesus Christ is the only efficacious 
source of salvation and he established the Church (Roman Catholic) as the only means 
by which salvation is made possible for all.  
While this exclusivist mentality was the case for the Catholic Church, especially 
from the third century onwards, perspectives changed along the paths that led to the 
Second Vatican Council in 1964. The Church took on an inclusivist position at this 
council where it admitted that there are some salvific elements in non-christian religions 
(seeds of the word).
53
 Though exclusivism is still very common with some evangelical 
Pentecostal churches, one also finds it in Islam and Judaism. In Judaism the 
interpretation of the concept of Israel as the “chosen people of God” eliminates all who 
do not accept Jewish monotheism.
54
 In Islam, Christians are accused of wrongdoing 
because of their Trinitarian beliefs (Surah 4:171). Thus, there are still religions which 
hold the view that salvation is only made possible within the confines of their religious 
traditions.  
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However, could this level of exclusivism be the measure of the sort of commitment 
needed for interreligious dialogue? If commitment defines the quality of being dedicated 
to a cause, an activity or a being, does not religious commitment demand one’s exclusive 
dedication to one’s object of worship? While this might be the case, within the context of 
dialogue, the absence of openness to one’s dialogical partner betrays the exclusivist 
position as inimical to dialogue. For the exclusivist, there is no need to dialogue with the 
religious other because there is nothing worthwhile to learn from them. Truth can only be 
found in the home tradition. So, whether in its open, closed or extreme forms,
55
 
exclusivism creates little room for dialogue with the other. The other can only be real 
when it becomes the self.  
2.2.2. Inclusivism as a Paradigm of Dialogue 
 Inclusivism is structured on the claim that whereas one’s religious beliefs are absolutely 
true, the other’s beliefs are only partially true and find their fulfilment in one’s beliefs. 
According to Pratt, inclusivism is “the effective identity of a particular religion as the 
universal, with some allowance made for others”.
56
 In contrast to exclusivism, inclusivism 
does not deny in advance the truth or soteriological value of other religions but claims that 
while one’s religion is absolutely true, other religions are only true if they contain religious 
features common to one’s religion.  
In a particularly Christian context (Roman Catholic), inclusivism asserts that 
salvation is possible in other religions but these find their fulfilment in Christianity because 
Jesus Christ the head of the Church is the one and only universal saviour of the world. For 
instance, Karl Rahner’s “Anonymous Christianity”
57
 purports that God’s salvific plan and 
universal self-communication, which was established in the covenant with Noah, was not 
just for some people but for all of humanity (Gen 9:16). For Rahner, God’s salvific will is 
for all to be saved as the text of 1Timothy 2:4 supports – God “wants all to be saved and 
reach full knowledge of the truth”. It follows then that if Christ is the ultimate fulfilment of 
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the salvific plan of God, then Christ came for all to save all.
58
 In this way, salvation is not 
only limited to an explicit knowledge and profession of faith in Christ but includes all who 
live in the state of Christ’s grace through faith, hope and love and yet have no explicit 
knowledge that their lives are oriented in grace-given salvation to Jesus Christ.
59
   
   The Second Vatican Council also affirms this intrinsic element of the universal gift 
of the grace of Christ when it says: “those who through no fault of their own do not know 
the Gospel of Christ or His Church but who nevertheless seek God with a sincere heart 
and moved by grace, try in their actions to do His will as they know it through the 
dictates of their conscience – those too may attain eternal salvation”.
60
 However, in more 
explicit terms, Christian theological inclusivism reflects Walter Kasper’s view that “the 
one God has once only, yet wholly, definitively and unreservedly communicated himself 
historically in Jesus Christ”.
61
 If God communicated himself in this way, then it follows 
that “Christ is both id quo maius cogitari nequit (that than which nothing greater can be 
thought) and id quo Deus maius operari nequit (that than which God can do no 
greater).
62
 Consequently, Kasper affirmed that “everything true and good that the other 
religions contain is a participation in what appeared in its fullness in Jesus Christ”.
63
 In 
the light of the above contexts, Christian theology (from a more Catholic perspective) 
perceives the other religions as possessing “seeds of the word”
64
 or the ray of that truth 
which enlightens all men.
65
 
Today, inclusivism seems to be popular among Christian scholars such as Kenneth 
Cragg, Hans Küng, Jacques Dupuis
66
 and Mark Heim
67
 among others. While many agree 
that inclusivism is more open to interreligious dialogue in contrast to exclusivism, it is 
nonetheless criticised in the way inclusivists restrict their openness to only what is 
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common between the self and the other. In John Hick’s view, inclusivism rests upon the 
claim that “non-christians can be saved because unknown to them Christ is secretly ‘in a 
way’ united with them”.
68
 Here, the affirmation of the unity and universality of the 
Christian dispensation of salvation is often viewed by some scholars as an imperialism that 
swallows up, co-opts or oppresses the religious other. However, as Panikkar cautioned, the 
other must be viewed as an equal source of self understanding and interpretation and their 
integrity must be respected in every dialogue.
69
 Genuine and honest dialogue demands that 
while the non-negotiable elements of one’s religious tradition are affirmed, the integrity of 
those of the other should also be respected.  
2.2.3. Pluralism as a Paradigm of Dialogue  
Unlike exclusivism and inclusivism, religious pluralism posits all religions as different 
expressions of one divine reality.
70
 In other words, pluralism perceives all the religions as 
different streams leading to the same ocean. According to Marianne Moyaert, “pluralism 
considers religious traditions to be mere variations of the same common ground, variations 
of the same soteriological theme”.
71
 Thus, its central significance is the purported equality 
it claims to offer to all the religions. As a proponent of this liberal pluralist view John 
Hick, for instance, views all religions as historically and culturally determined 
interpretations of the ineffable Real or partial expressions of the Ultimate Reality.
72
 As a 
consequence, Hick argues for a shift away from Christian Christocentricism to a 
theocentric approach to religion.
73
 Put in his own words, Hick describes this shift as the 
“Copernican revolution” which necessitates a movement “away from the dogma that 
Christianity is at the centre, to the realization that it is God who is at the centre and all 
religions including our own serve and revolve around him”.
74
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In his pluralist theocentric approach to the religions, Paul Knitter also considered 
that the Christian belief in the uniqueness of Christ as normative and constitutive for any 
true encounter with God is an obstacle and an unnecessary barrier that stands in the way of 
authentic dialogue. For him, Jesus most likely experienced himself as a prophet anointed 
specially by God’s Spirit to complete the mission of the earlier prophets by announcing 
and ratifying the good news of the reign of God.
75
 In his soteriocentric and correlational 
model of dialogue, Knitter reckons that the dialogical task today should not be centred on 
“right beliefs” in Christian uniqueness but “right practice” with other faith traditions in the 
promotion of the reign of God’s saving mission. In this way, the uniqueness of Jesus 
should then be construed adverbially in correlation to other salvific mediators. In other 
words, Christians can affirm that “Jesus is truly divine and saviour but they no longer need 
to announce that he is solely divine and saviour”
76
 because of the presence of other saviour 
figures.  
When one considers the pluralists approach to dialogue, it appears to be conducive 
for dialogue in the way it offers equal opportunity to all the religions through its “common 
ground approach to the religions”.
77
 However, as Moyaert puts it: the pluralists’ are “so 
eager to promote dialogue that they tend to forget the irreducible differences that exist 
between the religions”.
78
 For instance, it is doubtful whether committed believers for 
instance in Judaism or Islam will succumb to the relativizing understanding that their 
religion is a partial expression of the Ultimate Real. Thus, Gavin D’Costa affirms that the 
fundamental problem of pluralism lies in its “desire to flee from the particularity of any 
religious claim; be it Christian or non-Christian”.
79
  
From the above analysis of the three paradigms, we could say that while 
exclusivism closes all doors to dialogue with the other, it is the self that determines the 
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degree of openness to the other in inclusivism. However, by declaring a limitless playfield 
of openness for all religions, pluralism only ends up caricaturing the real identities of both 
the self and the other. Hence, not only do these paradigms fail to adequately preserve the 
integrity of the identity of the other in the light of the specificity of their traditions, they 
also fail in respect of the self’s commitment to the home tradition. As Michael Barnes 
asserted,  while “exclusivism privileges one’s tradition against all others; inclusivism 
patronises other traditions as less or partial versions of what is realized in only one; and 
pluralism argues for the relativizing of all others including one’s own”.
80
 In Joseph 
DiNoia’s view, these paradigms obscure basic issues posed by the current situations 
relating to religious engagements, especially on how to affirm the universality of the 
Christian dispensation without sacrificing its particularity.
81
  
In the light of the apparent inadequacies of these traditional paradigms Anselm Min 
intimates that “we are living in a new kairos that demands a new paradigm of its own”
82
 
and this paradigm demands a turn away from the threefold traditional paradigms of 
dialogue to models that engage the religions in meaningful and beneficial ways. It is in 
response to this need that we undertake this project of Christian-Muslim dialogue on 
Christology as “an exercise in learning from and about the other”. This form of dialogue, 
we shall argue, finds its theological reflections in what is today called comparative 
theology. The question however is: what is comparative theology? What is its attitude 
towards the other in dialogue and how does it serve the interest of dialogue as an exercise 
in learning? 
2.3. The Case of Comparative Theology and Interreligious Learning 
As a theological approach, comparative theology engages in the comparison of the 
theologies of different religions and reflects on their theological themes, methods and 
concepts as exemplified in their respective traditions, in order to learn and understand them 
and so be enriched by this learning. Comparative theology is a learning process as it asserts 
that a deeper interest and learning of the traditions of the religious other through shared 
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experience is necessary for an understanding of this other. It is therefore distinguished by 
its interests and attention to how theology is done in other traditions by exploring their 
theological theme through the practice of comparisons. While this may be the seminal 
feature of its task, the views of Ulrich Winkler, David Tracy, Francis Clooney and James 
Fredericks among others may help to clarify the defining characteristics of this form of 
theologizing. 
For Ulrich Winkler, “comparative theology is not a new variation of an academic 
theological field with new materials from other religions but presupposes both theological 
reflection and religious experience – in one’s own and the other religious traditions, 
intellectual discourse and existential encounter”.
83
 Comparative theology is not just the 
mere comparisons of religions and their theologies but involves critical reflections on and 
the experience of, these theologies.
84
 In mapping out the parameters of the systematic 
description of comparative theology, Winkler asserts that comparative theology is, first of 
all a confessional theology and not a depreciatory apologetics. It is confessional because it 
“has its place in the sphere of creed and church even if the details of the relationship may 
be laden with tension”.
85
 It is anti-apologetic because it is “against the self-aggrandizing 
and self-immunization of one’s own faith directed against the degradation of other 
religions through a hermeneutic of suspicion”.
86
 In other words, comparative theology 
relates to other religions with benevolence, a willingness to learn from them and a critical 
appreciation of who they are.  
Secondly, comparative theology is more about theology and not about Religious 
studies. According to Winkler, whereas religious studies chooses an outsider perspective 
for observing religions by describing and classifying them, comparative theology reflects 
from the insider perspective and advocates claiming validity for one’s own religious 
truth.
87
 For Winkler, “religions are parameters of meaning that ask not just to be observed 
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and reflected upon but also to be existentially tried and experienced”,
88
 and comparative 
theology tries to exactly do that. In consequence, Winkler concludes that while 
comparative theology is not the same as religious studies or the theology of religions, it is 
also not an alternative to these fields of study. It rather builds on these fields of study to 
achieve its end. Thus, whereas the theology of religions must be able “to argue the 
potential equality of religious traditions and the constitutivity of religious differences for 
the portrayal of one’s own religious faith, comparative theology ventures with this 




Winkler’s idea that comparative theology is non-depreciatory apologetics but seeks 
positive relationship with other religions, offers an important contribution to our discourse 
on Christian-Muslim dialogue as an exercise in learning – for not only does it affirm the 
theologian’s commitment to his/her religious tradition, it also invites the theologian to 
learn and understand the religious traditions of the other. This dialectics of commitment 
and openness reflects the type of dialogical attitude we intend to propose for Christian-
Muslim conversations on Christology.  
For David Tracy, the term comparative theology was used in the past (the 19
th
 
century if not earlier) either in contrast to theoretic theology or to the study of religious 
doctrines. In its predominantly used Christian contexts, the concept by then conveyed the 
sense of what is known today as the theology of religions i.e. a “Christian reflection on the 
general idea of other religions in the light of some particular understanding of the Christian 
faith”
90
 However, the fact that today theology is not just a Christian discipline but is 
situated within the multidisciplinary field of religious studies, impels contemporary 
theology in its varied traditions to become comparative theology.
91
 Though comparative 
theology “was not used in the pre-modern period, comparative elements based on 
reflections on other religions were present in the Christian tradition since its beginnings... 
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These comparative elements can be traced in leanings both positive (in terms of 
borrowing) and negative (i.e. exclusivism or the tendencies to demonise the other)”.
92
  
According to Tracy, therefore, the reality of religious plurality today suggests that 
doing theology necessitates relying on theological methods that are general in character 
(religious studies) and on those that deal with comparative methods. In his exploration of 
the interplay between these two methods of theologizing, Tracy notes four major shared 
premises in comparative theology: “the reinterpretation of central religious symbols in a 
religiously pluralistic world, the construction of new foundations for traditions, the 
addressing of questions of religious pluralism on explicitly theological grounds, both the 
hermeneutics of suspicion and critique and the hermeneutics of retrieval”.
93
  
From these premises Tracy suggested two understandings of comparative theology: 
firstly “it refers to the comparisons of the doctrinal systems of two or more religious 
traditions”.
94
 This aspect of comparative theology is non-theological and non-confessional 
but is part of the general academic study of religions. Secondly, it is a confessional 
discipline where one’s religious tradition is critically correlated with another religious 
tradition.
95
 So we could say that between Tracy and Winkler, we can already infer that 
comparative theology is the critical correlation of two religious traditions with the view to 
deeply learn and understand them and hence be enriched by this learning. It is this 
understanding of comparative theology which supports the model of dialogue we propose 
here. Let us see how Francis Clooney and James Fredericks contribute to it. 
According to Francis Clooney, comparative theology is not just a confessional 
theology or one which engages in the work of mere comparisons but it is a theology that is 
constructive. It is “constructive” because one “interprets the meaning and truth of one 
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tradition by making a critical correlation with the classics of another religious tradition”.
96
 
It is also distinguished “by its sources and ways of proceeding, by its foundation in more 
than one tradition and by reflection which builds on that foundation rather than simply on 
themes or methods already articulated prior to the comparative practice”.
97
  Thus, the 
comparison of theologies, the posing of theological questions in comparative ways and the 
doing of constructive theology from and after comparison constitute the meaning of 
comparative theology. In this way, Clooney sees comparative theology as “a manner of 
learning that takes seriously diversity and tradition, openness and truth, allowing neither to 
decide the meaning of our religious situation without recourse to the other”.
98
 
James Fredericks, who is an associate of Clooney, also points out four themes that 
are at the heart of comparative theology. First of all, comparative theology proceeds 
dialectically. Here, it is a critical study of another religious tradition either by means of 
reading their classic texts or by personal dialogue with practioners of the other religion or 
both. “The conversation with the other tradition eventually becomes a conversation with 
the home tradition in which its classic texts, art, rituals and ascetic practices are 
reinterpreted in the light of the study of the other tradition”.
99
 Though this critical 
correlation can sometimes be positive or negative (relating to issues of similarities and 
differences), these two dialectics are very significant for the comparativist because they 
help to eradicate theories of religion which either marginalize difference (exclusivism and 
inclusivism) and reduce religions to “more of the same” (Pluralism) or those which 
privilege difference by contending that religions are incommensurable (Particularism).
100
 
Secondly, Fredericks observes that comparative theology emphasizes that thinking 
interreligiously is an intrinsic component of the theological enterprise and not a 
supplementary reflection that is consigned to an appendix of systematic theology.
101
 We 
note here that Tracy, earlier on, attested to this fact when he said that theology today is a 
multidisciplinary concept engaging all the religions i.e. in the face of religious diversity, 
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interreligious theologizing is no longer a secondary matter but a sine qua non. For 
Fredericks, therefore, “doing theology comparatively therefore means that the correlation 
of Christian doctrines and practices with those of other religions must be located at the 
centre of the Christian theological querens itself”.
102
 In other words, the inevitability of 
religious plurality today demands that religious people learn to think and behave in ways 
that preserve the integrity of the religious other without losing their own identities. 
Thirdly, Fredericks indicates that the problem of interpretation raised by 
comparisons is not limited to soteriological questions as in the case of the study of 
religions. Instead, “comparative theology addresses every aspect of the home tradition’s 
doctrine and practices”.
103
 Unlike some theologians who think that Christian-Muslim 
dialogue on the person of Jesus Christ (the doctrinal) remains contentious and should be 
avoided where possible,
104
 Fredericks objects to this way of thinking by his assertion that 
doing theology comparatively is theology in the broadest sense of the word. In other 
words, it must be a theology that is intellectually rigorous in interpreting classic texts, 
doctrines and practices of the religions in their entirety.
105
  
Fourthly, James Fredericks asserts that comparative theology relies on limited 
experiments in the work of comparison. In other words, it relies on limited case studies. 
This is better explained by Clooney when he said that “the more specific a comparison, the 
better; the more particular a Christian effort to understand a non-Christian practice, the 
better; the more we attend to learning about particular things and ideas that were 
previously other to us, the better”.
106
 So, instead of offering all-encompassing theological 
theories based on claims for or against universal religious experiences, Frederick suggests 
“limited case studies” in which specific elements of the home religion are interpreted in 
comparison to another tradition. This allows for in-depth learning and understanding of the 
specific area of the traditions undergoing comparison. 
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From this brief literature review of the concept, we could say that the comparative 
theological journey appears to have many destinations in respect to the scholars concerned 
and the goals they seek to achieve. However, our interest is to start the journey as defined 
by the views of Winkler Ulrich, Francis Clooney and James Fredericks among others.
107
 
As James Fredericks briefly noted, “comparative theology as we have proposed it, entails 
the interpretation of the meaning and truths of one’s own faith by means of a critical 
investigation of other faiths”.
108
  
As an exercise in learning, not only does it emphasize a profound learning of one’s 
faith but it also stresses knowing the other’s faith more authentically and living together 
ever more creatively. In this way, comparative theology differs from comparative religious 
studies because whereas comparative religious studies holds up for itself the scholarly 
ideal of detached inquiry and seeks as its primary public – the academic community of 
scholars, comparative theology proceeds not from a religiously neutral starting point.
109
 It 
is a faith seeking understanding – one undertaken by believers for the benefit of believers, 
even as it includes the academy of scholars as its public.
110
  
From the brief evaluations of the three traditional paradigms of dialogue, one 
would notice that whereas exclusivism is viewed as inimical to dialogue, inclusivism too is 
criticised as a sort of subtle imperialism that swallows up and oppresses the religious other. 
Though pluralism is viewed as more open to the religious other than the other two 
paradigms, its homogenization of all the traditions as expressions of the same reality has 
equally provoked negative sentiments from postliberal theologians who argue for the 
tradition-specific understanding of the religions.
111
As Pratt asserted, “there is no 
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reasonable ground to assume a link across religions; their individual or particular identities 
militate against any such linkage”.
112
  
Pratt’s view re-echoes the position of the postliberals who argue that religions are 
particular, untranslatable and incommensurable. According to Moyaert, due to the above 
reaction of postliberalism against pluralism, “the theological pendulum swings from the 
virtue of openness to the value of commitment”.
113
 Here, while liberal theology defends 
the logic of sameness which pushes religious identities “into procrustean bed of 
unrestricted homogeneity, postliberalism affirms the logic of difference that presents 
religions as ‘indissolubly distinct entities.’”
114
 Thus, between both approaches the religious 
other is perceived as a problem that needs to be resolved either by “retreating to the 
security of sameness (pluralism) or by distancing otherness (postliberalism)”.
115
  
It is within this context that comparative theology asserts its significance – as it 
argues for the intersubjective understanding among religions. Whereas it admits, with the 
postliberals that the religious other cannot be homogenized into an overarching liberal 
pluralist scheme, it also emphasizes that the religious other should not be made so strange 
to the self for reasons of radical incommensurability. For comparative theology, the 
theology of religions needs to pay due attention to: (1) otherness – which concerns 
respecting the uniqueness of the traditions undergoing dialogue (2) living creatively with 
the other – which goes beyond tolerance to focus on the genuine wish to understand and 
learn from another’s life as a friend and to embrace the dynamics this life entails. As James 
Fredericks indicates, comparative theology looks upon the truths of other traditions as 
resources for understanding one’s own faith.
116
 
The question, however, is: what hermeneutic understructure supports this 
comparative theological claim? In other words, what is the conceptual hermeneutic 
framework within which comparative theology operates and moves towards its application 
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and appropriation as a methodological and ethical resource in interreligious dialogue as an 
exercise in learning? It is in response to these questions that we find the hermeneutics of 
Paul Ricoeur on selfhood and otherness illuminating.
117
 As the basis for establishing 
intersubjectivity, Ricoeur states that selfhood implies otherness to such an extent that 
selfhood and otherness cannot be separated.
118
  
Ricoeur substantiates the above claim through his hermeneutics on personal 
identity in Oneself As Another. Here, we shall argue that his effort to re-engage the self and 
other in contexts where they are considered divided sets the context for Christian-Muslim 
dialogue on Christology as exercise in learning. Ricoeur’s notion of translation will also 
provide the appropriate context for reflecting on the challenge of intratextuality in 
interreligious dialogue. Until then, let us see how Ricoeur sets the hermeneutic grounds 
from which comparative theology takes off as an exercise in learning from and about the 
other in Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology. 
2.4. Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of the Self and Interreligious Dialogue  
The hermeneutic issues we shall raise here are particularly Ricoeurean. Our discourse here 
is first guided by how Ricoeur presents the attestation of the self as a bridge between the 
self and the other. The interest here is not only to demonstrate how Ricoeur’s notion of 
attestation creatively mediates the epistemological gap created by the impasse between 
Descartes’ cogito and Nietzsche’s demolition of it, but more so, to show how attestation 
serves to remove dialogue from an argumentative and confrontational context, by placing it 
in a context of mutual sharing through dialogue as an exercise in learning. In this way, we 
shall argue that when Christians and Muslims attest to their respective faith convictions 
about the identity and mission of Jesus Christ, such dialogues traverse the problem of 
parallel monologues.  
Secondly, through idem, ipse and narrative identities, Ricoeur also demonstrates 
how our identities are formed and how others also contribute to the enrichment of our 
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identities and we theirs. For Ricoeur, literary narratives and life histories are not exclusive 
from each other because narratives are always part of us before they are exiled from life 
into writing and return to life along the multiple paths of appropriation.
119
 In narrating our 
history, we find that “whole sections of our lives are part of the life history of others – of 
my parents, my friends, my companions in work and in leisure”.
120
  
Hence, in narrating the story of one’s life, one finds that others are co-authors to 
one’s narrative identity and “learning to narrate oneself is also learning how to narrate 
oneself in other ways”.
121
 Situating these aspects of personal identity within the context of 
comparative theology and interreligious dialogue, we shall demonstrate how they apply to 
the identities of the Christian and the Muslim and how they set the context for the 
possibility of Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology.  
2.4.1. Attestation as Mediation in the Crisis of the Cogito 
Reflexivity “refers to the capacity to reflect on oneself, to take responsibility for oneself 
and to act upon oneself. These reflexive acts of the self are basic features of selfhood”.
122
 
However, as we shall see, the concept of the self together with the possibilities and limits 
of reflexivity are highly contested in both philosophical and theological discourses. In 
other words, while the modern emphasis on reflexivity laid the foundations for “a self-
transparent, self-grounding knowing subject who is also an autonomous lawgiver and 
sufficient moral agent”,
123
 others think that this emphasis on reflexivity has severely 
distorted our understanding of human existence, deepening our egocentricity and nurturing 
the illusions of the self.  
In Oneself As Another, whereas Ricoeur views Descartes, Kant and Husserl among 
others as espousing the philosophies of the exalted subject,
124
 he presents Nietzsche as 
Descartes’ “privileged adversary” whose critique of the self shatters and humiliates the 
philosophies of the “exalted cogito”. In Ricoeur’s view, the aftermath of Nietzsche’s 
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assault on the “exalted cogito” left it in a critical condition. For Ricoeur, the philosophies 
of the “exalted cogito” seem to overlook the distortions that may be inherent in self-
interpretation. While being a reminder of the possibility of self-deception, Nietzsche’s 
“shattered cogito” only leads to the all-consuming abyss of suspicion. With this impasse, 
Ricoeur introduces attestation as a new form of the certainty of the self. The attestation of 




In the Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes constructs a hypothesis of an all-
encompassing metaphysical doubt to indicate the disproportions within a particular area of 
certainty.
126
 To dramatize the doubt he creates the hypothesis of the great deceiver or an 
evil genius as the one behind every conceivable thought in me. He then concludes that 
there must be a “cogito” for the evil genius to deceive. Hence, “if the cogito can arise out 
of this extreme condition of doubt, it is because someone is doing the doubting”.
127
 This 
led to the philosophy of the Cartesian certainty – “cogito ergo sum” (the philosophies of 
the exalted cogito). It is this kind of philosophy that Kant and Husserl among others would 
later develop.  
For instance, Husserl asserted that consciousness is determined by intentionality. 
To be conscious is to be conscious that I am a ‘true’ being – definitively decided or 
definitively decidable being. So, if I abstain from believing or accepting already 
established philosophical foundations and my experience of the world around me, “I do so 
now as the ego that philosophizes and exercises the aforesaid abstention”.
128
 In a Kantian 
sense, Husserl also reckons that “all reality is pure phenomena”
129
 – the only data from 





 intentional consciousness effects an eidetic 
intuition which makes objects present to the subject. Thus, epoché is “the radical and 
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universal method by which I apprehend myself purely: as ego and with my own conscious 
life, in and by which the entire objective world exists for me and is precisely as it is for 
me”.
132
   
Consequently, Husserl asserted that this state of being reveals a transcendental ego 
whose intentional act is the source of objective knowledge of the world. In this way, 
“anything belonging to the world, any spatiotemporal being, exists for me – that is to say, 
is accepted by me – in that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, 
judge about it, value it, desire it or the like”.
133
 Thus, the other is for me absolutely nothing 
other than the way I conceive it to be in my conscious cogito. This emphasis on the cogito 
led to Michael Barnes’ assertion that the Husserlian egology implies that “the world is 
ordered round me as the centre. Temporally and spatially, I am at the centre with 
everything and everyone, near and far, dependent on me insofar as they appear to me”.
134
 
Here, the cogito is posited as the exclusive claimant of truth, a type of religious 
exclusivism. It is the self who gives meaning to the other without reference to the other’s 
self-understanding. 
Opposed to this Husserlian egology is the Levinasian emphasis on the infinity and 
ethical transcendence of the other. For Levinas “infinity remains ever exterior to thought 
and overflows the thoughts that think it”.
135
 The self’s relation with the other is a 
“relations without relation”. This is because, the other who is, first of all, not reducible to 
the same, remains unknowable, is outside the totality of the same and calls egology to 
question. Secondly, when the “I” encounters the other, the “I” is called back to the 
meaning of its freedom – a freedom which is founded by the other. Here, the genuine 
freedom of the “I” is based on its responsibility and obligation towards the other.
136
 In 
other words, the ethical responsibility of the “I” is to guard the infinite other against any 
systematic determination of moral principles. These sets of a priori principles are 
considered as violations to the alterity of the other.  
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While Levinas’ conception of the infinite other more or less dethrones the 
Husserlian cogito, Ricoeur presents a Nietzschean position
137
 in Oneself As Another which 
shatters the exalted cogito’s hyper-certainty as mere illusion. Nietzsche’s attack against the 
above foundational claim to philosophy is based on his critique of language in which 
philosophy expresses itself. For Nietzsche, language is figurative and is thus reputed to be 
deceitful. It is a paradox in a double sense: “first in that from the opening lines, life, 
apparently taken in a referential and nonfigural sense, is taken as the source of the fable by 
which it sustains itself”.
138
 Secondly, language is paradoxical in that “Nietzsche’s own 
discourse on truth as a lie ought to be drawn into the abyss of the paradox of the liar. But 
Nietzsche is precisely the thinker who assumes this paradox to the end”.
139
 Thus for 
Nietzsche, this turn is “missed by the commentators who take the apology of life, of the 
will to power, to be the revelation of a new immediacy, substituted in the very place and 
with the same foundational claims of the cogito”.
140
  
In consequence, Nietzsche asserted that the Cartesian certainty is an illusion 
because in Descartes’ effort to establish an Archimedean point from which he can freely 
inspect the world, certain forces, certain will to power, already condition the way Descartes 
regards the data.
141
 The cogito therefore “flatters itself that it can gain a transparent view of 
itself, that it can set itself on display for reflection but this self-consciousness is actually 
self-deception”.
142
 For Nietzsche, the human being is an animal who has cultivated the 
illusions of culture and civilization but the bestial nature remains and this is what 
underlines the cogito.
143
 Thus, truth is not the correspondence between signs and reality as 
the cogito implies. “Reality is just a matter of conventions that we fit to our 
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 and so truth is the obligation to lie according to these conventions. There 
is no factual reality beyond these conventions. All we have are interpretations.
145
  
From the above discourses, one finds a dialectic tension between Descartes’ 
“exalted cogito” and Nietzsche’s “shattered cogito”.
146
 Even though Ricoeur agrees with 
Nietzsche’s criticism of the Cartesian tradition (in the sense of a hermeneutic of suspicion), 
he does not give in to the Nietzschean total dissolution of the cogito. According to Ricoeur, 
one may not be able to attain an absolute certainty about the cogito but one can reach some 
degree of certainty about it through attestation.
147
 He defines attestation as a kind of belief 
“but not a doxic belief in the sense in which doxa (belief) has less standing than 
episteme”.
148
 Whereas “a doxic belief is implied in the grammar of ‘I believe that’ 
attestation belongs to the grammar of ‘I believe in.’”
149
 It connotes the sense of credence, a 
belief-in and trust. It is linked with testimony “inasmuch as it is in the speech of the one 
giving testimony that one believes”.
150
 In other words, “when I attest to something, I not 
only believe that but I believe in something. It is more a statement of confidence and 
conviction than knowledge and certainty”.
151
 
Attestation is “placed at an equal distance” between the “exalted cogito” and the 
“shattered cogito”. This however does not suggest that it is placed in an exact midpoint 
between the two. Rather, it implies that attestation occupies an epistemic and ontological 
position beyond the alternatives provided by the exalted cogito and its demolition.
152
 To 
express it symbolically, Greisch asserts that Ricoeur’s idea of attestation implies that the 
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cogito of attestation is neither a triumphant cogito as with the Cartesians or a crushed 
cogito as per Nietzsche but a wounded cogito that is capable of believing in itself.
153
  
This concept of attestation serves as the basis for Ricoeur’s development of the 
hermeneutics of the self. For Ricoeur, “attestation is fundamentally the attestation of the 
self”.
154
 It is a “trust in the power to say, in the power to do, in the power to recognize 
oneself as a character in a narrative, in the power, finally, to respond to accusation in the 
form of the accusative”.
155
 Attestation is “assurance of being oneself acting and 
suffering”.
156
 This assurance remains the ultimate recourse against all suspicion. It 
provides the epistemological response to the question “what knowledge does the self have 
about itself?” In response, the self is seen as the being that is certain that it is both an agent 
and a patient. Ontologically, if it is asked: “who is the self?” For Ricoeur, the self is “the 
assurance – the credence and the trust – of existing in the mode of selfhood”.
157
  
According to Ricoeur, this assurance or confidence is the ultimate recourse against 
all suspicion; even if it is always in some sense received from another, it is always self-
attestation. “It is a self-attestation that every – linguistic, praxis, narrative and prescriptive 
– will preserve the question ‘who?’ from being replaced by the question ‘what?’ or 
‘why?’”
158
 Attestation is credence without any guarantee but also a trust greater than any 
suspicion. The certainty of attestation is not a scientific one but a trust, a confidence, an 
assurance that cannot be demolished completely by suspicion. 
Within the context of Christian-Muslim dialogue, Christology is one of the most 
contentious theological subjects which sometimes divide the two religions irreconcilably. 
This is because whereas Christians believe that Jesus Christ is the “Son of God” (human 
and divine), Muslims believe that this very Jesus is only a “prophet of Allah”. The Islamic 
doctrine of the Tawhid (the oneness of God) serves as the basis from which God is 
understood as absolutely transcendent. Since there is only one God (Surah 5:73) in Islam, 
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Jesus only functions as a messenger or prophet of God within the context of the Tawhid. 
This underscores the Islamic truths about Christology. In contrast, the Christian doctrine of 
the Holy Trinity also serves as the formidable grounds on which Jesus Christ is understood 
as the “Son of God” (the second person of the Holy Trinity).   
Consequently, when one focuses on the right claimant of Christological truths 
between Christianity and Islam, one only ends up in a hotbed for theological 
confrontations. As Pratt puts it, “not only have internal theological debates and discussions 
been hotbeds of high emotions and deep dissent but such engagement between the 
religions...have been equally, if not more so, contentious and fraught”.
159
 As religions of 
belief, the theologies of Islam and Christianity constitute self-enclosed systems of meaning 
and doctrine which can only be measured by their internal logic and coherence.
160
 Here, 
the truth claims of one religion cannot be used as the standard of measurement for the 
truthfulness of another. The attempts to engage in such forms of dialogue would only lead 
to parallel monologues.  
Thus, what is required today is the kind of Christian-Muslim dialogue on 
Christology which allows the other to tell their stories about the life and mission of Jesus 
Christ in a mutual atmosphere of give and take – a conversation which is neither defined 
by Cartesian style of the “exalted cogito” nor shaped by the Nietzschean sense of it. As we 
indicated earlier on, whereas the Christian and Muslim understandings of Jesus Christ 
coherently fit into their respective systems of belief and narratives, none of the systems can 
be used as the yardstick for judging the truthfulness of the other.
161
 Hence, the attempt to 
engage the two religions in dialogue based on exclusive truth claims can only lead to a 
context of claim and counterclaim and at the end, the mutual dismissal of the other’s 
viewpoint.  
In this way, what is needed in Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology is 
dialogue as attestation whereby Christians and Muslims attest to their respective truth 
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claims on Christology within the overall process of dialogue as an exercise in learning 
from and about the other. Here, the question is not who is right about Christology but what 
can be learnt from the story the other tells about Jesus Christ? In other words, this form of 
attestation is one of mutual sharing of testimonies of one’s beliefs on Christology, while 
maintaining some degree of openness to learn from the testimonies of the other. The 
purpose is the interest to learn from and about the other and to grow as a consequence of 
this learning. As Catherine Cornille puts it, “such a process of religious learning and 
growth is at the heart of the discipline of comparative theology, which may be regarded as 
the systematic expression or mode of interreligious dialogue”.
162
 As an exercise in learning 
from and about the other, we assert that a dialogue guided by this notion of attestation is 
far more likely to succeed than the often debative and confrontational forms of dialogue. A 
dialogue between two competing “exalted cogitos” only lead to dialogical aporias but a 
dialogue base on attestation has the potential for mutual learning and enrichment.  
While we argue for the case of attestation as the appropriate method of dialogue as 
an exercise in learning, there are questions that confront the comparativist when engaging 
in dialogue as an exercise in learning. In other words, if learning about the other leads to 
learning about oneself, then the question is: “how can the other’s self-enclosed systems of 
belief become the context for reflection about one’s beliefs? As Barnes puts it, “how 
precisely is faith deepened – and what is learnt?”
163
 Furthermore, what becomes of the 
identity of the other after this learning? Does it remain the same or it is a matter of 
becoming and growing – and thus of change and transformation? If the latter obtains, how 
does it occur without the self losing itself?  
We shall respond to these questions with the aid of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the 
self expressed in idem, ipse and narrative identities. By engaging these three aspects of 
personal identity, we shall argue that they disclose the possibilities of the intertwinement 
of personal narratives in contexts where they are considered exclusive of each other. By 
engaging in this form of dialogue as an exercise in learning, one might be surprised, to 
borrow Leirvik’s words, at how “dialogical overtones in Bakhtin’s sense may strike a note 
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anywhere in the scale between parody, polemics and affirmations”.
164
 We shall first of all, 
argue that such a disclosure is in itself an exercise in learning about a subject which has 
remained contentious in Christian-Muslim relations (Christology).  
Secondly, while being committed to their traditions and open to learn from the 
traditions of the other, when the content of these disclosures lead to the common cognition 
of common values which require collective actions in response to them, then dialogue as 
an exercise in learning is all the more successful on the basis of its goal. Here, the other’s 
tradition-specific understanding of Christology does not change per se. What may change 
as a consequence of the dialogue is their mutual interrelationship – which is transformed 
from disparate actions to collective action. As a starting point, let us first of all, see how 
Ricoeur’s views on idem, ipse and narrative identities prepare the grounds for the 
possibility of Christian-Muslim conversations on Christology.  
2.4.2. The Two Poles of Personal Identity 
In Oneself As Another, Ricoeur identifies two modes of personal identity: idem-identity 
and ipse-identity. While idem-identity is characterized by sameness or the permanent 
features of things, ipse-identity concerns the self-constancy needed for keeping one’s 
word. For Ricoeur, these two modes of identity define two modes of permanence in 
time.
165
 Ricoeur presents character as conveying the equivocalness or double valence of 
the mode of identity as sameness and selfhood. Hence, the self is the embodiment of idem-
identity and ipse-identity; and narrative identity holds together the dialectics of idem-
identity and ipse-identity in the person. Let us begin this hermeneutic journey by 
examining Ricoeur’s notion of idem, ipse and narrative identities. 
2.4.2.1. The Mode of the Self as Idem-identity 
In real life experience we normally distinguish one person from another by their 
appearances. Their body and character which differentiate them from one another, gives 
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them a specific identity. Ricoeur identifies this form of identity as sameness or idem-
identity. Identity here is viewed as either a state of being the same or a state of being 
oneself or one thing and not another. According to Ricoeur, idem-identity is a constituent 
of personal identity, which is stable and sedimented in the person. Ricoeur presents four 
criteria by which sameness can be understood: numerical identity, qualitative identity 
uninterrupted continuity and permanence in time.
166
  
Numerical identity connotes the sense of oneness or unity as opposed to plurality. 
In other words, “we say of two occurrence of a thing, designated by an invariable noun in 
ordinary language, that they do not form two different things but ‘one and the same’ 
thing”.
167
 For Ricoeur, “this first component of the notion of identity corresponds to the 
notion of identification, understood as the reidentification of the same which makes 
cognition recognition: the same thing twice, n times”.
168
  
Qualitative identity relates to similarity over difference. According to Ricoeur, 
qualitative identity relates to the category of extreme resemblance where for instance, “we 
say that x and y are wearing the same suits – clothes that are so similar that they are 
interchangeable with no noticeable difference”.
169
 These two components of identity apply 
when we speak of the physical identity of a person. “We have no trouble recognizing 
someone who simply enters and leaves, appears, disappears and reappears”.
170
 Hence, 
qualitative identity helps us to resolve problems where numerical identity fails. For 
instance, in a case where one is unsure about whether or not two appearances correspond to 
“one and the same thing” as indicated earlier, one can resort to the criterion of qualitative 
identity to ascertain their resemblance.
171
 
But how do we know that the person standing here in court is the author of a crime 
committed ten years ago? This question exposes the weakness in qualitative identity 
because changes may have occurred in the appearance of the person after ten years. 
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According to Ricoeur, “the weakness of this criterion of similitude, in the case of a great 
distance in time, suggests that we appeal to another criterion, one which belongs to the 
third component of the notion of identity, namely uninterrupted continuity”.
172
 It helps us 
to identify persons or things in spite of change over time.
173
 This explains why we can say 
of an oak tree that it is the same from the acorn to the fully developed tree. This form of 
continuity “rest upon the ordered series of small changes, which, taken one by one, 
threaten resemblance without destroying it”.
174
  
Consequently, Ricoeur sees time within the context of uninterrupted continuity as 
“a factor of dissemblance, of diversity and of difference. The threat time “represents for 
identity is not entirely dissipated unless we can posit at the basis of similitude and 
uninterrupted continuity, a principle of permanence in time”.
175
 The principle of 
permanence in time could be seen in the example of a “tool” which maintains its structure 
despite the replacement of all its parts; or in the permanence of the genetic code of a 
biological individual. What remains permanent in these two subjects is their structure; and 
“structure” reflects the sense of permanence in time.
176
  
Permanence in time is the most complete criterion of identity as sameness. While 
numerical and qualitative identity do not properly appropriate the problem of time, identity 
as uninterrupted continuity takes into consideration the time problematic but leaves 
identity as sameness with the difficulty of following the trajectory of a thing through time. 
However, the criterion of permanence in time resolves the time problematic in that it 
focuses on the structure of a thing, which remains the same through time.  
Having considered the four criteria that determine idem-identity as sameness, 
Ricoeur then sought to find out whether there is a form of permanence in time which is not 
simply the schema of the category of substance. In other words, “is there a form of 
permanence in time which can be connected to the question ‘who?’ inasmuch as it is 
irreducible to the question ‘what?’ Is there a form of permanence in time that is a response 
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to the question ‘whom am I?’”
177
 His focus here is on persons (who?) and not things 
(what?). 
For Ricoeur, when we speak of ourselves, we in fact have two models of 
permanence in time available to us. These are: character and keeping one’s word. The 
polarity between these two models of permanence in time with respect to persons results 
from the fact that “the permanence of character expresses the mutual overlapping of the 
problematic of idem and ipse, while faithfulness in keeping one’s word marks the extreme 
gap between the permanence of the self and that of the same.
178
 As we shall later discover, 
Ricoeur will present narrative identity as the mediation between the poles of character 
where idem and ipse tend to coincide and that of self-maintenance where selfhood frees 
itself from sameness.  
Ricoeur also presents character as expressing another kind of sameness which 
constitutes an aspect of personal identity. He defines character as “the set of distinctive 
marks which permit the reidentification of a human individual as being the same”
179
 or 
“the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognised”.
180
 As a set of permanent 
dispositions, whereas character gives to personal identity the stability which is proper to 
identity as sameness, it also expresses a dimension of ipseity through the permanent 
dispositions in the person who answers the question “whom am I?” It demonstrates an 
overlap between idem-identity and ipse-identity.  
If we understand character as the set of permanent dispositions in a person, then 
character reflects the sense of numerical identity in that it can be identified and re-
identified as “one and the same thing” in a person. It also expresses qualitative identity 
because it defines the features in the individual which allows for easy comparison of one 
character with another. For example, one could say to his long time friend: “you really 
haven’t changed after all these years”. Uninterrupted continuity also helps us to see the 
same person we knew some years ago despite some changes in them (physical or 
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psychological). The permanence in time of character is situated within “the set of 
distinctive marks” that remain constant in the person.  
Ricoeur identifies habits and acquired identifications as the two main constituents 
of character.
181
 According to him, what we do and learn by doing affect our habits and 
habits define to some extent, who we are and guide our orientations. They are formed 
without the conscious attention to the question; “who to be?” Habits are the sedimentations 
of practices in a person. These sedimented practices somewhat form a “second nature” in 
the person. Habits have a twofold valence: habits that are formed and habits that are 
acquired.
182
 These two forms of habits give character a history – “a history in which 




Character also relates to “the acquired identifications by which the other enters into 
the composition of the same”.
184
 These acquired identifications denote the values, norms, 
ideals, models and heroes in which a person or community assumes as proper and 
recognize itself by.
185
 These identifications clearly display how one takes on otherness and 
makes it one’s own. In other words, through acquired identifications, what was initially 
alien to a person or the community now becomes part of it. In this way the person or 
community begins to understand these identifications as necessary for their survival. This 
sense of necessity elicits an element of loyalty that is incorporated into character and 
makes it turn towards fidelity and hence, towards maintaining the self. How does this 
aspect of identity apply in the case of the Christian and Muslim tradition-specific 
understandings of Christology? 
We indicated at the start of this chapter that Christology “discusses the evaluation 
of Jesus Christ in respect of who he was and the role he played in the divine plan”.
186
 
Within this evaluative context, while Christians believe that Jesus is God and the son of 
God, Muslims believe that he is only a prophet of Allah. These different theological 
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evaluations of Jesus along with other religious doctrines, have contributed in forming the 
horizons which shape the Christian and Muslim understandings of Christology. If Ricoeur 
pointed out that idem-identity denotes sameness (the set of lasting dispositions which one 
does not choose but by which one is recognised), then Muslims and Christians equally 
share this dimension of sameness with their views on Christology. Here, sameness 
constitutes the religious practices, rites, symbols, customs and traditions which the 
adherent does not choose but from which his/her religious identity is derived.  
As Moyaert indicated, Christian identity for instance means the “identification with 
particular Christian norms, values, doctrines, biblical texts, rituals and the like”.
187
 Here, 
Christians believe in the Holy Trinity because of their experience of God as Father, Son 
(Jesus Christ) and Holy Spirit. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is therefore constitutively 
part of the “deposit of faith” that has been handed on from the Apostles to successive 
generations of Christians. It contributes to shaping the identity of the “good” Christian. 
Within this doctrine, Jesus Christ can only be understood as the son of God and saviour of 
the world. Hence, the belief in Jesus Christ as the Son of God, the Bible, the norms and 
practice of Christian ritual, all give expression to the identity of the Christian. They 
represent the idem aspects of Christian identity. 
In Islam too, belief in the Qur’an, the profession of the Shahada and observing the 
five pillars of the religion among other religious practices shape the identity of the Muslim. 
For instance, the obligation to acknowledge the Tawhid forms the root of Islamic 
monotheism. The confession that “there is no god but One God” (Surah 5:73) is a 
fundamental statement of Islamic belief and all Muslims are identified by that confession. 
Hence, the Shahada, the doctrines, the ritual prayers and other practices all constitute the 
idem-dimension of the believer’s life in Islam. They are the same for all Muslims within 
their tradition-specific contexts. As Moyaert observes, “idem is not added to the faith 
commitment but is constitutive of it”.
188
  
In this way, “by reading certain texts, adhering to certain rules, agreeing with 
specific doctrines and by performing certain religious practices which rather remain stable, 
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the believer (Christian or Muslim) submits his/her life to God”.
189
 Though sedimented in 
the believer, this idem dimension of religious identity is delicate in the sense that it is the 
immediate aspect of every religion which could be in danger of being lost in the face of 
religious plurality and interreligious dialogue. As a consequence, Ricoeur notes in a 
different context that some religions tend towards a “protective withdrawal” from the 
religious other because of the fear of losing this aspect of their identity.
190
  
Within the context of dialogue as an exercise in learning, we agree with Moyaert 
that “there is thus no single reason to formulate a negative judgement about the idem 
dimension of religious identity”.
191
 Whereas for Moyaert, the reason is that “the idem 
aspect is not added to faith commitment but is constituted of it”, for us, another compelling 
reason also lies in the fact that religious truths are self-enclosed systems of meaning (Holy 
Trinity vis-a-vis Tawhid) which can only be measured by their internal coherence. Hence, 
no particular system (whether Islam or Christianity) can be used as a standard of 
measurement for the truthfulness of the other. The idem-identity of the Christian or 
Muslim believer very often forms their second nature – the sedimented part of their 
identity which each protects at all cost. It is for this reason that comparative theology 
always emphasizes that when engaging these aspects of the religion in dialogue, one must 
treat with care, caution and respect for the elements thereof undergoing comparison. If the 
idem aspect of personal identity constitutes the sameness aspects of the religion, then what 
is the ipse aspect of the religions? 
2.4.2.2. The Mode of the Self as ipse-Identity 
When asked: “who are you?” people may respond to this question by appealing to the 
“what?” of themselves. For instance, when asked “who are you as a Muslim?” the response 
is likely to be that: “I believe in the one God and in Muhammad as his Messenger”. Of 
course this response reflects the Muslim confession of the Shahada which is at the heart of 
Islamic faith. However, while every Muslim confesses the Shahada, not all Muslims live 
out the Shahada in the same way. In other words, there are varying degrees in their 
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submission to the will of Allah. The same applies to Christians in their confession of faith 
in God as Holy Trinity. One always finds variations in the living out of what is confessed 
as faith in Christianity. Thus, we could say that it is not just the mere confession of faith in 
God that matters but also the living out of what we confess – this makes us truly Christian 
or Muslim.  
In this way, even though we often answer to the “who?” of ourselves by appealing 
to the “what”, the “what?” dimension of ourselves (idem) does not fully express who we 
are as Muslims or Christians. There is more to the Christian or Muslim life than just the 
mere adherence to religious practices, customs and norms. This suggests that there is 
another aspect of identity which reflects, for instance, the Muslim’s degree of commitment 
to the confession of the Shahada. Commitment is directly linked to the Muslim’s promise 
to keep and live the Shahada in every circumstance. Here, when I promise to observe the 
Shahada, I affirm that in times of changes, disappointments and motivations that lead me 
to contrary alternatives in respect of my belief in the one God and in Muhammad as his 
messenger, I will still hold firm to this belief.  
This dimension of the self-maintenance of the believer is at the heart of Ricoeur’s 
notion of ipseity or ipse-identity.  Ipse-identity is another mode of personal identity which 
conforms to the criteria of permanence in time. It is defined by the self-constancy 
necessary for keeping one’s promise or faithfulness to one’s word.
192
  According to 
Ricoeur, a person’s commitment to what he/she promises, even in the face of danger, 
disappointments, uncertainties and new opportunities, demonstrates that the person is 
reliable and can be counted on.
193
 In Marianne Moyaert’s view, Ricoeur believes that this 
reliability and self-constancy is the condition for lasting relationships because “people are 
not characters; they are relational beings. A human being becomes a person only when 
others can count on him or her”.
194
  
While with character the identity of the self is supported by habits and acquired 
identifications; in keeping one’s promise, the self is affirmed without the need for the 
                                                          
192 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself As Another. 1992, p, p119 
193
 Ibid, p124 
194
 Marianne Moyaert. “Absorption or Hospitality.” 2010, p78. 
54 
 
permanence entailed in character. Keeping one’s promise “does not appear as a challenge 
to time, a denial of change: even if my desires were to change, even if I were to change my 
opinion or my inclination, ‘I will hold firm.’”
195
 Here, it is not necessary for promise to be 
placed in the context of being-towards-death but its ethical justification suffices for itself: 
“a justification which can be derived from the obligation to... respond to the trust that the 
other places in my faithfulness”.
196
  
Thus, while sameness refers to the sedimentations of the self i.e. of habits and 
attitudes that are part of us, promise-keeping sometimes breaks with the past and affirms 
an identity that is grounded on the innovations of the present. For instance, my promise to 
start praying regularly and going to Church every Sunday after fifty years of not doing so, 
demonstrates a break with my way of life in the past and a commitment to a new beginning 
which presents a future challenge. The challenge is that despite the disruptions in the 
history of my sameness (my cultivated habits of not praying regularly and not going to 
Church every Sunday) because of my promise to be faithful, I will hold firm to the promise 
made. Here, the break between idem and ipse identities lies in the fact that the sameness of 
one’s life now gives way to a new way of life defined by the promise to be faithful to God 
through regular prayers and attending Sunday services. How then is ipse identity related to 
the question of religious identity? 
Even though we mentioned that to be Christian or Muslim, is to adhere to the 
doctrines, rites, customs and practices of Christianity or Islam, these idem aspects of the 
religions do not define the totality of the identity of the Christian or Muslim. Mere 
conformity to the idem-dimension of the religion is not enough.  It demands a certain sense 
of commitment which goes deeper than mere conformity to rituals. As Moyaert implied, 
religious identity also implies a relationship with God – a commitment to God which is 
expressed through the practice of faith.
197
 This commitment establishes a living 
relationship between the believer and God such that one continuously chooses to be in that 
relationship amidst changes, disappointments or contrary motivations. This is what 
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Ricoeur calls, “the self-constancy necessary for keeping one’s promise”.
198
 Here, Moyaert 
explains that through this commitment, the believer binds his or her life to God, as it were 
and says, ‘whatever happens, I promise to remain faithful to you.’”
199
  
Thus, ipse-identity grows from the creative involvement of the adherent in co-
fashioning his/her identity within the community of faith on the one hand and on the other, 
his/her experience of life and encounter with others. In this way, faithfulness to God is not 
merely limited to idem-identity but it goes beyond just the traditions to seek God where 
God can be found. In other words, to be a Christian for instance, implies as Moyaert puts 
it, “encountering God in reading the Bible, in performing daily rituals and maintaining the 
tradition on the one hand and on the other hand, letting God break  open the tradition so 
that God’s transcendence does not become fastened down to it”.
200
 It is being open to 
where God calls and sends; for God’s transcendence means God speaks where God wills 
(both within and without the traditions). It is this inspiration which sometimes stimulates 
the self to want to know and learn from what God is saying in the traditions of the religious 
other. Since these two poles of identity are operative in the same person, Ricoeur asserts 
that narrative identity keeps the two poles dialectically creative in the fashioning of one’s 
identity. What then is narrative identity? 
2.4.3. Narrative Identity in the Formation of Personal Identity 
According to Ricoeur, personal identity is constituted by the two poles of identity we have 
discussed above. The self is the embodiment of these two poles and narrative identity holds 
them together in the self. Ricoeur believes that there is a relationship between narrative and 
life. According to him, human life becomes more readable when interpreted in the context 
of the stories people tell about themselves.
201
 Hence, life can be understood narratively. In 
Time and Narrative, Ricoeur demonstrates how narrative identity evolves through his 
theory of the “threefold mimesis”.
202
 Though he takes up the same project in Oneself As 
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Another, we shall follow closely how this theory serves to elucidate his concept of 
narrative identity as a mediating principle. The clarity that Oneself As Another brings to 
this context also remains significant to the discourse since Ricoeur reckons that his work in 




According to Ricoeur, the life of a person or community is understood through the 
narratives they tell about themselves. Narratives are essentially temporal because they can 
only be mediated through temporal experience.
204
 In his analysis of Aristotle’s Poetics that 
extends beyond tragedy, Ricoeur focused attention on emplotment and mimetic activity to 
demonstrate the relationship between Time and Narrative and how human actions are 
prefigured, configured and refigured narrative.
205
 For Ricoeur, “imitating or representing is 
a mimetic activity inasmuch as it produces something, namely, the organization of events 
by emplotment”.
206
 The plot is the model of concordance which is characterized by 
completeness, wholeness and an appropriate magnitude.
207
  
Concordance also includes discordance in the sense of the phenomenon of a tragic 
action which Aristotle calls reversal. In tragedy, reversal turns good fortunes into bad ones 
yet this direction can also be reversed. Hence, the art of composition consists in turning 
discordance into concordance.
208
 Ricoeur demonstrates this through the theory of the 
threefold mimesis – mimesis1 refers to prefigurations, mimesis2 refers to configuration and 
mimesis3 relates to refrigeration or the reader’s reception of the narrative composition. 
Without the intention to go into the details of these mimetic activities, what is significant 
to note in mimesis1 is that many events and incidences occur in our lives (prefiguration of 
narratives). So, to compose a plot of our lives, it is first necessary to take into consideration 
its semantic, symbolic and temporal structure.  
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In mimesis2, Ricoeur shows that the events and incidents which occur in our lives 
only make meaning when they are composed into narratives (narrative configuration). In 
other words, mimesis2 constitutes the configuration of actions accomplished through 
“emplotment”.
209
 Understood as “a well constructed history”, emplotment connotes the 
synthesis of heterogeneous elements like the agent, the action, accidental or anticipated 
configurations, interactions, means and outcomes that are found in a story. Thus, 
configuration as emplotment refers to the art of composition which mediates between 
concordance and discordance through the “synthesis of the heterogeneous which accounts 
for the diverse mediations performed by the plot”.
210
 Here, the world of action configured 
by emplotment has an ontological status of “being-as”,
211
 and “being-as” implies that the 
world of the narrative is the real world as it is given. But this world can only be reached 
when the text is received by the reader (mimesis3). 
Hence, mimesis3 refers to the reception of the narrative by the reader. It concerns 
the moment when the narrative is received through dialogue. According to Ricoeur, 
narratives achieve their full development only in the intersection between the world of the 
text and the world of the reader – that which Gadamer in a different context calls the fusion 
of horizons.
212
 Here, the world of the text unfolds itself through the mediation of the world 
of the reader. The reader fulfils the meaning of the text by dwelling in the text’s world.
213
 
As Ricoeur puts it, what is interpreted in the text “is the proposing of a world that I might 
inhabit and into which I might project my ownmost powers”.
214
 In other words, by reading 
the narrative, the reader is enriched by the text’s world of possibilities.  
This triggers a mutual dialogue between the world of the text and the world of the 
reader, which leads to the “fusion of horizons” of the reader and the text. The continual 
interaction between narrative and  reader (implied in the interaction within mimesis1, 
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mimesis2 and mimesis3) gives rise to what one might call the circular mimetic movement 
(the hermeneutic circle) in which the prefigured experience of mimesis1 is configured in 
mimesis2 and re-figured in mimesis3 in a circular or more accurately, in a spiral form.
215
 
In other words, the experience which comes from the world of action (already mediated by 
narrative) is configured in narration which in turn re-figures the world of experience. This 
leads to a continuous enrichment of the world of action.  
Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity presupposes this mimetic activity – a narrated 
experience that is mediated by emplotment and re-figured through the reception of 
narratives. In other words, “to state the identity of an individual or a community is to 
answer the question, ‘who did this?’ ‘Who is the agent, the author?’”
216
 For Ricoeur, the 
answer to this question resides in narratives. To answer the question “who?” means to tell 
the story of a life. The story told tells about the action of the “who” and the identity of this 
“who” is a narrative identity.
217
 As a transition from narrative to character, Ricoeur asserts 
that emplotment is not only applicable to a narrative but also to a character. For Ricoeur, 
personal identity is comparable to the “emplotment of characters”.
218
 The emplotment of 
characters consists in the different elements which are commonly present in the story of 
one’s life: a person’s interaction with others, the actions that a person performs and his/her 
physical and psychological features which together constitute the identity of the person.  
Hence, narrative identity is understood as the formation of one’s identity by the 
integration of one’s life experiences into an internalized evolving story of the self which 
provides the individual with a sense of unity and purpose. It is not a stable or a seamless 
identity but a continuous effort whereby a self reinterpreting identity is repeated in 
response to different encounters with different others. Ricoeur emphasized here that “the 
art of storytelling is the art of exchanging experience”.
219
 By narrating the stories of our 
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lives, we soon realize that we are subjects in others’ stories and others are subjects in our 
stories.
220
 We discover that our narratives are essentially interwoven with other narratives 
such that we find ourselves as characters in others’ narratives and histories – we are our 
parents’ child, our partner’s partner, our friends’ friend – and they are characters in our 
narratives.
221
 So, through our encounter with others, we facilitate the articulation and 
direction of their narratives and they ours. How does this sense of narrativity apply in the 
case of Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning? 
We indicated earlier that dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the 
other, dialogue on Christology is facilitated by the method of attestation whereby 
Christians and Muslims share their mutual testimonies of faith about the life and mission 
of Jesus Christ. The purpose is for the interlocutors to learn and understand the other’s 
narratives about Jesus and be enriched by this learning. It is a form of dialogue where 
Christians for instance, “are called not just to speak of the God who is revealed in Christ 
but to listen critically yet with generosity to what is spoken about God by the other”.
222
 
Islam and Christianity have unique narratives about the identity and mission of Jesus 
Christ. These narratives are constituted by the idem and ipse aspects of the religious 
identities of the believer. So, in sharing the story of one’s life with the other, Christians and 
Muslims are called upon to know and be committed to the traditions that define their 
respective understandings of Jesus Christ while being open to listen to each other’s 
narratives about Jesus. 
Thus, dialogue as an exercise in learning concerns Christian-Muslim mutual 
exchange of narratives as a means of learning from and about the other’s viewpoints. As 
Ricoeur indicated, by narrating the stories of our lives this way, we discover that our 
narratives are essentially interwoven with other narratives. Whereas we consider that the 
intertwinements of the Christian and Muslim narratives about Jesus Christ is not a 
compelling outcome to this form of dialogue as an exercise in learning, its occurrence will 
nonetheless be celebrated as part of the success of the dialogue. For instance, if the 
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dialogue leads to the disclosure of the similarities or differences between Christology in 
Islam and in Christianity as we shall see in chapter five, then dialogue is considered 
successful on the basis of its goal. Furthermore, if this exercise in learning also leads to the 
discovery of common values as we shall see in chapter six, then it is all the more worth-
pursuing. 
As its primary goal, dialogue as an exercise in learning focuses on knowing oneself 
profoundly, knowing the other authentically and living together more creatively. If 
learning from the other’s tradition is supposed to lead to an enrichment of the self, what 
becomes of the identity of the self after such learning? In other words, what becomes of the 
identity of the comparative theologian who crosses over to different religious traditions to 
learn from them and be enriched by this learning? Does not the self or the other expose 
themselves to the danger of losing their identity through this form of learning? How does 
Ricoeur resolve this identity fragmentation in order to give the self a stable and definitive 
identity in its encounter with the other?  
2.4.4. Attestation in the Context of the Fragility of the Self 
From the discourse above, Ricoeur indicated that narrative identity is not a stable or 
seamless identity but a continuous effort whereby a self reinterpreting identity is repeated 
in response to different encounters with different others. This means that I can tell many 
stories about myself and read many interpretations into these stories. I can even read the 
narratives of my life from different perspectives and evaluate the stories others tell about 
me in different ways. So, in these different narratives I make for myself Ricoeur would ask 
“who am I?”
223
 These imaginative variations of the narratives of my life make me feel that 
I have no definitive or stable identity. I am just a bundle of influences that cannot be 
categorized under a single unit as my identity. If the self or the other has to live with these 
imaginative variations of itself, then it could be assimilated or absorbed as a consequence 
of its encounter with the other. How does Ricoeur resolve this problem of the fragmented 
self? 
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For Ricoeur, the capacity of the self to promise and to believe that it is the self that 
is acting and suffering through attestation, resolves its fragility to some extent. Through 
attestation the self can choose one narrative over another through its confidence that the 
chosen narrative better expresses who the self is. The capacity for the self to make such 
choices is informed by its embodiment as both idem and ipse. Since idem defines the 
sedimented part of the self, the self is capable of knowing that which conforms to its idem-
identity and that which is alien to it. Since ipse-identity defines the self-maintenance 
achieved through promise-keeping, then through attestation, the self is capable of attesting 
to its defined identity against the variant possibilities of its identity construction.  
Thus, narrative identity is made complete through attestation. It is an attested to 
identity – an identity constructed on the credence of the self in a particular narrative 
configuration as expressive of who the self is. So, in my encounter with the other which 
exposes me to many possibilities of identity construction; attestation as belief in, a 
commitment to and credence in, helps me to make informed choices as to which narrative 
variations conform to my true self identity. 
 Thus, the attested to self gives the self a foundation from which it encounters the 
other who equally has an attested to self, a foundation or a tradition. So by narrating or 
sharing the story of one’s life through dialogue, one witnesses to one’s identity as it 
pertains to this dialectic interplay of idem and ipse identities. As we mentioned earlier, the 
significance of this sharing of mutual testimonies of faith between the self and the other 
lies in how this could lead to the discovery of the intersubjective or interconnected 
character of their narratives or the sharpening of their awareness of how different their 
respective narratives are to each other. In whichever way this takes, dialogue as an exercise 
in learning from and about the other can be considered successful.  
In conclusion, it must be emphasized here that Ricoeur never applied Idem, ipse 
and narrative identities to the specific contexts of Christian-Muslim dialogue on 
Christology as we have done. He was aware of the problems of interreligious violence and 
conflicts among the religion. But he never applied his hermeneutics on personal identity to 
this particular area of interreligious dialogue. Consequently, by applying these aspects of 
personal identity to issues of interreligious dialogue, the interest is to see how they offer 
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the framework for reflecting on the challenges presented by dialogue as an exercise in 
learning. Narrating the stories of one’s life through dialogue as an exercise in learning 
helps another to understand and learn from this story. Hence, the overarching question is: 
what can Christians and Muslims learn from each other from their respective tradition-
specific understandings of Christology? 
Before attending to the question above, it could also be asked: how can one 
understand religious texts, doctrines and practices of another religion in the light of the 
differences that exist between them? For George Lindbeck and the postliberal school, the 
intratextual nature of religious texts and doctrines do not permit the possibility of crossing 
over to another’s tradition to understand texts without distorting them. If intratextuality 
implies that religious texts are context-driven, does this means that meaningfulness is 
absolutely determined intratextually and that one cannot cross over to another tradition to 
learn texts and doctrines in their original religious context?  
2.5. Comparative Theology and the Problem of Intratextuality 
As an exercise in learning, comparative theology entails, as Clooney puts it, “a manner of 
learning that takes seriously diversity and tradition, openness and truth, allowing neither to 
decide the meaning of our religious situation without recourse to the other”.
224
 It involves 
the crossing over to another religious tradition to critically understand its rituals, belief-
systems, texts, norms and practices by critically correlating them with one’s own tradition. 
However, how does comparative theology pursue this project in the light of the assertion 
that religious texts are intratextually determined? By text, we mean the written or spoken 
discourses which define the identities of the religions. 
For instance, Islam and Christianity possess different classic texts which inform 
and define their respective theological understandings of Jesus Christ. As the Word of 
God/Allah, the Bible and Qur’an enjoy the authority to guide Christians and Muslims 
respectively in terms of what God demands of them and how they are to order their lives in 
response to this demand. Even though for both Christians and Muslims, the Bible and 
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Qur’an are the Word(s) of God, each text contains different revelatory experiences, written 
by different authors, in different linguistic systems and in completely different cultural 
metric – giving rise to differences in narrative histories and ways of theologizing about 
God. Into this context of difference is Jesus Christ situated; common to both traditions as a 
historical person, yet different in the way he is construed. 
On the one hand, the differences in texts, history and tradition of both religion 
signal the fact that the two traditions possess strong elements of intratextuality. Hence, it 
will be an act of immerse naiveté to simply assume that both sacred texts mean one and the 
same thing when studying about Jesus Christ. Yet, on the other hand, the common 
cognition that Jesus is not only a historical person but one who also uniquely played 
distinctive roles in both religions as proclaiming a unique message of/from God also draws 
in some elements of similarities. Thus, should similarities be compromised for reasons of 
difference? If dialogue entails commitment to the home tradition and openness to the 
tradition of the other, then what is the consequence of the postliberal theological stand on 
intratextuality for interreligious dialogue? We shall argue that comparative theology is 
built on the hermeneutic confidence that learning across traditions is possible, but not 
without challenges. It defends the irreducibility of the identity of the other, but argues for 
the possibility of understanding the other through dialogue. 
Hence, by engaging George Lindbeck (intratextuality) and Paul Ricoeur 
(translation) in conversation, we hope to demonstrate how comparative theology responds 
to the challenge of intratextuality. Whereas we shall acknowledge Lindbeck’s view that 
religious texts are intratextual to some extent, we shall also argue that one can reach a 
certain understanding of texts through translation.
225
 For Ricoeur, the power of translation 
makes communicability possible. In other words, translation always presupposes 
interpretation and texts can be interpreted and understood to some extent. We shall argue 
that while Lindbeck’s stand serves to remind every theologian about the need to be 
sensitive to the unique meanings and functions texts play within particular religion, 
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Ricoeur views on translation re-engages religious texts in dialogue, aware that there can 
never be perfect translations.  
Intratextuality defines that aspect of hermeneutics which asserts that religious text 
and meanings are untranslatable.
226
 Untranslatability refers to the understanding that 
religious meaning is located within a semiotic system. As Moyaert puts it, “religious 
words, practices and experiences derive their meaning from the religious language game 
from which they function. They can only be understood within their own religious 
context”.
227
 Thus, George Lindbeck’s cultural linguistic theory of religion emphasizes that 
religions are all-encompassing schemas on the basis of which all reality is given 
significance: i.e. a religion is “a comprehensive interpretive scheme embodied in myths or 
narratives and heavily ritualized”.
228
 So, only those who belong to this scheme and share 
its worldview can experience reality within it.
229
 For Lindbeck, the vocabulary of a religion 
includes symbols, concepts, rites, commandments and stories which only find their rightful 
meaning within the religion itself as a system.
230
 
The Bible, for instance, functions as an authoritative narrative text that creates and 
imagines its own world and invites people to live in and through this world. So people who 
live outside the world of the Bible cannot properly interpret or understand this world. Here, 
meaning is inseparably connected to context which is intratextually determined.
231
 In this 
way, Lindbeck asserted that if Christian language ultimately refers to Christ, then it is only 
Christians who can understand what it means to love God through Christ.
232
 Saving faith is 
an explicit response to the Gospel of Christ. Thus, the essential task of theology today does 
not lie in the working out of connections between the Christian text and other religious text 
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As a matter of critique, one could say that Lindbeck’s stand on intratextuality 
underscores the need to respect the boundaries that separate the religions. Religions 
possess unique texts, traditions and horizons of interpretation and understanding of reality. 
Thus, one could see Lindbeck’s position as emphasizing the need to avoid the tendency to 
homogenize the differences between the religions into neat schemas of commonality. In 
this way, one would agree with Lindbeck that hermeneutical openness consists in 
recognizing the distance between the religions and respecting that distance. However, 
Lindbeck’s radical separation of the religions from each other leaves much to be desired. It 
only succeeds in inflating the “space-between” the self and the other, disallowing the 
possibility of dialogue between them. To borrow the words of Moyaert, what is left with 
Lindbeck’s position is “a broken middle with no hope of reconciliation”.
234
  
In this way, intratextuality poses a difficult challenge to comparative theology and 
interreligious dialogue in that it creates a gulf that makes it impossible to cross over to 
another tradition to learn texts and religious doctrines. Thus, how does the hermeneutics of 
comparative theology negotiate this “space-between” to allow the possibility of dialogue? 
It is in response to this question that we turn to Ricoeur’s views on translation. The 
concept translation is commonly understood as the communication of the meaning of texts 
from one language to another. Understood interreligiously, Moyaert asserts that translation 
involves “explaining, clarifying and elucidating particular religious meanings by searching 
for correlations and possible analogies between the strange and the familiar language”.
235
 
Thus, the process of translation demands that one does not “simply remove and abstract 
words, action, practices and doctrines out of their original context but reflect precisely on 
the way they... are embedded in the broader field of religious meaning”.
236
 Since 
translation always involves the explanation of one’s own religious texts to another, it 
constantly mediates between the familiar and the strange in order to make the transfer of 
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 If the communication of meaning is the goal of translation, then one 
can say that translation applies directly to both the “insider” and the “outsider” since both 
constantly seeks meaning as an exercise in understanding texts.  
In “Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe”,
238
 Ricoeur asserts that the translation 
of one language to another “displays an irreducible pluralism which is infinitely desirable 
to protect”.
239
 Europe is neither interested in giving chance to another Esperanto which 
threatens it nor giving in to a single cultural language as the only means of communication. 
Unlike Lindbeck, Ricoeur asserts that the threat to Europe today lies in giving in to “the 
danger of incommunicability through a protective withdrawal of each culture into its own 
linguistic traditions”.
240
 Since Europe remains ineluctably polyglot, it is translation which 
makes communicability possible within its linguistic diversity. A person’s mother tongue 
does not lock him/her in an exclusive ethnic belonging but potentially opens him/her to the 
whole of humanity. Through our mother tongue, we learn other languages and become 
acquainted with other cultures.
241
 Hence, language is not a closed system but always in a 
way, open to what is outside. Language makes dialogue possible and the possibility of 
dialogue makes mutual understanding possible.  
In On Translation,
242
 Ricoeur takes up the problem of translatability and 
untranslatability and seeks to work out the dialectics of the gain and the loss in meaning in 
translation. He first poses the question: how is it possible to mediate between two separate 
languages with different semantic resonances, incompatible syntactical structures and 
different lexical systems? These differences are so pronounced that they seem to make 
translation impossible. So, how is the transfer of meaning from one particular language to 
another possible? For Ricoeur, since a translator is a go-between – always mediating 
between the familiar and the strange, the discourses on untranslatability highlight the 
inevitable problems translators face in their exercise of translation.  
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The problems lie in the fact that the strangeness of the text always presents itself as 
a “lifeless block of resistance to translation”.
243
 This makes the desire for a perfect 
translation an illusion. But the absence of a perfect translation does not also annul the 
possibility of translation.
244
 Thus, one finds a tension between translatability and 
untranslatability – a tension which “corresponds to the somewhat uncomfortable situation 
of the translator who serves two masters: the foreign and the familiar”.
245
 The translator 
takes a vow of faithfulness to the text and lives constantly with the risk of betrayal. The 
risk lies in the promise and commitment of the translator to transfer the actual meaning of 
the text. Yet the translator is also aware that this exercise of translation involves an 
inevitable loss of meaning. Consequently, in the exercise of translation, the translator must 
be conscious of the fact that there is never a perfect translation. Yet he/she is called upon to 
do justice to the text’s translation.  
For us, the constant dialectic interplay between faithfulness and betrayal in the 
exercise of translation leads to better translation. This is because while committed to the 
exercise of translation, the translator’s consciousness of the risk of betrayal provides the 
hermeneutic vigilance needed to render the appropriate transfer of meaning of the text to 
the other. Within this exchange, Ricoeur asserts that what is demanded is a sense of active 
receptivity where “the pleasure of dwelling in the other’s language is balanced by the 
pleasure of receiving the foreign word at home, in one’s own welcoming home”.
246
 Here, 
translation is seen as a way of “living with the other in order to take the other to one’s 
home as a guest”.
247
 It entails making room for the strange other in one’s space or 
receiving the other in a way that does justice to their alterity. It is against this background 
that we argue that religious texts are not completely untranslatable. 
Since translation makes the communication of the meaning of texts possible, one 
can correlate Qur’anic texts on the identity and mission of Jesus with their Christian 
counterparts on the basis of the meanings brought to them by Islamic commentators and 
                                                          
243
 Ibid, p5 
244
 Ibid, p14 
245
 Marianne Moyaert. Fragile Identities. 2011, p229 
246
 Paul Ricoeur. On Translation. 2006, p10 
247
 Paul Ricoeur. “Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe.” 1996, p5 
68 
 
Christian theologians. Whereas these scholars provide the insiders’ point of view on the 
tradition-specific meanings of the texts concerned, it is through the comparative 
theological exercise that one gets to know the differences or similarities between the texts 
concerned. As Holland puts it, this “critical and analogical reading of texts will disclose 
numerous points of intersection with other texts”.
248
 So, this process of textual correlation 
as dialogue, leads to learning from and about the other. As Moyaert puts it, here, 




2.6. Conclusion  
At the start of this hermeneutic discourse, we did acknowledge along with scholars like 
Anselm Min, Gavin D’Costa and Michael Barnes that the three traditional paradigms of 
interreligious dialogue are inadequate in meeting the needs of our current context of 
interreligious dialogue. Today, not only are we called to be attentive to the voice of the 
other in dialogue but dialogue also demands that we learn from what the other has to say 
about God. This explains why dialogue as an exercise in learning is deemed the 
appropriate method of interfaith engagement today.  
As an exercise in learning, this form of dialogue needs a theological approach 
which supports the engagement between the self and the other who seek to understand and 
learn from each other. Here, we proposed comparative theology as that theological method. 
In its work of correlations, not only does comparative theology involve the crossing over to 
another’s tradition to learn and understand texts, doctrines and practices as they pertain to 
their original tradition-specific contexts, it also affirms the significance of the commitment 
of the theologian to the home tradition. The goal here is to reach knowledge of one’s 
tradition, authentic knowledge of the other’s tradition and living together more creatively 
as a consequence of this learning.   
Since the comparative task involves a back and forth movement between one’s 
tradition and that of the other, comparative theology must have an adequate hermeneutic 
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understructure which is capable of properly addressing the challenges presented by 
dialogue as an exercise in learning. It is here that we found Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the 
self a competent guide. Here, Ricoeur demonstrated how the narrative self is in one way or 
another connected to the narratives of others such that in narrating the stories of our lives, 
we find that others contribute to our narratives and we theirs. We argued that this 
understanding of narrative identity demonstrates how Jesus Christ is at once common to 
Christianity and Islam as historical personality and yet understood differently.  
While attestation is the “password” to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self, we 
argued that it opens up a new form of Christian-Muslim dialogue where dialogue is viewed 
as the sharing of mutual testimonies. Here, the dialogical context is more a statement of 
confidence and conviction in what one believes while being open to listen to and learn 
from the faith testimonies of the other. As Kaplan puts it, Ricoeur’s dialogue “presupposes 
the ability to take the perspective of the other, learn from one another, communicate and 
convince each other and to reach understanding over generalizable interests”.
250
 Thus, we 
argued that when Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology is defined by attestation, it is 
more likely to be constructive and beneficial. 
Under what Ricoeur calls the ethical intention, he explains how self-esteem or self-
respect transforms into solicitude or esteem/respect for others at the interpersonal level and 
extends to the level of institutions. We shall attend to these hermeneutic issues as the 
ethical and moral implications of narrative identity. The interest here is to see how they 
provide the appropriate framework for reflecting on the possible challenges posed by 
engaging Christians and Muslims in dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning. 
This is what chapter three focuses on i.e. the ethical and moral implications of narrative 
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3.  THE ETHICAL AND MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF NARRATIVE 
IDENTITY FOR CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM DIALOGUE 
3.1.Introduction 
From the discourses in chapter two, we argued that despite the contentious nature of 
Christology in the light of Christian-Muslim relations, dialogue on Christology is possible. 
This is because though Islam and Christianity construe the identity and mission of Jesus 
Christ differently, Jesus still remains a common historical personality who plays distinctive 
roles in both religious traditions. For instance, not only is Jesus viewed as the “Word 
of/from Allah” in the Qur’an (Surah 3:45), but he also functions as the precursor and 
guarantor of the coming of the prophet Muhammad (Surah 62:6). For Christianity, Jesus 
does not only proclaim the Word of God, but he is the “proclaimed Word” itself. Thus, 
between Christianity and Islam one finds some similarities and differences in their 
Christological understandings. With this in mind, we argued that dialogue as an exercise in 
learning is the best approach for Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology today. For its 
theological and hermeneutic approaches, we proposed comparative theology and Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of the self respectively.  
We also indicated that even though Ricoeur does not directly address issues 
relating to Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology, he nonetheless offers the 
hermeneutic framework which supports reflection on the challenges presented by the 
encounter between the self and other. Here, Ricoeur emphasized that selfhood implies 
otherness such that selfhood and otherness cannot be separated. While this intertwinement 
between the self and the other points to the possibility of interrelationship between them, 
fundamental to this relationship are the ethical and moral underpinnings to it. In Oneself As 
Another, Ricoeur discusses these ethical and moral implications in what is considered his 
“little ethics” expressed through what he calls the “ethical intention” i.e. “aiming at the 
good life with and for others in just institutions”.
251
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Ricoeur divides his “ethical intention” into three components: “the good life”, 
“with and for others” and “just institutions”. These three components correspond to self-
esteem/self-respect, solicitude/respect for other and equality. In a context where 
Christology continues to pose difficult theological and doctrinal challenges which seem to 
impede the possibility of dialogue between Christians and Muslims, we argue that 
Ricoeur’s “little ethics” offers the framework for reflections on these challenges to 
dialogue. Not only does it bring clarity to the challenges concern, but it also offers the way 
forward in terms of the ethical and moral issues which support constructive engagements 
between the self and the other.  
Hence, his hermeneutic views do not provide direct answers, so to speak, to the 
challenges posed by Christina-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning. 
They rather offer the framework for reflecting on these challenges in the quest to find 
better ways of engaging the two traditions in positive and constructive dialogues. Thus, 
whereas chapter two focused on the epistemological validity for engaging Christians and 
Muslims in dialogue on Christology, this chapter focuses on the ethical and moral 
implications to this engagement.  
Pratt reports that from the 15
th
 to the 18
th
 century and beyond, “the attitude between 
Christianity and Islam oscillated between indifference and hostility”.
252
 Jean-Marie 
Gaudeul also affirms that both Islam and Christianity at this time “shared the same planet 
but mentally they lived in different worlds and as time went on, the mental universe of 
each society grew impervious to the thinking, the values and motivations and indeed the 
whole mental universe of the other”.
253
 Here, while Christians viewed Islam as another 
heresy which has to be eradicated by violence, if need be; Muslims perceived Christianity 
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Though today, there are more efforts at engaging the two religions in dialogue, 
sufficient attention has not been directed to the problem of “dialogical attitudes”. Since 
Christianity and Islam hold different views about the identity and mission of Jesus Christ, 
the attitude that often characterizes dialogue between them is one of “claim and 
counterclaim” and at the end, a mutual dismissal of the other’s truth claims. Thus, some 
scholars propose dialogue on the ethics of Jesus as a means of avoiding these contentions. 
As Beaumont puts it, “since belief in the status of Jesus Christ causes disputes between 




But does not the status of Jesus serve as the basis from which his teachings derive 
their authority and authenticity? Dialogue on the teachings of Jesus cannot possibly avoid 
his status; because the status of Jesus, for instance, grants him the authority to instruct 
Christians about the will of God and the human response to it. It is against this background 
that we argue that Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology must first begin from the 
status of Jesus and proceed to his teachings. This is made possible when these forms of 
dialogue are guided by “dialogical attitudes” that are appropriate to such contexts of 
dialogue. It is here that Ricoeur “little ethics” provide the appropriate framework for 
reflecting on what we consider as the appropriate dialogical attitudes to interreligious 
dialogue, namely commitment to one’s tradition, openness to and respect for the traditions 
of the other and viewing the other as an equal-partner-in-dialogue. Let us now turn to 
some aspects of Ricoeur’s “little ethics” in Oneself As Another and see how they provide 
the context for further reflections on the above dialogical attitudes.  
3.2. The Ethical and Moral Dimension of Narrative Identity 
From the perspective of the dialectics of idem and ipse identities, Ricoeur identifies the 
ethical dimension of idem-identity as symbolised by the phenomenon of character by 
which a person is identified and reidentified. Ipse-identity is however represented by the 
ethical notion of self-constancy – that manner of conducting myself so that others can 
count on me i.e. “because someone is counting on me, I am accountable for my actions 
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 Hence, between “counting on” and “being accountable for”, Ricoeur 
discerns the idea of responsibility which unites both terms such that in the question; 
“where are you?” which is posed by the other who needs me, the response, “here I am” 
becomes a statement of self-constancy.
257
  
However, to the question: how can we bridge the gap between the narrative identity 
question “who am I?” and the moral identity response “here I am!” for the benefit of their 
living dialectics? Ricoeur’s response is: the answer “here I am!” implies that I recognize 
myself as a subject of imputation. So, between “the imagination that says ‘I can try 
anything’ and the voice that says everything is possible, but not everything is beneficial, a 
muted discord is sounded. It is this discord that the act of promising transforms into a 
fragile concordance: ‘I can try anything,’ to be sure, but ‘here is where I stand!’”
258
 This 
affirmative sense of the self, underscores the self-constancy implied in ipse identity.  
We argued in chapter two that attestation changes dialogue from being debative, 
argumentative and confrontational to being the mutual sharing of testimonies. Under the 
category of comparative theology, we emphasized that dialogue as an exercise in learning 
involves crossing-over to another’s religious tradition to learn and understand texts, 
doctrines and practices. This act of crossing usually raises some ethical and moral 
questions which relate to the im/possibility of crossing religious boundaries to understand 
texts, doctrines and practices as they pertain to their original religious contexts, the 
religious allowance for such crossing and one’s response to difference. In other words, 
what ethical and moral principles best serve the interest of dialogue as an exercise in 
learning when confronted by the fact of difference in the religions? For Richard Kearney, 
“if ethics rightly requires me to respect the singularity of the other person, it equally 
requires me to recognize the other as another self... capable of recognizing me in turn as a 
self capable of respect and esteem”.
259
  
One could say that Kearney’s view here appears to deal with the attitude of the self 
and the other towards each other. In Ricoeur’s “little ethics” he demonstrates the kind of 
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attitudes the self and the other must have towards each other in the accomplishment of the 
ethical intention. For Ricoeur, self-esteem/self-respect, respect for others and equality are 
significant for the living out of the “good life”.
260
 As we indicated earlier, Ricoeur’s 
“ethical intention” does not provide direct answers to the challenges presented by the 
encounter between the self and the other in dialogue as an exercise in learning. They only 
offer the framework for reflecting on these challenges. Thus, we shall use them as the basis 
for reflecting on the meaning and significance of commitment, openness, respect and 
equality to dialogue as an exercise in learning. Let us examine their meaning through 
Ricoeur’s ethics of the self. 
In his ethics of the self, Ricoeur attempts to justify the primacy of the Aristotelian 
teleological aim (the ethical aim) over the Kantian deontological moment (the moral 
norm). By doing so, Ricoeur develops “practical wisdom” (phronesis) as the nonsynthetic 
third term which helps in rendering appropriate and just judgement in the living out of the 
“good life” especially in morally aporetic situations. As Kaplan puts it, Ricoeur designed 
his “little ethics” in two axes: “the horizontal axis of moral philosophy refers to the 
dialogical constitution of the self in relation to others socially and politically, as friends 
and as citizens; the vertical axis refers to the predicates we attribute to agents and acts such 
as ‘good’ or ‘obligation.’”
261
  
By following Ricoeur’s “little ethics”, our interest is not to re-present Ricoeur’s 
work on how Aristotelian teleology (ethics) mediates Kantian deontology (morality), but to 
show how in the course of doing this, Ricoeur provides a hermeneutic framework for 
reflections on the meanings and significance of commitment, openness, reciprocity of 
respect and equality as “constructive dialogical attitudes”
262
 for dialogue as an exercise in 
learning. In a world where there is increasing acceptance of the plurality of religions and 
the awareness of the potential blessings the religions could bring to human society, the 
goal of dialogue as the desire to live the “good life” with and for the others in just 
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institutions cannot be understated. Let us see how Ricoeur achieve this form of ethical self 
in the encounter with the other.  
3.2.1.  Ricoeur and the Concepts of Ethics and Morality 
Unlike common practices where people use “ethics” and “morality” interchangeably, for 
Ricoeur it is important to draw distinctions between the two terms. Thus, whereas “ethics” 
defines that which is considered to be good, “morality” concerns that which imposes itself 
as obligation. While ethics attempts to answer the question “how should I live?” morality 
responds to the question “what must I do?” In this way, ethics focuses on the “aim of an 
accomplished life”, while morality focuses on “the articulation of this aim into norms”.
263
 
The former is predicated on “good” or the question of “what is” while the latter predicates 
“obligation” or the question of “what ought to be”.
264
  
In terms of the relationship between the two, Ricoeur emphasizes on the primacy of 
the Aristotelian teleological perspective (ethics) over the Kantian deontological point of 
view (morality). So, between ethics and morality, Ricoeur asserts “(1) the primacy of 
ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the 
norm and (3) the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to 
impasses in practice”.
265
 Morality is here perceived as a limited form of ethics since ethics 
encompasses morality. While being subordinate to ethics, morality is necessary for the 
actualization of ethics. This final recourse of morality to ethics occurs through what 
Ricoeur calls Phronesis – a form of practical wisdom geared towards the appropriate 
application of universal norms in particular situations. 
But how is the discourse on ethics and morality linked to Ricoeur’s examination of 
selfhood? Ricoeur demonstrates this linkage by situating the teleological aim and the 
deontological moment within the predicates of “good” and “obligation” respectively. 
According to him, the teleological aim corresponds to “self-esteem” while the 
deontological moment corresponds to “self-respect”. Following the same pattern which 
defines the relationship between ethics and morality, Ricoeur asserted that (1) self-esteem 
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is more fundamental to the development of selfhood than self-respect, (2) self-respect is 
the aspect under which self-esteem appears in the domain of norms and (3) in the aporias 
of duty where no norm provide guidance for the exercise hic et nunc of respect, self-esteem 
becomes not only the source but recourse for self-respect.
266
 In this way, self-esteem and 
self-respect together represent the most advanced stages of the growth of selfhood.  
For Ricoeur, therefore, it is impossible to conceive a moral self without reference to 
the other. To demonstrate how the ethical or moral self is connected to the other, Ricoeur 
traces the notion of the self with respect to itself, to others and even to anonymous third 
parties both on the ethical and moral planes. He then demonstrates how the autonomy of 
the self is “tightly bound up with solicitude for one’s neighbour and with justice for each 
individual”.
267
 Let us, at this point, attend to the hermeneutic issues that pertain to 
Ricoeur’s self and the ethical aim. Here, the focus would be on the three components of the 
ethical intention. 
3.2.2. The Hermeneutics of the Self and the Ethical Aim 
Ricoeur defines the “ethical intention” as: aiming at the “good life” with and for others, in 
just institutions. He finds in this definition, three essential components of the ethical 
intention: (1) aiming at a “good life”, (2) “with and for others”, (3) “in just institutions”. 
As we shall see, whereas the “good life” on its own does not directly refer to selfhood in 
relation to otherness, the “good life” lived “with and for others” finds itself within a 
dialogic structure where the self and the other meet at the interpersonal level (solicitude). 
However, at the level of institutions (the plurality of society) where relationships are not 
necessarily interpersonal, the principle of justice and equality goes beyond the limitations 
of solicitude to ensure justice and equality for all in social life. It is here that we find self-
esteem, solicitude and equality as providing the hermeneutic framework for reflecting on 
commitment, openness, respect and the virtue of equal-partner-in-dialogue as necessary 
conditions for constructive dialogues. What follows below is a brief consideration of these 
ethical components. 
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3.2.2.1. Aiming at the “Good Life” 
As we indicated earlier, Ricoeur’s notion of the “good life” also refers to what Aristotle 
called “living well”. For him, every action and decision is always directed towards the 
good; that which MacIntyre understood as internally good in-itself. A good life is that 
which everyone seeks to achieve because of its internal goodness i.e. those goods which 
are “good-in-themselves.
268
 Hence, to say that a person is good is to think of the person in 
terms of virtue and a virtue is the quality a person acquires which enables him/her to 
achieve the internal good to practice. Here, the notion of good understood as internal good 
immanent to practice, gives “support for the reflexive moment of self-esteem, to the extent 
that it is in appraising our actions that we appraise ourselves as being their author”.
269
  
On the question of life, Ricoeur considers life as denoting “the biologic rootedness 
of life and the unity of the person as a whole, as the person casts upon himself or herself 
the gaze of appraisal”.
270
 Put together, Ricoeur sees the “good life” as “the nebulus of 
ideals and dreams of achievements with regard to which a life is held to be more or less 
fulfilled or unfulfilled”.
271
 It is the idea of a higher finality which never ceases to be 
internal to human action. The “good life” is itself an ideal and a standard of excellence 
which sets a limit to how I should live and how we should live together.
272
 It is the 
standard of excellence which provides the basis for my self-esteem. For Ricoeur, the 
pursuit of this higher finality (the good life) comes with the practical choices we make for 
ourselves.  
Here, between the aim of the “good life” and the “practical choices” we make, a 
sort of hermeneutic circle is traced by the back-and-forth motion between the idea of the 
“good life” and the most important decisions we make for our existence.
273
 This back and 
forth movement is comparable to the interpretations of a text in which the whole and the 
parts can be understood each in terms of the other i.e. the agent who interprets the text of 
an action is, by so doing, also interpreting himself/herself. This “self-interpretation 
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 in the sense that “the interpretations and choices I make about 
how I should live my life and attain my ideals involve an understanding of who I am and 
who I want to become”.
275
 So, “I am capable of evaluating my actions, assessing my goals 
and determining if they are good, just as I am capable of evaluating, assessing and 
determining if I am good”.
276
  
To determine whether I am good or not is not achieved through scientific 
investigations because living the “good life” is internal to the self. For Ricoeur, the search 
for the adequation of interpretation of the character of a person “involves an exercise of 
judgement which, at best, can aspire to plausibility in the eyes of the other”.
277
 In other 
words, it is the judgement of the other which helps in determining whether I live the “good 
life”. This connection to the other situates “self-esteem” and the “good life” within a 
dialogic structure which constitutes the second component of Ricoeur’s ethical intention. 
But before we attend to the dialogic structure of self-esteem, let us attempt to situate this 
Ricoeurean understanding of self-esteem within the context of commitment as a necessary 
condition for dialogue as an exercise in learning.  
Many religions have traditions which ensure the transmission of religious beliefs, 
doctrines, customs and practices from one generation to the other. While belief-systems or 
doctrines define the character of the “constitutive rules” which one must follow if one is to 
be constituted as a member of the religious community, “standards of excellence” point to 
the outcomes that correspond to the living out of the belief-systems of the religion. Thus, 
to subscribe to a particular religion (Christian or Muslim) is to acknowledge by so doing, 
that one believes in its doctrines and practices as capable of providing the necessary 
guidance to the living out of the “good life”, also understood as “life in submission to 
God’s will”. This explains why a considerable knowledge of a religion precedes one’s 
choice to belong to it. Even in the case of “infant baptism” where babies become full 
members of the Catholic Church through the waters of baptism, this exercise is made 
                                                          
274
 Ibid, p179 
275
 David Kaplan. Ricoeur’s Critical Theory. 2003, p103 
276
 Ibid, p103-104 
277
 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself As Another. 1992, p180 
79 
 
possible on the basis of the informed consent of the parents who act on behalf of their 
children. These children are then taught to know and live the faith as they grow.  
Thus, because of the necessity of religious knowledge which serves as the basis for 
full allegiance, many religions turn to catechesis or religious instruction as a way of 
imparting religious knowledge – aware that knowledge of one’s religious tradition is the 
basis for one’s commitment to it. Therefore, the motivation for sticking to one’s religious 
tradition thus emanate from one’s esteem for that tradition as providing the necessary 
guidance to the living out of the “good life” or the life lived according to God’s will. This 
sense of esteem for one’s religion represents one’s self-confidence and self-conviction in 
its belief-systems as providing the necessary guidance in the living out of the “good life”. 
Such a realization, so to speak, informs and inspires one’s commitment to both the idem 
and ipse-dimensions of the tradition aware that in being faithful to God (through this 
tradition) amidst changes, disappointments and other contrary opinions (the ipse), one is 
following the path to a good life, a life lived in accordance to God’s will. 
In this way, we could say that self-esteem or the esteem for tradition leads to one’s 
commitment to it. While we shall later develop commitment to the home tradition as a 
necessary condition for dialogue, it is essential to mention here that where religious 
commitment is affirmed, the best way to engage the other in dialogue is through learning. 
Here, the interlocutors get to know each other’s beliefs-systems and the theological 
frameworks which support their sense of commitment to the traditions. As we indicated 
earlier, attestation as the mutual sharing of testimonies of faith shapes and directs this form 
of dialogue. Even though this response to faith through commitment appears to lie in the 
choice of the individual believer, the believer is also aware that he/she does not live in 
isolation but in communion with other believers who may or may not be part of the same 
tradition. How then does commitment or self-esteem open up to the esteem for others in 
the second component of the ethical intention? 
3.2.2.2. The Good life “with and For Others” 
Ricoeur considers solicitude as the second component of the “ethical intention”. It defines 
the dialogic structure of self-esteem, expressed in the concern for the other or the desire to 
80 
 
live the “good life” with others. Here, the self and the other are linked to such an extent 
that one cannot be reflected upon without reference to the other.
278
 As we shall see, when 
taken in its symmetrical form, solicitude emerges as a kind of Aristotelian friendship 
which expresses the mutual and reciprocal relationship between the self and the other. 
However, when taken in its asymmetrical form as in the Levinasian sense of the infinite 
other who summons me to responsibility without reciprocity, solicitude emerges as 
“benevolent spontaneity” or a sympathy which is expressed by the desire to understand and 
experience the world as the other sees it. 
But how do we tease out a dialogic structure of self-esteem when we know that the 
reflexivity of self-esteem carries with it the danger of turning in upon oneself or closing up 
on openness? In other words, how does the reflexivity of self-esteem connect with 
solicitude which expresses the reciprocity of openness and concern for the other? In 
response, Ricoeur asserts that “solicitude is not something added on to self-esteem from 
the outside, but it unfolds the dialogic dimension of self-esteem, which up to now has been 
passed-over in silence”.
279
 To justify this claim, Ricoeur turns attention to Aristotle’s 
analysis of friendship in order to demonstrate how the self is dialogically constituted and 
why we need each other to be able to live the “good life”.  
Aristotle understands friendship as “a mutual reciprocal relationship that is the 
highest good towards which life and actions and therefore happiness and pleasure, are 
oriented”.
280
 Friendship is based on self-love a form of refined egotism (philautia) because 
one cares for one’s friend for the same reason that one cares for oneself. Two premises are 
drawn here in the way egotism (self-love) is mediated by friendship. The first is that 
friendship is essentially equivocal and can only be   clarified by recourse to its true object 
i.e. philēta (love).
281
 Here, Aristotle says that there are three objects of love: the good, the 
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pleasant and the useful; and these three objects correspond to three forms of friendship 
(friendship of utility, of pleasure and the good).
282
  
The second premise is that “regardless of the place of philautia (self-love) in the 
genesis of friendship, the latter presents itself from the outset as a mutual relationship”.
283
 
Here, reciprocity is part of its content because it extends to the commonality of “living 
together” or in mutual intimacy. This sense of mutuality has its own requirements which 
are different from those eclipsed by the Husserlian notion of the same and the Levinasian 
notion of the infinite other. In this form of mutuality “each loves the other as being the 
man he is”,
284
 which is different from friendship based on utility and on pleasure. “As 
being” here expresses the sense of being as the other is. “As being” here averts any egoistic 
leanings by its mutual constitutivity. In this way “the reflexivity of oneself is not abolished 
but is, as it were, split into two by mutuality”.
285
  
Thus, Ricoeur retains from Aristotle an ethics of reciprocity, sharing and living 
together whereby friendship adds reciprocity/mutuality to self-esteem. For Ricoeur, “the 
friend inasmuch as he is the other self of oneself, has the other role of providing what one 
is incapable of procuring for oneself”.
286
 So, whereas self-esteem is the primordial 
reflexive moment of the aim of the good life, friendship makes a contribution to self-
esteem without taking anything away. It introduces the idea of reciprocity in the exchange 
between human beings who both esteem each other.  
In contrast to this Aristotelian concept of friendship is the Levinasian notion of the 
command of the face of the other who establishes asymmetry with the self. If solicitude 
and reciprocity apply to someone who is a friend to me, then what about someone who is 
not a friend to me; how does solicitude apply in asymmetrical relations? As we saw earlier 
in chapter two, Levinas asserts that the other summons me to responsibility without 
reciprocity because the other is exterior to me, separate from me and unequal to me. 
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Following Levinas, Ricoeur uses this notion of the dissymmetrical other to demonstrate 
how a new sense of solicitude is established through benevolent spontaneity
287
 which is 
intimately connected to self-esteem.  
Whereas the Aristotelian sense of friendship is structured on the basis of giving and 
receiving, on the basis of benevolent spontaneity, Ricoeur asserts that receiving is placed 
on an equal footing with the summons to responsibility where the self recognizes the 
superiority of the other who enjoins him/her to act in accordance with justice.
288
 This 
“equal footing” is not the same as that of friendship in which giving and receiving are well 
balanced. Rather, “it compensates for the initial dissymmetry resulting from the primacy of 
the other in the situation of instruction, through the reverse movement of recognition”.
289
  
Here, the other’s inability to reciprocate is viewed as suffering.  
Suffering here is not the same as physical or mental pain, but a reduction in the 
other’s capacity for acting or being-unable-to-act. The other’s incapacity to act is seen as a 
violation of its integrity because we are by nature created with the capacity to give and to 
receive. With the Levinasian other, the full capacity to act only resides in the self who 
gives his sympathy and his compassion by sharing in the pain of the other who lacks the 
capacity to give. Because the Levinasian other is reduced to the condition of only receiving 
without being-able-to give, the self is assigned the responsibility of caring for the other by 
giving without expecting. As a mark of true sympathy, “the self whose power of acting is 
greater than its other, finds itself affected by all that the suffering other offers to it in 
return. From the suffering other comes a giving that is no longer drawn from the power of 
acting and existing, but precisely from weakness itself”.
290
 For Ricoeur, the supreme test 




Ricoeur concluded this second component by emphasizing that I cannot have self-
esteem unless I esteem others as myself. “As myself” means that “you too are capable of 
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starting something in the world, of acting for a reason, of hierachizing your priorities, of 
evaluating the ends of your actions and, having done this, of holding yourself in esteem as 
I hold myself in esteem”.
292
 Consequently, in the equivalence between the “you too” and 
the “as myself” lies a trust that is held as an extension of the attestation that I can do 
something and therefore have worth. This equivalence expresses “the esteem of the other 
as oneself and the esteem of oneself as an other”.
293
 How does this dialogical sense of the 
self apply in an interreligious dialogue context? 
We indicated earlier that one’s esteem for a particular religion is first of all 
preceded by one’s knowledge and conviction in its ability to provide guidance for the 
living out of the “good life”. This knowledge and conviction becomes the basis for the 
establishment of one’s commitment to a particular religion. But this living out of the “good 
life” is not done in isolation but in community with other believers who also share similar 
convictions and commitments to the religion, albeit the degree. Hence, we can talk of the 
Christian community or the Muslim Ummah (the Islamic community). Take for instance 
the Muslim Ummah in the light of the individual’s relationships to it. Here, the individual 
Muslim is first related to his immediate family, then his/her relatives and finally to other 
Muslims in the bond of religious brotherhood understood as the Muslim Ummah.   
To this horizontal axis of relationships is also added the vertical axis which 
concerns the believer’s submission to the will of Allah. It is this vertical axis which gives 
meaning to the Muslim Ummah. In other words, the basis of the Islamic community is not 
that of a common forefather but that of a common God (Allah), a common Book (the 
Qur’an) and a common prophet (Muhammad). Consequently, the desire to live the “good 
life” understood as “life in total submission to the will of Allah” is the reason for the 
Ummah; as the Qur’an says “Indeed, all the believers are brothers” (Surah 49:10). In this 
sense, while the believer is personally responsible for his/her level of commitment to Allah 
through the religion of Islam, the believer also knows that he/she needs the support of 
other Muslims (the community) and vice versa to be able to live the “good life”. It is here 
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that the dialogic structure of self-esteem, also understood as religious commitment, fleshes 
out as solicitude. 
Taken in its interreligious dialogue context, solicitude also expresses the concern 
religious communities give to each in the living out of their respective notions of the “good 
life”. For instance, in a cosmopolitan context, the Muslim Ummah may live in close 
proximity with other religious communities such as Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. 
If these different communities are to be able to live out their respective notions of the 
“good life”, they must show concern for each other through respect, friendship and mutual 
co-existence. This form of mutuality and friendship captures the sense of what Ricoeur 
considered as esteeming the other as I esteem myself. It is establishing a kind of solicitude 
with the other, a mutual friendship which is developed out of the understanding that we 
must show respect to the other who desires to live the “good life”, a respect which is in 
itself part of living the good life with and for others. In other words, I cannot expect to 
have my self-esteem/respect honoured by others unless I esteem others as myself.
294
 
Interreligious dialogue as an exercise in learning is defined by this willingness to “give” 
and “receive” in mutual friendship and respect. While we shall later develop respect as a 
necessary condition for dialogue as an exercise in learning, let us examine how Ricoeur 
presents the principle of equality as the corollary of reciprocity where friendship is placed 
on the path of justice and where the life lived together at the interpersonal level gives way 
to the life lived beyond the interpersonal. 
3.2.2.3.The Good life with and for others “in Just Institutions” 
According to Ricoeur, aiming at “the good life with and for others” extends beyond 
interpersonal relationship to include anonymous others in the wider society. So, while 
solicitude is that which mediates the ethical intention within interpersonal relationships, in 
the plurality of human society where there are anonymous third parties, the ethical 
intention is mediated by just institutions. Justice serves the ethical intention at this level 
and it produces ethical features like equality, which is not contained in solicitude. In other 
words, though there is an interpersonal dimension of a “good life” through solicitude, to 
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achieve a “good life” at the societal level we need institutions which would serve our sense 
of justice through the obligations they impose and the privileges and opportunities they 
provide to members of the community.  
But what is an institution? For Ricoeur, an “institution” connotes the structure of 
living together as a historical community – a people, a nation or even a religion.
295
 It 
defines, as Kaplan puts it, “the structures of living together and belonging to a particular 
community united by the bond of common mores”.
296
 According to Ricoeur, human 
society is basically plural, consisting of people who do not necessarily know each other 
and may not have interpersonal relations. In this plurality, one meets the anonymous other 
– someone I may meet and greet occasionally but whom I do not intimately know. It also 
includes those whom I may never meet face-to-face. As Ricoeur puts it, this “plurality 
includes third parties who will never be faces”.
297
 Thus, the plea for this anonymous other 
is included in the fullest aim of the true life, the “good life”. If institutions serve to regulate 
this state of plurality in human society, then what does it mean to be just to these 
anonymous others in society? And what does it mean to be treated justly by them in 
return? 
By virtue of their common mores, institutions are rule-governed and they regulate 
the interactions and activities of the anonymous others through their own standards of 
excellence which embody the corporate aspects of the good life.
298
 So, in the idea of 
“everyone” which is characteristic of social institutions, it is the virtue of justice (fairness) 
which ensures the “good life” for everyone. Social institutions ensure this “sense of 
justice” for everyone through the principle of equality. Justice for Ricoeur is “the first 
virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought’”
299
  
According to Ricoeur, this sense of Justice points to two directions: (1) the good in 
respect to the institutional mediation of the desire to live the “good life” together in society 
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and (2) the legal where the judicial system confers upon the law the right of constraint.
300
 
Here, Ricoeur focuses attention on the first direction because the idea of justice was, first 
of all, not constructed from legal systems in the beginning but emerged out of the mythical 
mold of Greek tragedy. Secondly, the “sense of justice” is not merely limited to the legal 
sphere but is at play in human relationships such that the “sense of injustice” is more 
poignant and perspicacious than the “sense of justice”, because “people have a clearer 
vision of what is missing in human relations than of the right way to organize it. This is 
why, even for philosophers, it is injustice that first set thought in motion”.
301
  
In human society, the “sense of injustice” expressed in forms of inequality is 
checked by just institutions. Institutions achieve this through the principle of distributive 
justice
302
 which “governs the appointment of roles, tasks, advantages and disadvantages 
between the members of the society”
303
through the principle of equality whose direct 
opposite is inequality. Here, the unjust man is considered to be one who takes too much in 
terms of advantage or not enough in terms of burdens. The intermediate between “taking 
too much” and “taking less” is proportional equality which defines the sense of distributive 
justice “regulating what is fair to each one as anonymous members of the society”.
304
  
In consequence, Ricoeur asserts that “distributive justice consists in equalizing two 
relations between, in each case, a person and merit”.
305
 This distributive interpretation of 
institutions contributes to tearing down the walls that separate the individual from the 
society and assures the cohesion between the three components of the ethical aim i.e. the 
individual, the interpersonal and the societal.
306
 Thus, while solicitude provides to the self, 
another who is a face in the strong Levinasian sense, equality provides to the self another 
who is the plurality of many others. As a result, the sense of justice takes nothing away 
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from solicitude but presupposes it to the extent that it adds to solicitude the field of 
application which extends beyond interpersonal relationships.
307
  
From a dialogical perspective, it is well known that Christianity and Islam are two 
major religious institutions. But Ricoeur’s discourse on just institutions focuses on the 
particularity of the institution and its response to issues of justice and equality for the 
plurality of others who are nonetheless bonded together by common mores. His discourse, 
therefore, concerns what happens between members of an institution who are tied together 
by common mores and not about the relationships between institutions. Thus, one might 
ask: how can this form of intra-institutional hermeneutic discourse be applied to an inter-
institutional context? In response, what follows below is an attempt to show how Ricoeur’s 
discourse on just institutions apply individually to Islam and Christianity as religious 
institutions on the one hand and how elements in this discourse provide the framework for 
reflecting on principle of equality as a necessary condition for inter-institutional relations. 
As different institutions, Christianity and Islam have different traditions and 
doctrines which give meaning to the notion of the “good life” and the practice of it. For 
instance, for Islam: while theology must be informed by the Five Pillars of the religion 
with particular focus on the unicity and transcendence of Allah (Tawhid), the daily living 
out of the “good life” is liturgically expressed in the believers commitment to confessing 
the Shahada and saying the five daily prayers (the Salat) amidst other practices. Thus, the 
confession of the Shahada and the commitment to the five daily prayers stand as a hub on 
which the believer’s daily living out of the “good life” revolves. Unlike Islam, Christian 
theology revolves around the understanding of God as Trinity, where the believer is daily 
called upon to submit himself to God the Father, through the message of Jesus Christ with 
the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. This message of Jesus Christ is summarised in the “love 
of God and the love of neighbour”.  
Consequently, between Christianity and Islam one finds two religious institutions 
who at once share similar theological concepts such as God, Jesus Christ and the Holy 
Spirit, but whose theological constructions of these realities differ substantially in the light 
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of the Tawhid (Islam) and the Holy Trinity (Christianity). While these two theological 
foundations will be taken up and elucidated upon in chapters four and five, it is sufficient 
to state here that the Tawhid and the Holy Trinity show that Christianity and Islam are 
different religious systems of belief.  
As systems, their respective doctrines and practices constitute the common mores 
which bind their respective adherents together. If we understand the essence of institutions 
as safeguarding the individual and collective needs of its members, then Islam and 
Christianity are two separate institutions which fundamentally exist to give guidance to 
Muslims and Christians in the living out of the “good life”. This task of the two 
institutions first of all, needs to be recognised when engaging in dialogue as an exercise in 
learning. Secondly, just as institutions also exist to promote the sense of justice through the 
principle of equality, so also one can apply this principle of equality to religions which 
recognize each other as different institutions with unique traditions and theologies. The 
realization that each institution is unique and different in its tradition and theology goes to 
support the claim that one’s system of belief cannot be used as the standard of 
measurement for the truthfulness of the other. If Islam and Christianity are to engage in 
dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning, then this dialogue needs to be 
constructed against the background of what the other has to say about Jesus Christ within 
their tradition-specific contexts.  
If I recognize that the other has something unique to share about Jesus Christ from 
which I desire to learn, then this other cannot be considered as inferior to me but as an 
equal partner in dialogue – one who learns from me and from whom I learn. Since each 
religion has its unique Christology which is independent of the Christologies of the other, 
justice is served when the other is recognized as an equal partner – an original source of 
self-understanding, capable of communicating a unique experience.
308
 This sense of 
equality opens up the dialogical process for the experiences of the other as an equal 
partner. As Gadamer puts it, the thou here must be seen truly as a thou – “not to overlook 
his claims, but to let him truly say something to us. Without such openness to one another, 
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there is no genuine human bond”.
309
 As this sense of equality pertains to the plurality of 
others in social institutions, so does it also apply to the plurality of religions – each 
religious institution always emerges as that “anonymous face” whose plea for justice 
resides in the respect and equal recognition they deserve.  
If self-esteem expresses itself in the form of the commitment of oneself to his/her 
religious tradition, then solicitude opens up the dialogic structure of self-esteem, inspiring 
the desire to want to live the good life with and for others at the level of interpersonal 
relations. However, at the level of inter-institutional dialogue, what is demanded is the 
sense of justice expressed as equal respect and recognition for the other who also possesses 
authentic, independent and unique theologies about God. It is this uniqueness of theology 
and faith-experience which becomes the subject of interreligious learning. Having said 
this, how does Ricoeur relate the above tripartite structure of the ethical intention to the 
moral norm as its subordination and completion? 
3.2.3. Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of the Self and the Moral Norm  
At the beginning of the discourse on ethics, Ricoeur asserted the following: (1) the primacy 
of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to be mediated by the moral 
norm, (3) the recourse morality must take in ethics to resolve conflicts and aporias. Under 
the plane of morality, Ricoeur shows how it is necessary to subject the ethical aim to the 
test of the norm. Here, our interest is to show how Ricoeur’s discourse on morality 
provides further clarity to our reflections on the values of commitment, openness, respect 
for the other and equality as necessary conditions for dialogue as an exercise in learning.  
Following the same tripartite structure of the ethical aim Ricoeur, first of all, 
subjects the aim of the “good life” to the test of the norm without recourse to the dialogic 
structure of the norm. This then leads us to the consideration of the moral norm in the light 
of solicitude which denotes the primordial relation of the self to the other at the ethical 
level. With just institutions, the sense of justice (ethics) is replaced by the rule of justice 
under the category of the moral norm
310
 Here, self-respect from the moral plane answers to 
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self-esteem from the ethical plane, reaching its full meaning where respect for the norm 
(first stage), blossoms into respect for others and for (second stage). This further extends to 
respect for everyone with the right to a just share in an equitable distribution (third stage).  
Ricoeur parallels the tripartite structure of the ethical intention with the moral norm 
reflected in the three formulations of the Kantian Categorical Imperatives.
311
 In this way, 
the teleological aim towards the good life first of all “corresponds to the principle of 
universality, in which the agent achieves freedom under self-imposed laws”.
312
 Secondly, 
solicitude also “corresponds to the formula of ‘end in itself’ in which we are bond to 
respect others as ends and not as mere means”.
313
 Thirdly, living in just institutions 
“corresponds to the obligation to pursue the ‘kingdom of ends’ in which we must act in 
maxims that will generate a community of free and equal members, each of whom will 
further the aims of others while realising his own intentions”.
314
  
So, one notices here that self-respect in the moral plane has the same structure as 
self-esteem under the reign of ethics. However, the relationship between ethics and 
morality according to Ricoeur is not one of parallelism, but complementarity because the 
ethical aim has to pass through the sieve of the moral norm in order to find its completion. 
In other words, whereas the good is prior to the right, the good requires the right in order to 
achieve the full sense of the good life which entails living well, with and for the other, in 
just institutions.
315
 Let us delve into these different aspects of the moral norm. 
3.2.3.1. The Autonomy of the Will 
Under this first component, Ricoeur examines the self’s relation to the norm by isolating 
the moment of universality in which the norm tests the wish to live the good life. Here, the 
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self is examined outside the dialogic moment of the norm. Ricoeur recognizes this turn as 
pure abstraction because there are no norms which do not take persons into account. 
However, by embarking on this course of abstraction, he hopes to demonstrate how 
through the same universality the self draws its authority from the reflexive plane. Ricoeur 
anchors the deontological moment on the Kantian concept of the “unconditional good will” 
expressed in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Here, Kant asserts that “it is 
impossible to conceive anything in the world or even outside of it, which can be taken as 
good without qualification, except the good will”.
316
  
In this Kantian “good-will”, that which receives the predicate ‘good’ is the will. 
Here, the will takes the place of desire which is at the heart of Aristotelian ethics. In other 
words, while desire is recognised through its aim, the will is recognised through its relation 
to the norm because the will responds to “the question ‘what ought I to do?’”
317
According 
to Ricoeur, Kant therefore sees the will as self-legislating and acting in response to the 
duty of obligation. Here, “the morality of obligation is tied to the universality of the will, 
characterized by the constraint which one imposes on oneself”.
318
 As Kaplan puts it, “a 
free individual acts under self-imposed laws, according to which each person freely 
submits to self-discipline”.
319
 This form of self-legislation is what Ricoeur refers to as 
autonomy. Under autonomy, the self finds support for its moral status without any support 
from the other. Here, Kant invests in the same subject the power of commanding and 
obeying.  
In chapter two under the category of idem-identity, we indicated that the idem 
aspects of the identity of the religious other consists of their doctrines, Scriptures, religious 
practices, rites and customs. These represent that which is given to all adherents of the 
religion. However, the ipse aspect of the identity of the believer consists in keeping one’s 
promise. As Ricoeur puts it, a person’s commitment to what he/she promises even in the 
face of danger, disappointments, uncertainties and new opportunities demonstrates that the 
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person is reliable and can be counted on.
320
 Consequently, on the level of religious beliefs, 
though by becoming a member of a religious community, one receives the systems of 
belief held by the community (idem identity); the living out of these belief-systems 
depends on the adherent’s commitment.  
Religious commitment cannot therefore be forced otherwise it runs the risk of 
being superficial and pretentious. It has an “internal” quality which emanates from the 
personal volition of the individual, measured by the adherent’s willingness and readiness to 
remain faithful to the idem aspects of the religion in all circumstances. Even though the 
object of one’s commitment is external (dealing with doctrines, customs and practices), the 
act of commitment always finds its roots in the personal decision of the adherent. Thus, 
under the category of ethics we indicated that while religious commitment is, first of all, 
preceded by one’s knowledge of and conviction in its doctrines as providing the necessary 
guidance in the living out of the “good life”, under the plane of morality, commitment is 
sustained by the will to remain faithful to the traditions that give rise to these convictions.  
However, as abstract as this first component of the triadic structure seem to be, 
Ricoeur indicates that its significance lies in how it serves as the basis for a progressive 
movement from the general formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative to its second and 
third formulations. These formulations would serve as guide to the second and third 
component of the triadic structure. What is therefore significant to note here is that just as 
the autonomy of the will is the foundation from which the other two Kantian imperatives 
are formulated, so also is the notion of religious commitment – it serves as the basis from 
which the virtues of openness, respect for others and equality are derived. Let us now 
consider these other components. 
3.2.3.2. Solicitude and Respect for others 
Ricoeur asserted, under the category of ethics that solicitude is not something added on to 
self-esteem but it unfolds the dialogic structure of self-esteem. So also under the category 
of the moral norm the respect owed to persons does not constitute a heterogeneous moral 
principle in relation to the autonomy of the self, but constitutes its intrinsic dialogic 
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structure on the plane of the obligation of rules.
321
 Ricoeur justifies this thesis in two 
phases: in the first phase, he demonstrates how the norm of respect owed to persons is 
intimately connected to solicitude. He then justifies the claim that “the respect owed to 
persons on the moral plane, is in the same relation to autonomy as solicitude is to the aim 
of the good life on the ethical plane”.
322
 In the second phase, Ricoeur argues that “the 
respect owed to persons posited in the second Categorical imperative is on the moral plane, 
in the same relation to autonomy as solicitude was to the aim of the good life in the ethical 
plane”.
323
 Let us now consider these phases according Ricoeur’s line of thought. 
In attending to the first phase where he shows the link by which the norm of respect 
owed to persons is connected to the dialogic structure of the ethical aim (solicitude), 
Ricoeur relies on the Golden Rule
324
 as the appropriate transitional formula between 
solicitude and the second Kantian imperative: “Act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end” (Gr. 66-67/429). According to Ricoeur, 
interpersonal relationship can sometimes be the occasion of violence which resides in the 
power one exerts over another. Here, he takes pain to differentiate between the 
expressions: power-over, power-to-do and power-in-common. While “power-to-do” 
expresses the capacity possessed by an agent to constitute himself/herself as the author of 
an action, “power-in-common” defines “the capacity for members of a historical 
community to exercise in an indivisible manner, their desire to live together”.
325
  
However, “power-over” which relates to what one does to another is held to be the 
occasion for the evil of violence. For instance, “from the domain of physical violence 
considered as the abusive use of force against others, the figure of evil begins with the 
simple use of threat, passing through the degrees of constraints and ending in murder”.
326
 
The end result is the destruction of the power-to-do of others and hence, the destruction of 
self-esteem and self-respect. Consequently, moral norms come as a response to issues of 
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violence. For instance, the values of truth, property and life are preserved from violations 
in the prohibition: “you shall not lie, you shall not steal, you shall not kill, you shall not 
torture”.
327
 So, while solicitude affirms the mutual exchange of self-esteem at the ethical 
level, this affirmation is seen as the hidden soul of prohibition on the moral plane where 
one rejects the indignities inflicted on others through solicitude. The fact that there is a 
possibility of the spectre of evil in the choices we make suggests that there is always the 
need to subject the desire to live the good life to the test of the moral norm.  
 The second phase of Ricoeur’s discourse on solicitude and the norm centres on the 
claim that the respect owed to persons posited in the second formulation of the Kantian 
imperative, is on the moral plane in the same relation to autonomy as solicitude was to the 
aim of the “good life” on the ethical plane. According to Ricoeur, whereas the link 
between “solicitude” and the “good life” occurred after a genuine leap on the ethical plane, 
things are much different with Kant because the second formulation of the categorical 
imperative (act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an 
end) is here treated as the development of the general form of the imperative.  
 This Kantian imperative reveals two terms which live in dialectic tension i.e. the 
idea of humanity and that of a person as an end in himself. Humanity as a singular term 
appears to be an abstract universality which governs the principle of autonomy without the 
consideration of persons. The idea of persons “as ends in themselves however demand that 
one takes into account the plurality of persons, without allowing one to take this idea as far 
as the conception of otherness”.
328
 Here, Kant gives priority to the continuity assured by 
the idea of humanity with the principle of autonomy, over the discontinuity which defines 
the sudden introduction of the notion of end-in-itself and the notion of persons as ends-in-
themselves.
329
 So, the idea of humanity which is not to be understood as the sum totality of 
human beings but as the basis from which one is worthy of respect, suggests a sense of 
universality which is taken from the perspective of the multiplicity of persons which Kant 
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called “object or matter”.
330
 Thus for Kant, humanity acts as a screen in the direct 
confrontation between oneself and another. It is within this context that “the notion of 
person as an end in itself comes to balance that of humanity, to the extent that it introduces 
in the very formulation of the imperative, the distinction between ‘your person’ and ‘the 
person of anyone else.’”
331
 In this way, the maxim then maintains that never treat humanity 
simply as a means.  
But what does it mean to treat humanity in a person as a means? For Ricoeur, it is 
to exert upon the will of others that power which, full of restraint in the case of influence, 
is unleashed in all the forms which violence takes culminating in torture.
332
 However, 
persons as rational beings must be considered as ends-in-themselves and “not merely as 
means for the arbitrary use of this or that will”.
333
 Thus, every man’s actions, whether 
directed to himself or to other rational beings, must always be viewed at the same time as 
an end. The basis for this form of respect lies in the fact that the consciousness of 
autonomy implies the “fact of reason” and the fact of reason implies the existence of 
morality and “morality exists because the person himself exists”.
334
 Thus, “the Golden 
Rule and the imperative of respect owed to persons do not simply have the same field of 
exercise, [but] they also have the same aim: to establish reciprocity wherever there is a lack 
of reciprocity”.
335
 According to Ricoeur, they constitute that which “ultimately arms our 
indignation, that is, our rejection of indignities inflicted on others”.
336
 
From this second component of the moral norm, two things remain significant for 
Ricoeur and also for our interreligious dialogue context. While it underscores the dialogic 
structure which underlies the autonomy of the self/will (where self-respect leads to the 
respect for other), it also emphasizes that within this dialogic structure the respect for 
others must be devoid of any violation of their dignity and integrity. It must be directed 
towards a sense of respect for who they are and what they are. In other words, this view of 
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respect does not only capture the sense of respect as it pertains to the Golden Rule, but it 
also goes even deeper than that to imply that even in situations where one does not treat 
himself/herself with respect the other must still be respected as an end-in-himself.  
3.2.3.3. The Principles of Equality and Justice 
For Ricoeur, just as solicitude on the ethical plane corresponds to the Categorical Formula 
of ends-in-themselves whereby we are bound to respect others not as means but as ends in 
themselves, so also, the sense of justice at the ethical plane corresponds to the rule of 
justice at the moral plane where “living in just institutions corresponds to the obligation of 
pursuing the kingdom of end, in which we must act on a maxim that will generate a 
community of free and equal members, each of whom would further the aims of others 
while realizing his own intentions”.
337
 Thus, just as we deliberated upon the sense of 
equality at the ethical plane, so also at the moral plane the focus is on the principle of 
equality which occurs at the level of the principle of justice.  
At the moral plane, the principle of justice ensures the application of equality to 
everyone within the community. Here, a formal principle of justice is necessary to ensure 
this application of equality. To achieve this end, Ricoeur turns to John Rawls’ conception 
of procedural justice. In his Theory of Justice, Rawls uses the concept of “fairness” as the 
key to his notion of justice because he views fairness as the basis from which the justice 
basic to institutions emanates. Here, Rawls tries to shake off and free his procedural 
conception of justice from the tutelage of the good defined by the teleological aim, 
especially its utilitarian version of the notion of justice
338
 whereby the simple pleasure of 
the individual is sacrificed for the benefit of the greater pleasure of the community.  
Rawls nonetheless shares Kant’s conviction that when the individual’s pleasure is 
sacrificed for the greater good, it means that the individual is being used as a means to an 
end and not as an end in himself. Thus, his entire work on the Theory of Justice is a shift 
from the question of foundation to mutual consent. Here, Rawls presents his work on 
justice as a response to three basic questions on the fairness of deliberation: (1) what would 
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guarantee the fairness of the situation of deliberation from which an agreement could result 
concerning the just arrangement of institution? (2) What principle will be chosen in this 
fictive situation of deliberation? (3) What arguments could convince the deliberating 
parties to choose the Rawlsian principle of justice rather than utilitarianism?
339
   
According to Rawls, we are all self-interested rational beings and therefore we need 
to stand behind the veil of ignorance.
340
 By “self-interested rational beings”, Rawls means 
that we are motivated to select in an informed and rational way, that which seems to favour 
us. Thus, a self-interested rational person behind the veil of ignorance would not want to 
belong to a social class, a race or a nationality that has been discriminated against. For him, 
all generations under the veil of ignorance are seen to have the same equal rights to 
resources both now and in the future. What Rawls seek to preserve here is the equality that 
each person deserves. Hence, he draws up a list of constraints which the individual must 
know so that the choices they make would depend on a system of distribution of 
advantages and disadvantages.  
These constraints are: (1) parties in deliberation must have sufficient knowledge of 
the general psychology of human nature (its fundamental passions and motivations). (2) 
The parties must know what every normal human being wishes to possess (i.e. the primary 
social goods which make the exercise of freedom possible). (3) Since the choice is between 
many competing systems of justice, every party must have sufficient knowledge about the 
competing systems. (4) All the parties must have equal information about the issues 
concerned; (5) the contract they make must be thereupon stable regardless of the prevailing 
circumstances.
341
 Thus, for Rawls the above constraints would guarantee the fairness of the 




To the second question: “what principle will be chosen in the fictive situation of 
deliberation?” Rawls presents two principles of justice and by so doing, he demonstrates 
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their correct placement. For Rawls, self-interested rational human beings behind the veil of 
ignorance would under normal circumstances, choose two general principles of justice to 
structure society: the first being the principle of equal liberty and the second the difference 
principle. While the first is more egalitarian – demonstrating that all persons have equal 
rights to liberty in society, the second principle stipulates that social and economic 
inequality should be carefully arranged so that they are directed (1) to the greatest benefits 
of the disadvantaged in society and (2) that they ensure equal opportunity for all in the 
society in terms of holding offices and positions.  
Here, justice as distribution is “extended to all kinds of advantages capable of being 
treated as shares to be distributed: rights and duties on the one hand and benefits and 
burdens on the other”.
343
 Their purpose is to ensure the establishment of fairness in all 
segments of society.  According to Rawls, just as the content of these principles remains 
very significant, “so also the rule of priority that ties them together”.
344
 This priority 
follows a serial or lexical order which signifies that “‘a departure from the institution of 
equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified... by greater social and 
economic advantages’”
345
 To puts it simply, Rawls’ emphasis is that the interest of the 
individual should never be sacrificed for the benefit of the common good. In other words, 
society must always be attentive to both the individual’s needs and the needs of the wider 
community. 
In response to the third question (where the deliberating parties would choose the 
Rawlsian principle of justice against that of utilitarianism), Rawls relies on what he calls 
the maximin which is a decision theory in the context of uncertainty where parties are 
required “to choose the arrangements that maximize the minimum shares”.
346
 Situated 
within the original context of the veil of ignorance where no one knows where his place in 
society is and therefore reasons on the basis of mere possibilities, the contracting parties 
become committed to each other on the basis of the terms of the contract which are 
publicly defined and unanimously accepted. In this way, “if two conceptions of justice are 
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in conflict and if one of them makes possible a situation that someone would find 
unacceptable, whereas the other would exclude this possibility, then the second conception 
would prevail”.
347
 Like Kant, the value of Rawls’ contractarianism makes it impossible to 
adopt rules to the advantage of some at the expense of others. “It also prohibits forms of 
treatment that no one would want for themselves”.
348
 
Having followed Rawls in response to the three questions on the principle of 
justice, Ricoeur then asked: does Rawls’ pure procedural conception of justice break all 
ties with the sense of justice that precedes it and follows it all along? In Ricoeur’s view, 
the procedural conception of justice, at best, formalises the sense of justice that it never 
ceases to presuppose.
349
 As it were, Rawls himself even admitted that the argument of the 
procedural conception of justice rests upon a preunderstanding of what justice and injustice 
are. It is the meanings derived from these concepts which permit us to define and interpret 
these two principles of justice before considering them as the chosen principles in the 
original situation behind the veil of ignorance.
350
 What is however noteworthy in the 
Rawlsian contractualist theory is that just like Kant, Rawls’ contractualism also makes it 
impossible to adopt rules which are discriminatory. However, what is the dialogical 
relevance of these ethico-moral components of aiming at the good life with and for other in 
just institutions? 
We indicated earlier that the basis for the individual’s faith response to Christianity 
or Islam emanates from one’s esteem for the religion as providing the necessary guidance 
to the living out of the “good life”. However, the “life lived in obedience to God” is not 
done in isolation. It also encompasses a relationship with others (solicitude) who equally 
aspire to live the “good life”. It is this form of relationship which gives rise to the 
formation of Christian or Muslim communities. In the wider society, Christians and 
Muslims know that they are not communities living in isolation but share sometimes the 
same space, streets, facilities and amenities with other religious communities. In other 
words, many societies today are multi-faith and multi-cultural such that in the living out of 
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the “good life” one is caught up not just with oneself or with members of one’s religious 
community, but with others. These “anonymous others” have to be carefully considered in 
my desire to live the “good life”.  
Mutual co-existence, which is the consequence of this reciprocity of respect, is 
better fostered when one knows and understands that which constitutes the other’s sense of 
the “good life”. To know the other demands that we learn from them and if we are to learn 
from each other, then this exercise of learning could take place through the medium of 
dialogue as “the sharing of mutual testimonies”. However, for such genuine dialogues to 
occur, the other must be recognized as an equal-partner who also possesses a unique 
understanding of what it means to live the “good life”. Viewing the other as an equal-
partner-in-dialogue is not based on the understanding that they share the same faith 
principles as we do. It is based on the recognition that just as I have faith principles which 
form the basis for my beliefs in God, so does the other and if I desire to be listened to and 
appreciated, so does the other. 
3.3. The Ethical and Moral Implications of Narrative Identity for Dialogue  
We defined interreligious dialogue in chapter two as the constructive and positive 
conversation between people of different religious traditions on issues of religious 
significance for the purpose of mutual learning, growth and enrichment. In the light of 
Christian-Muslim dialogue, we proposed Christology as the context for dialogue as an 
exercise in learning from and about the other. Within this form of dialogue, two issues 
need to be clarified: “learning about” and “learning from” the other. The “other” here is 
used interchangeably to refer to either Christianity or Islam or their respective adherents. 
Hence, whereas the Muslim could be considered other to the Christian, so also is the 
Christian to the Muslim. 
To “learn about the other” implies the desire to acquire knowledge concerning the 
other. In respect of Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology, “to learn about the other” 
therefore defines a certain interest in knowing the Islamic or Christian tradition-specific 
understanding of Christology. By “tradition-Specific understanding”, we mean the 
Christian or Islamic orthodox understanding of Christology which answers the question: 
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who is Jesus Christ in Islam or in Christianity? If knowledge of the other is to be shared, 
then it demands that the other truly knows who Jesus is within their tradition-specific 
context and should be committed in explaining and defending this body of knowledge. 
Knowledge of one’s tradition and commitment to it is viewed here as a sine qua non for 
the success of dialogue as an exercise in learning.  
However, “to learn from the other” goes beyond the mere acquisition of knowledge 
about the other’s belief-systems to include applying that knowledge (modified or not) to 
one’s way of life. It involves a sense of creativity whereby the acquired knowledge from 
the other is meaningfully integrated into one’s way of life, contributing to enriching it. 
This sense of enrichment could take the form of how it changes one’s perceptions of the 
others, leading to respect and appreciation of the other’s viewpoints. Taken religiously, 
learning from the other could also lead one to develop a sharpened awareness of the 
particularity of one’s own religious beliefs and the significant place they occupy in one’s 
aim to live the “good life”. It could also lead the interlocutors to the discoveries of the 
similarities that lie between their respective faith perspectives which they previously did 
not know. In whichever way this occurs, learning would have taken place. As we can see, 
for this form of dialogue to takes place it needs to be guided by some necessary conditions 
which we call dialogical attitude: i.e. commitment, openness, respect for the other and 
equality. These necessary conditions to dialogue contribute significantly in helping the 
interlocutors to cultivate the appropriate dialogical dispositions that facilitate the process of 
dialogue as an exercise in learning. Let us consider them below. 
3.3.1. Self-esteem and the Value of Commitment 
The virtue of commitment defines the idea of being dedicated, devoted and faithful to a 
cause. It conveys a sense of rootedness. Understood interreligiously, commitment 
highlights one’s faithfulness to the doctrines and practices of the religious tradition to 
which one belongs. It defines the attitude of believing and belonging to a particular 
religious community. As Cornille puts it, religious commitment is “a deliberate 
identification with the teachings and practices of a particular tradition. It thus entails assent 
to the truth-claims of a particular tradition and recognition of the authority of the tradition 
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in matters of doctrine and discipline”.
351
 Though we indicated that the establishment of 
religious commitment occurs against the background of critical reflection as to whether the 
tradition provides guidance to the living out of the good life, it must be said here that the 
process itself is not also devoid of the practice of inherited faith.
352
 
Whether established through inherited faith or through critical reflection or both, 
religious commitment represents the esteem of the self for the teachings and practices of a 
particular tradition to which one belongs. If attestation is a statement of conviction and 
confidence in one’s beliefs, then in an interreligious dialogue context attestation derives its 
meaning also from the commitment of the believer. It is one’s commitment to the religion 
which contributes to defining who one is – otherwise there can be no attested to self. 
Hence, commitment is a necessary condition for dialogue as an exercise in learning. As 
Dupuis puts it, “honesty and sincerity specifically require that the various partners enter it 
and commit themselves to it in the integrity of their faith. Any methodical doubt, any 
mental reservation, is out of place here”.
353
  
But this form of commitment must be informed by the interlocutors’ understanding 
of the teachings and practices of their respective traditions on Christology. This is because 
dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the other demands knowledge of the 
Christology of one’s religion so as to meaningfully share it with others. It consists of what 
Panikkar calls intra-religious dialogue
354
 – a dialogue where one consciously and critically 
appropriates one's own tradition to deeply understand it. Without this deep understanding 
of and commitment to one's own tradition, there are simply no grounds for dialogue to 
proceed. 
3.3.2. Respect for Others and the Value of Openness 
In Ricoeur’s view, esteem for oneself and for others is very fundamental for the 
establishment of meaningful relationships. This is because Ricoeur believes that “I cannot 
have self-esteem unless I esteem others as myself. ‘As myself’ means that you too are 
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capable of starting something in the world, of acting for a reason, of hierachizing your 
priorities, of evaluating the ends of your actions and, having done this, of holding yourself 
in esteem as I hold myself in esteem”.
355
 To understand the other in this way is to 
recognise and respect their integrity as I would want my integrity respected. Thus, it 
establishes a kind of solicitude between oneself and the other based on mutual respect – the 
kind of respect which goes beyond treating people simply as means to an end to treating 
them as ends-in-themselves. While the first exploits and violates their integrity, the second 
recognises and preserves it.  
If the virtue of openness in dialogue means the willingness to enter into dialogue by 
sharing my testimonies of faith with the other while listening with generosity to the other’s 
testimonies of faith, then openness is founded on the respect one has for the other. Here, 
the value of openness begins from my recognition and acknowledgment that the other is an 
authentic other who also possesses unique truths which I desire to learn. As Panikkar puts 
it, the other here “is not just an other (alius) and much less an object of my knowledge 
(aliud), but another self (alter) who is a source of self understanding and also of 
understanding, not necessarily reducible to my own”.
356
 It is on the basis of this sense of 
respect for the traditions of the other which sets dialogue as an exercise in learning on a 
hopeful course.  
 
3.3.3. The Principle of Equality or Equal-Partners-in-Dialogue 
Within the context of the ethical intention, Ricoeur asserted that just institutions use the 
principles of justice and equality to ensure the equitable distribution of benefits and 
burdens, rewards and tasks among the different members of society. Whether understood 
as the sense of justice in the ethical plane or in the Rawlsian conception of fairness in the 
moral plane; the principle of equality attempts to regulate “what is fair to each one as 
anonymous members of the society”.
357
 Its distributive principle “consists in equalizing 
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two relations between, in each case, a person and merit”.
358
 Consequently, it ensures that 
the beliefs, needs and aspirations of some are not sacrificed for or violated by the interests 
of others. In this way, the principle of equality ensures that the views of all members of the 
society are fairly served.  
It is the above sense of equality which is at the heart of dialogue as an exercise in 
learning. In his seventh “Ground Rules to Interreligious Dialogue”, Swidler rightly pointed 
out that “dialogue can only take place between equals”.
359
 This sense of equality is 
informed by the fact that one does not consider the other’s religious tradition or theological 
views inferior to one’s own. It does not glory in absolutist or exclusivist claims which 
denigrate the other’s viewpoints nor does it relativizes one’s religious beliefs in the face of 
the other. Here, the principle of equal-partners-in-dialogue recognises and respects the 
other’s belief systems as constitutive truths within their original tradition-specific contexts. 
That which dialogue as an exercise in learning then offers is the opportunity to learn from 
what the other has to say in respect of their beliefs.  
In consequence, we could say that religious commitment remains the foundation 
from which authentic interreligious dialogue occurs.  It is from one’s commitments that 
one seeks to know the commitments of another. As Dupuis indicated, “it is in the fidelity 
to these personal nonnegotiable convictions, honestly accepted on both sides, that 
interreligious dialogue takes place ‘between equal’ – in their differences”.
360
 In this way, 
the tension between commitment and openness is neither dissipated nor resolved but is 
made creative in an on-going process whose interest is learning from and about the other.  
However, what happens when the living out of the ethical intention through the 
moral norm produces conflicts of obligations? In other words, if we agree that Islam and 
Christianity are unique religions with different systems of belief, what happens when 
differences in christological understandings create dialogical aporias in their assessment of 
what is considered a value to them? In response, let us turn to Ricoeur’s notion of practical 
wisdom understood as the appropriate judgement of situations for the good of the situation. 
                                                          
358
 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself As Another. 1992, p201 
359
 Leonard Swidler. Towards a Universal Theology of Religion. 1988, p15 
360
 Jacques Dupuis. Christianity and the Religions. 2003, p129 
105 
 
3.4. The Hermeneutics of the Self and Practical Wisdom  
By way of recall, we noted that Ricoeur’s “little ethics” sought to establish a relationship 
of subordination and complementarity between ethics and morality. In doing this, Ricoeur 
proposed three theses: (1) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the 
ethics to be mediated by the moral norm, (3) the recourse morality must take to ethics to 
resolve morally conflictual situations. The exercise we have undertaken so far has been an 
investigation into the first two theses. This section concentrates on the third thesis – the 
recourse morality must take to ethics to resolve moral conflicts. Ricoeur calls this practical 
wisdom – the appropriate judgement of situations for the best of situations in the effort to 
live “the good life with and for others in just institutions”.  
Ricoeur undertakes this project within the context of tragic wisdom. For him, 
tragedy produces ethico-practical aporias. Ricoeur cites examples of such aporetic 
situations in Greek tragedy; like the case of Antigone and Creon
361
 who find themselves in 
conflicting moral obligations. Without intending to recount these stories, what Ricoeur 
emphasizes in these accounts is the moral obligation which forces Antigone to give her 
brother a sepulchre in accordance to custom, even though he has become an enemy of the 
city. For Ricoeur, this act expresses something more than the rights of the family in 
opposition to those of the city.
362
 Here, one finds that the bond between sister and brother 
supersedes the political distinction between friend and enemy. However, in the case of the 
city in whose defence Creon “subordinates his family bonds by forbidding the burial of the 
friend now become an enemy, it too receives from its mythical and from its lasting 
religious structure, a significance that is more than political”.
363
  
In these two tragic cases, therefore, one finds discordance in the way Antigone and 
Creon draw the lines between friend and enemy. For Ricoeur, the practical determination 
of these two cases “cannot be reduced to simple modalities of choices along the lines 
described by Aristotle and Kant”.
364
 Something more is needed and in the light of 
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Sophocles’ Antigone, Ricoeur relies on tragic wisdom.
365
 According to Ricoeur, “tragic 
wisdom” is capable of directing us in conflicts of different nature – conflicts which arise as 
a result of conflicting moral obligations. Like the tragedy of Antigone we are also, in some 
way, caught up with the interminable opposition between man and woman, old age and 
youth, society and the individual, the living and the dead – an opposition whose solution is 
not to be sought in an either/or dialectic.  
In the same way, the conflicts that arise as a result of our obligations to one thing or 
another are not merely resolved by recourse to morality or ethics or even a synthesis of the 
two. What is to be sought in such aporetic situations is “practical wisdom”.
366
 Practical 
wisdom is the appropriate application of universal norms in situations where one is 
confronted by conflicting moral obligations. It is neither synthetic nor disavows the 
morality of obligation but is designed to give guidance as to how one can act appropriately 
and justly in aporetic situations. It is the art of mediating the requirements of the ethical 
aim and the moral norm so as to be able to act appropriately and thereby contribute to 
establishing happiness with and for others in just institutions.
367
  
Taking the triadic components of the ethical aim (just institutions, respect for 
persons and autonomy), Ricoeur demonstrates how morally conflictual situations arise 
within these different components.
368
 However, we shall only focus attention on two 
examples of moral conflicts within the context of respect for person and show how Ricoeur 
proposes a mediation of them through practical wisdom. The reasons for this delimitation 
are as follows: while the reciprocity of respect (solicitude) constitutes the dialogic structure 
of self-esteem/respect, the principles of justice and equality are the extension of solicitude 
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at the level of just institutions. As Ricoeur puts it, “the sense of justice takes nothing away 
from solicitude but presupposes it to the extent that it holds persons to be irreplaceable”.
369
  
Since self-respect (autonomy) and the principles of justice and equality (just 
institutions) can be derived from respect for persons (solicitude), we deem that the focus 
on two examples of the conflicts generated in solicitude and how practical wisdom 
mediates between them would, to some extent, provide an implied sense of how practical 
wisdom could mediate between morally conflictual situations at the levels of society and 
the individual. Apart from this reason, not only is time and space a factor, but the attempt 
to give a comprehensive treatment to the other components would digress from the thesis 
of the chapter. Thus, let us address the two examples of moral conflicts in solicitude or 
respect for persons and how practical wisdom mediates between them.   
3.4.1. Respect for Persons and Conflicts 
Ricoeur’s moral principle of respect for persons hinges on the second Kantian Categorical 
Imperative: “treat humanity in one’s own person and in the person of others as an end in 
itself and not as a means”.
370
  For Ricoeur, one finds in this imperative a fine dividing line 
between the universalist version of the imperative (represented by the idea of humanity) 
and the pluralist version of it (represented by the idea of persons as ends in themselves). 
Whereas Kant finds no opposition between the two versions,
371
 Ricoeur asserts that a 
conflict arises “as soon as the otherness of persons, inherent in the very idea of human 
plurality, proves to be... incompatible with the universality of the rules that underlie the 
idea of humanity”.
372
 Here, respect due to persons splits up “into respect for the law and 
respect for persons”.
373
 Under these competing claims between respect for persons and 
respect for the law, practical wisdom may constitute “giving priority to the respect for 
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Ricoeur examines the idea of promise-keeping in the light of the application of the 
second Kantian Categorical Imperative and those sanctioned by law. According to Ricoeur, 
the Constitutive rule of promising says that “A places himself under the obligation of doing 
X on behalf of B in circumstance Y”.
375
 Here, the principle of fidelity
376
defines the 
obligation to keep one’s promises. It begins from the firm intention or the commitment to 
do what the other expects of me. As a rule of reciprocity, it “establishes the other in the 
position of someone to whom an obligation is owed, someone who is counting on me and 
making self-constancy a response to this expectation”.
377
  
In respect of promises sanctioned by laws, oaths and contracts, Ricoeur says that 
“the expectations of others who count on me... becomes a right to require something of 
me”.
378
 Though the promise-to-keep-the-law takes us into the area of legal norms which 
seem to obliterate the relations between the norm and solicitude when one reconsiders the 
forms of promise sanctioned by the courts, there still remains a tie between the normative 
moment and the ethical intentions expressed as: “‘from you’ says the other, ‘I expect that 
you would keep your word; to you I reply, ‘you can count on me.’”
379
 So, counting-on-me 




Since the above discourse constitutes the context within which self-constancy is 
maintained through promise-keeping and the obligation imposed on one by law, the 
conflicts of moral duty arise when one makes exceptions to the maxim on behalf of oneself 
or on behalf of others. Here, Ricoeur cites two examples of morally conflictual situations 
and how practical wisdom mediates between them to facilitate the path to the living-out of 
the good life with and for others in just institutions. Whereas one example is cited from the 
“beginning of life”, the other comes from the “end of life” situations. 
The first example concerns whether or not to tell the truth to the dying. Here, a 
breach occurs between two extreme attitudes: either telling the truth to a dying person out 
                                                          
375
 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself As Another. 1992, p262 
376
 Ibid, p262 
377
 Ibid, p268 
378
 Ibid, p268 
379
 Ibid, p268 
380
 Ibid, p268 
109 
 
of sheer respect for the law and without the concern for the capacity of the dying person to 
receive the truth or consciously lying to the dying person out of fear that the truth might 
agonise the dying person. How does practical wisdom apply in such situations? For 
Ricoeur, practical wisdom would consist of inventing the just behaviour best suited for 
each case. It considers as false the establishment of rules out of the duty to lie to the patient 
for fear that the truth might cause them more pain. It therefore disallows “transforming into 
a rule, the exceptions of the rule”.
381
  
Practical wisdom focuses on how to communicate the truth to the patient in the 
most appropriate way taking into consideration the condition of the patient. As Ricoeur 
puts it, “it is one thing to name an illness, it is quite another to reveal the degree of 
seriousness and the slight chances of survival and yet another to wield the clinical truth as 
a death sentence”.
382
 By focusing on the appropriate way to communicate the truth, 
practical wisdom also takes cognizance of the fact that there are some situations where 
even telling the truth to the patient “becomes the opportunity for the exchange of giving 
and receiving under the sign of the acceptance of death”.
383
 Thus, it demands that we 
carefully judge the situation with the aid of expert advice. This advice then helps one to 
take the best suited step in response to the rule of reciprocity and respect. 
The second example relates to respect for persons at the “beginning of life” or the 
problem of abortions. Abortions cause difficult moral problems because of the ontological 
questions which are posed at the beginning of life. For instance, what is the nature of the 
being of the embryo and the foetus? If Kant’s statement that “rational beings exist as ends 
in themselves” is to be taken seriously as the basis for respect due to persons, then the 
difficult moral question is – what sort of being are the embryo and the foetus? Are they 
things or persons? If one follows Kant’s argument that “only rational beings exist in 
themselves”, then the implication remains that only fully developed rational beings have 
moral standing and since the foetus and embryo are not fully rational they have no moral 
standing.  
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Construing the human person based on the Kantian “rational being” proposition 
contradicts the views of others who focus essentially on life as the presence and absence of 
the human person. For advocates of the biological criterion, a “person and life are 
indissociable inasmuch as the latter supports the former”.
384
 For them, the genomics of 
heredity which defines biologic individuality is constituted at the moment of conception. 
This means that human life begins at the moment of conception. In this way “the embryo’s 
‘right to life’ is a right to a ‘chance to live.’”
385
 Thus, any practice that does not serve this 




Practical wisdom therefore mediates between Kant’s rational beings view and the 
views of the biologic school by stirring a middle ground between the understanding of 
persons and things. Here, it focuses on the position of the biological school to determine 
the phenomenon of the “thresholds and stages of the development of life” through a 
progressive ontology which recognizes embryos as potential human beings whose rational 
capacities develop over time.
387
 This is then used to defend the rights of foetuses as 
persons.  
Thus, practical wisdom affirms that there are different stages of the development of 
the human person from the human embryo to the fully developed person. Embryos are 
therefore potential human beings. So, in each stage of their development there is a 
progression of qualitatively different rights and duties: the right not to suffer, the duty to 
prevent suffering, the right to protection and the obligation to offer it and the right to 
respect and the duty to give it, “once something like an exchange – even dissymmetrical, 
of proverbial signs is begun between the foetus and its mother”.
388
  
In consequence, practical wisdom in these and similar moral conflictual situations 
has the following features: firstly, it upholds the moral norm, though it may apply it 
differently according to different situations; secondly, it searches for a “just mean” or the 
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Aristotelian mesotēs i.e. it searches for a common ground or a negotiation of the broken 
middle; thirdly, as a judgement in situations, practical wisdom always relies on the 
knowledge of competent and wise experts, in order to traverse the domain of arbitrariness 
and make appropriate judgements of the situation.
389
 As Kaplan puts it, a person of 




In considering practical wisdom in the light of Christian-Muslim dialogue, one 
could say that in the case of the conflict of interpretations concerning the meaning of, for 
instance, a christological title like Messiah which is common to Islam and Christianity, 
practical wisdom would first of all consist of understanding its meaning within each 
traditions and the theological frameworks which give rise to its meaning. Hence, a 
consideration of the principle of the Tawhid and the doctrine of the Holy Trinity and how 
they give meaning to the Christian and Islamic interpretations of the title is helpful. Here, 
the views of recognised Islamic and Christian scholars may contribute to giving clarity to 
the understanding of the concept within the two traditions.  
In the case of Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning, 
practical wisdom would also emphasize on how Christians and Muslims can learn from 
each other on the basis of the message of Jesus as it reflects in their respective traditions. 
Here, though the title Messiah may mean differently between the two traditions, practical 
wisdom does not emphasize on “who is the right claimant of truth about the meaning of the 
title”, but what can be learnt from the message, the life and mission of the title bearer in the 
living out of the good life with and for others in just institutions? This is the significant 
question which will guide our deliberations in chapters five and six. 
3.5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it must be said that Christology is still, today, a hotbed for contentious 
Christian-Muslim conversations. These contentions seem to have been worsened by the 
negative perceptions both Christians and Muslims have about each other’s Scriptures and 
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the place of Jesus in these Scriptures. Yet Jesus remains a common historical personality to 
both traditions. Though differences in religious traditions may be the reason for the 
sometimes deadening apologetics between them, much of these are also the results of 
unresolved prejudices each have about the other. This is why dialogue on Christology as an 
exercise in learning is deemed relevant for clarifying some of these prejudices, where 
possible. 
Here, learning has the capacity to clarify unfounded prejudices and set the 
dialogical parties on a new form of interrelationship defined by what Ricoeur refers to as 
aiming at the good life with and for others in just institutions. If we consider that in 
interreligious dialogue the “good life” could also mean “a life lived in submission to God” 
expressed in the love of God and love of neighbour; then aiming at the “good life” is not 
only undertaken in isolation, but together with others through the institutions which shape 
and guide their respective understandings of the good life. However, living a good life 
together with others in just institutions demands that we cultivate certain attitudes or 
dispositions in respect of our perceptions of the other and how we relate to them. In other 
words, the encounter with the other demands honest, sincere and respectful relationships. 
We consider that dialogue as an exercise in learning is made possible under some 
necessary conditions such as commitment, openness, respect for others and the recognition 
of the other as an equal partner. In the discourses above, we found that Ricoeur’s three 
components of the ethical intention somehow provided the medium for further reflections 
on these necessary conditions also called the appropriate dialogical attitudes. 
Consequently, the thesis of this chapter lies in the claim that: for Christian-Muslim 
dialogue on Christology to succeed as an exercise in learning, it must take serious 
considerations of the above necessary conditions to dialogue with the other. By so doing, 
the locus of learning would then lie in what the self and other have to say about Jesus. For 
Islam Jesus is a “prophet or messenger of Allah”, while for Christianity he is the “Son of 
God” or the incarnate Word of God. Thus, let us now specifically turn to what Christians 
and Muslims mean when they consider Jesus as the “Son of God” and the “prophet of 
Allah” respectively. Here, the question to be asked is: what can Christians and Muslims 




COMPARATIVE THEOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM DIALOGUE ON 
CHRISTOLOGY AS AN EXERCISE IN LEARNING 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
4. TOWARDS THE TRADITION-SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS OF 
CHRISTOLOGY: CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES 
4.1. Introduction 
The thesis of this chapter is built on the argument that Christianity and Islam have 
tradition-specific responses to the christological question: “Who do you say Jesus is?” 
Consequently, as an exercise in learning from and about the other, Christian-Muslim 
dialogue on Christology needs to begin from these responses. By tradition-specific 
understandings, we mean the ‘distinctively Christian or Muslim orthodox responses to 
questions regarding the identity and mission of Jesus Christ. As we asserted in chapter 
three under the category of commitment and openness to the other, genuine dialogue 
demands that one shares with the other from the integrity of one’s faith. It also requires 
that one is open to learn from and about what the other has to say about Jesus from the 
integrity of their faith.
391
 Thus, the Christian and Islamic tradition-specific understanding 
of Christology is significant for the success of dialogue as an exercise in learning. 
Though construed differently, Jesus is significantly referenced in the scriptural 
canons of both Islam and Christianity. While Christians conceive that Jesus Christ is “God 
or the Son of God”, Muslims believe that Jesus is “a prophet of Allah”. Consequently, a 
Christian-Muslim comparative theological approach to Christology needs to investigate 
what Christians and Muslims mean when they conceive Jesus as “God or Son of God” and 
“a prophet of Allah” on the one hand and the theological frameworks which support these 
conceptions. This is considered relevant because such an approach would enable the 
                                                          
391
 Dupuis. Christianity and the Religions. 2001, p230 
114 
 
dialogical partners to understand and appreciate the basis from which each tradition 
theologizes about Jesus Christ the way it does.  
A careful survey of the christological literature of both Christianity and Islam 
reveals that these two faith communities appear to have more to say about Jesus Christ 
than any other religion in the world. Yet between them, the identity and mission of Jesus 
remains a contentious theological subject – sometimes dividing them irreconcilably. For 
this reason Charles Kimball could ask; “Why have these two communities clashed so 
vigorously through the centuries? What informs the sense of mistrust that pervades the 
history of Christian-Muslim relations and skews every attempt to relate more 
constructively today?”
392
 For Douglas Pratt, the reason is because Christianity and Islam 
are pre-eminently religions of belief. Each has had to struggle to define its own orthodoxy 
from variant heterodoxies and heresies from within, with a “history of self-proclamation as 
universal truths over against any claimant of truth from without”.
393
  
Tarif Khalidi however thinks that the Qur’anic Jesus is made to distance himself 
from the doctrines that his own community (Christianity) holds of him. According to 
Khalidi, the bulk of references to Jesus in the Qur’an “come in the form of divine 
pronouncements which speak about him or on behalf of him; passages that remind Jesus 
himself or mankind in general that God is the ultimate creator and master of the life and 
destiny of Jesus, as of all creation”.
394
 As if to say, “here, then, is the true Jesus ‘cleansed’ 
of the ‘perversions’ of his followers, a prophet totally obedient to his maker and offered up 
as the true alternative to the Jesus of the incarnation, crucifixion and redemption”.
395
 Here, 
Christians are left to wonder where the biblical narratives of Jesus have gone.
396
 
 Whether or not Pratt and Khalidi provide adequate responses to Kimball’s question, 
our claim here is this: the identity and mission of Jesus Christ is differently construed in 
Christianity and Islam. These different religious traditions have their respective theologies 
which provide the framework for a systematic understanding of his identity and mission 
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within their own contexts. For instance, Jesus as a prophet of Allah perfectly fits into the 
Islamic acknowledgement of the Tawhid. Here, Jesus’ divinity as expressed in the 
incarnation, the crucifixion, suffering, death and resurrection cannot be supported. The 
Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity also supports the incarnation and resurrection, but 
forbids the reduction of Jesus’ identity to the status of a prophet. Thus, one could view 
Jesus as both bridge and barrier to Christian-Muslim relations – a bridge because, both 
religions recognize him as a “historical personality” who proclaimed a unique message 
from God and a barrier because each has a unique theological framework within which he 
is construed.  
The desire to understand these unique theologies is the motivation behind this 
chapter on “the tradition-specific understanding of Christology”. We deem this to be 
relevant because if we understand that the success of dialogue as “an exercise in learning” 
is the acquisition of something new from the other; then the fact that Christianity and Islam 
are religions with different traditions suggests that there is something more about Jesus in 
the other’s tradition which we can learn in new and better ways. As we argued in chapter 
three, respect for the integrity of the other must first begin by allowing the other to 
communicate truths about Jesus as they pertain to their traditions. This chapter therefore 
seeks to create the appropriate platform for this mutual sharing to occur. Within this 
context of sharing as Gadamer puts it, “what is to be grasped is the substantive rightness of 
the other’s opinion, so that we can be at one with each other on a subject”.
397
     
4.2. Tradition-Specific Understanding of Christology: A Christian Perspective 
“Christology” has its etymological roots from two Greek words: “Χριστός” (Christos) 
which means “Christ” and “λογία” (logos) which means “word, reason or the study of”. 
Since “Christ” refers to Jesus, we could say that “Christology” in the Christian context, 
means “the study of the person and mission of Jesus Christ” or as Raymond Brown puts it, 
“Christology would discuss how Jesus came to be called Messiah or Christ and what was 
meant by that designation”.
398
 From this perspective, Brown views Christology as that 
subject which discusses any evaluation of Jesus in respect to who he was and the role he 
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played in the divine plan.
399
 It addresses issues relating to Jesus as both God and Man and 
how he became such in the incarnation. Whereas the Christian scriptures provide a wealth 
of evidence in relation to narratives that justify the conceptual pairing of the humanity and 
divinity of Jesus Christ, Christology correlates and clarifies how this is made possible in 
the same person. 
In other words, we could say that today, Christology represents a renewed response 
to the question Jesus put to his disciples: “Who do you say I am?” From the testimony of 
the synoptic Gospels, we find different responses to this christological question. In Mark 
8:27-29, while others said he was John the Baptist, still others said he was Elijah or one of 
the Ancient prophets. But for Peter, Jesus is “the Christ, the son of the living God”. So 
from the text of Mark 8:27-29, we could say that these different responses represent the 
diverse understandings of the early Christians’ experience of Jesus, giving rise to what 
some scholars called the ‘multiple christologies’ of the New Testament.
400
  
In our contemporary context, there is a growing interest among scholars who seek 
to find whether there is a correlation between Jesus’ self-understanding and the 
understanding of the disciples. As Raymond Brown rightly interrogated, “to what extent 
did what his followers said and thought about him corresponds to the image reflected in 
what he himself said and did?”
401
 Are these in continuity with Chalcedonian Christology? 
Responses to these questions have equally precipitated multiple christological approaches 
such as low Christology (Christology from below) and high Christology (Christology from 
above) – sometimes set in diametrical opposition to each other. According to Brown, while 
“low christology” covers the evaluation of Jesus in terms that do not necessarily imply his 




Thus, there are variant responses to the Christological question – sometimes very 
similar with the responses of the immediate disciples of Jesus. However, do these different 
responses defy any possibility of a unified christological understanding of Jesus Christ for 
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Christian faith and theology? For Longenecker, there may be distinctive features in the 
portrayals of Jesus by the New Testament writers, but “there is a certain ‘sense of centre’ 
in the various representations and statements about Jesus of Nazareth by the New 
Testament writers”.
403
 Trusting the veracity of Longenecker’s view in the light of the 
contemporary argument that “Christology is pluralistic in both method and content”,
404
 it 
could be said that Christian theology nonetheless continues to emphasize on this “sense of 
centre” as the appropriate Christian response to the christological question i.e. for Christian 
theology, Jesus is “the Christ, the son of the living God” (Mark 8:29). 
In the light of the views that the synoptic Gospels portray Jesus Christ as one who 
was predominantly concerned with proclaiming the imminence of the kingdom of God and 
of its justice, without particular emphasis on himself as God,
405
 some scholars seem to 
battle with the question as to how the proclaimer or the bearer of the word of God could 
suddenly become the proclaimed or the essential content of that Word.
406
 They ask whether 
there is congruence between Jesus’ self understanding and the understanding of the early 
Christian community. Here, the question Muslims constantly put to Christians remains 
relevant: how could God become man in Jesus Christ and still retain his divine attributes?  
The above questions point to the christological challenge which Christian theology 
is called upon to respond. Consequently, our interest in this section is to investigate into 
how the Synoptic Gospels (especially the Gospel of Mark) map out the identity and 
mission of Jesus Christ and how this is articulated in Christian theology today. We choose 
to take this route into the Christian perspective on Christology because: Christology 
represents an enormous branch of Christian theology whose scope cannot be covered in 
this limited space. As we shall see, Jesus Christ is the reason for Christian faith and hence, 
permeates the entirety of the Christian life and theology. So a Christology from a Christian 
perspective cannot be comprehensively attended to in the limited space provided here 
because it would consist in giving an account of Christian faith and theology which ranges 
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from protology to eschatology.  However, since dialogue as an exercise in learning 
demands the sharing of mutual testimonies of faith about the life and mission of Jesus 
Christ, Christians cannot but present a Christian view of the identity and mission of Jesus 
Christ – one which is at once summarised and yet represents an authentic Christian 
perspective.  
It is in response to the above duty to share the Christian story about Jesus Christ 
that we turn to the Christology of the synoptic Gospels, particularly the Gospel of Mark. 
While it is scholarly acclaimed that the synoptic Gospels “see Jesus Christ with the same 
eye” and so, tell similar stories about him; our interest in Mark’s Gospel is informed by 
how Mark presents the identity of Jesus Christ through his “Son of God” and “Son of 
Man” motifs. On the one hand, while this two-nature Christology represents the authentic 
Christian perspective on the identity of Jesus Christ, on the other hand, it is also the locus 
of conflict (the Son of God motif) between the Christian and Muslim understanding of 
Jesus Christ. Hence, a clarification on the metaphoricity of the “Son of God” motif in 
Christianity might contribute to changing Muslim perceptions about Christians, albeit the 
degree. Where this occurs, dialogue as an exercise in learning would have been all the 
more enriching – notwithstanding its emphasis on one’s commitment to the home tradition.  
4.2.1. Christology in the Synoptic Gospels: the Markan Priority  
The term “synoptic” has its etymology from two Greek words; “syn” and “optic” which 
means “together” and “seen” respectively. Hence, “synoptic” literally means “seeing 
together”. When applied to the Gospel material, synoptic characterizes those Gospels that 
“see together” or present the same narratives, in the same sequence and wording about 
Jesus Christ. The first three Gospels (Matthew, Mark and Luke) are often defined by this 
category because of their degree of similarity in content, narrative structure, language and 
sentence formation. As Paul M. Haffner pointed out, “when placed side by side and 
brought in one view, these three Gospels present a striking resemblance and appear as one 
narrative”.
407
 Thus, Matthew, Mark and Luke are said to be so similar to each other that in 
a sense, they view Jesus Christ “with the same eye” in contrast to the very different picture 
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of Jesus Christ presented in the Johannine Gospel. Yet, as Haffner indicated, there are also 
many significant differences between the synoptic Gospels. Hence, we consider that a 
focus on Mark’s Christology would, to some degree, speak to the christological issues 
raised in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. Why Mark’s Gospel? 
The Gospel of Mark is credited to John Mark, a companion of Peter the Apostle 
(see Acts 12:12-13, Col 4:10 and 1Tim 4:11). Whereas some scholars like Dominic 
Crossan think that Mark made use of earlier traditional sources (the Gospel of St Thomas 
or the Gospel of Barnabas) in composing his Gospel,
408
 scholarly consensus has it that 
Mark’s Gospel was written between 60-70AD and is regarded as the earliest among the 
canonical Gospels.
409
 Mark’s Gospel is the shortest among the canonical Gospels, written 
in primitive (simple) Greek possibly by an author who clearly has a first language other 
than Greek.
410
 Its language is very direct and vivid. It has no background information 
about Jesus; especially his ancestry and other relevant biographical information as one 
might expect. The Gospel is equally stripped of the normal endings of Jesus’ appearances 
after the resurrection, commonly associated with the other synoptics. So apart from the 
“son of God” and the “Son of Man” motifs, its earlier dating is the reason for our 
preference.  
According to Morna Hooker, the best way to discover Mark’s Christology is by 
considering the Gospel as it stands; a narrative Christology which can only be understood 
by studying the story that Mark tells.
411
 If dialogue demands that we listen carefully to 
what the other has to say about Jesus, then it is all the more necessary for us to be attentive 
to the story Mark tells about Jesus. Many scholars agree that the narrative structure of 
Mark’s Gospel consists of the Prologue (1:1-15), the Galilean Ministry (1:16 – 8:26), the 
Way of the Cross (8:27 – 15:39) and Epilogue (15:40 – 16:8). Kummel however indicates 
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that the epilogue (Mk 16:9-20) is not part of the original Mark.
412
 From this structure, one 
could study Mark’s Christology in different ways: either by focusing on the healings, 
exorcisms and miracle stories or by the titles used by Jesus or designated to him. For this 
study, we propose an entry into Markan Christology through the titles “the Son of God” 
and “the Son of Man”. Here, we shall argue that Mark’s authorial intent is unmistakably 
stated in the prologue of the Gospel, with the rest of the narrative being a progressive 
development of this intent. As we indicated in the introduction, the work here is not 
exegetical per se but a theological reading or interpretation of the Gospel.    
4.2.1.1. The Prologue of Mark (1: 1-15) 
According to Donald English, Mark’s purpose is to be found in the prologue, especially in 
the opening thirteen verses which “sets it out in breathtaking clarity”.
413
 The prologue to 
the Gospel begins in Mk 1:1 – “this is the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son 
of God”.
414
 According to Hooker, Mark sees the Gospel (the Good News) to be, not just 
about Jesus Christ, but Jesus Christ himself. This is attested to by the fact that from Mk 1:9 
onward, Jesus would become the central figure in the narrative. Furthermore, the fact that 
Mark describes Jesus as the “Christ” (Christos) and as the “Son of God” (huios Theou) in 
Mk1:1 further defines his authorial intent concerning Jesus’ identity and mission. 
But what does Mark mean by “Christ” and “Son of God?” Though one finds the 
answer to this question in the prologue, it is also located in the main narrative of the 
Gospel. In the prologue, Mark first of all, draws continuity between Jesus and God’s 
previous activities in the world (Mk1:2-3) – “Look, I am sending out my messenger ahead 
of you to prepare your way...” According to Morna Hooker, Mark attributes this quotation 
(which is a mixture of Exodus 23:20, Malachi 3:1 and Isaiah 40:3) to the prophet Isaiah
415
 
who is a strong pillar in the Old Testament (OT) prophetic narratives. By establishing that 
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continuity between Jesus and the prophet Isaiah, Mark “sees Jesus as the fulfilment of OT 
hopes and as the one who brings redemption that is, in effect, a new exodus”.
416
  
Secondly, John the Baptist who is the last of the OT prophets is presented in the 
Gospel as the “voice” that cries in the wilderness (1:3). Here, John functions as the one 
who calls the nation to repentance through baptism (1:4-5) and to some extent, a herald 
and a witness to the identity of the one he announces (1:7-8).
417
 Thirdly, the voice from 
heaven which said; “You are my son, the beloved with whom I am well pleased” (1:11), 
seals Mark’s Christological intent in that the “heavenly Father’s” voice is identified as God 
himself. So, if God calls Jesus His son, what further evidence does one need to ascertain 
Jesus’ divine sonship? This made Donald English assert that Mk 1:11 “provide the closing 
brackets of the parenthesis which began with the Son of God in Mk 1:1”.
418
  
In consequence, Mark provides the reader with three veritable testimonies to the 
identity of Jesus in the prologue: i.e. the testimony of the scriptures through the prophet 
Isaiah, the witness of John the Baptist as a herald and above all, the affirmation of a 
heavenly higher authority (a God-Father). As Morna Hooker puts it, “whatever answers are 
given to the question ‘who is Jesus?’ in the rest of the narrative would certainly have to be 
judged against this one”.
419
  Hence, what follows the prologue is the progressive 
development of Mark’s Christology in the main narrative; built on the “Son of God” and 
“Son of Man” motif. These two christological titles would provide access to a fuller 
comprehension of Mark’s story about Jesus Christ. 
Without the presumption that the prologue is the summary of the content of the 
Gospel, it could be said that the prologue in Mark’s Gospel gives clarity to the words and 
deeds of Jesus which follow from Mk1:16 – 15:47. The corpus of Mk1:16 – 15:47 is 
divided into two sections, defined by the density of the two christological titles: “Son of 
God” and “Son of Man”. Peter’s confession on the way to Caesarea Philippi (Mk8:27-30) 
would be the watershed which separates these two titles and yet unites them in an holistic 
narrative which concerns Mark’s story about the identity and mission of Jesus Christ. 
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Thus, the first section is defined by the density of the “Son of God” sayings and 
implications (1:16 – 8:26), while the second section has the dominance of the “Son of 
Man” sayings and implications (8:31 – 15:47). However, it must be said that the two 
sections are not entirely exclusive to each other in the use of these christological titles. 
Occasionally, one finds the title “Son of God” in the second section and vice versa. This 
intertwinement probably demonstrates how the titles are united and yet separated in 
providing a single narrative about the identity and mission of Jesus Christ. Let us see how 
Mark develops this in his Gospel. 
4.2.1.2. Jesus Christ as the “Son of God” in Mark (1:16 – 8:26) 
Many New Testament (NT) scholars have variously noted the conspicuously favoured 
position Mark gives the title “Son of God” to Jesus. The title appears in the opening lines 
of the prologue (1:1), it is proclaimed by the voice from heaven at Jesus’ Baptism (1:11), it 
is confessed by the demons as Jesus subdues them (3:11 and 5:7), the “voice from heaven” 
proclaims it again at the Mount of Transfiguration (9:7), Jesus himself claims it at the high 
priest’s interrogation (14:61-62), the Centurion confesses it at the foot of the cross (15:39) 
and other instances in which by word or deed or both, Jesus directly or indirectly shows the 
appropriateness of the use of this title in reference to himself (13:32). Though Jesus is not 
seen to openly refer to himself by this title, except in response to the question put to him by 
the High Priest (Mk14:61), he neither openly objected to it anytime he was addressed by it. 
As Lewis S. Hay pointed out, “that Mark had a high regard for the title is not seriously 
questioned, but the precise meaning of the title to the Evangelist is a matter of sharp 
debate”.
420
 What then did Mark mean by use of the title Son of God?  
The title “Son of God” has frequently been used in the OT. Thus, understanding its 
meaning and context within the OT might offer us helpful insights into Mark’s 
understanding of the title. According to Cornelius Aherne, “the word ‘Son’ was employed 
among the Semites to signify not only filiation, but other close connexion and intimate 
relationship”.
421
 Hence, one finds descriptions such as the “son of strength” (meaning a 
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hero), the “son of Belial” (meaning a wicked man), the “sons of prophets” (meaning the 
disciples of prophets) and so forth. From this sense of established relationships, the title 
“Son of God” was applied in the OT to persons who have such special relationships with 
God. For instance, the Angels, devout men, the descendants of Seth were called sons of 
God (See Job 1:6, 2:1, Ps 88:7, Wis 2:13).  
The title also refers to Israel as a nation (Ex 4:22, Deut 14:50, Jeremiah 31:9, 
Hosea 11:1) and to Israel’s leaders who owe their authority to God (2Sam 7:14, 1Chr 
17:13, Ps 2:7). In the light of Israelite kingship, the title is also used in reference to 
Yahweh’s promise of the Messianic King. Here, James Dunn confirms that “in the Qumran 
scrolls, the royal Messiah is thought of as God’s son”.
422
 Hence, the use of the title in the 
OT was more analogical and metaphorical than the literal sense of filiation. Could this be 
the same sense in Mark’s identification of Jesus as the Son of God? 
Before responding to the above question, it might be helpful to try to conceptualize 
how the designation Son of God in Mark relates to Jesus’ identity as Messiah. This is 
significant because: first of all, the title Messiah feeds into Mark’s identification of Jesus 
as the “Son of God”. Secondly, the Qur’an in many verses also refers to Jesus as Messiah 
(al-Masih – see Surah 4:171). As a result, some Christian enthusiasts have the tendency to 
illegitimately impose Christian views on Islamic contexts when theologizing on al-Masih. 
In dialogue as an exercise in learning, both Christians and Muslims need to know what 
each mean when they refer to Jesus as Messiah or al-Masih. This is very significant for the 
prospects of dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the other.  
Mark’s identification of Jesus as Messiah begins in the prologue which has within 
it the key Greek terms: [‘ησοῦ Χριστοῦ υἱοῦ θεοῦ] or “Jesus Christ, the Son of God” (Mk 
1:1). The word Christos (Messiah in Aramaic) means “the anointed one”. It initially 
referred to the anointing of a king who is appointed by God (King David for example). 
O’Collins here indicates that “by the ritual act of anointing, OT kings were installed, for 
example: Saul (1Sam10:1), David (2Sam2:4, 5:3) and Solomon (1Kings 1:34). Hence the 
king could be called the ‘Lord’s anointed.’”
423
 O’Collins adds that this practice of 
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anointing kings was later extended to the anointing of Aaronic priesthood; and also to the 
prophets, though there was no actual rite of anointing for the prophets.
424
 However, with 
time, the term became linked to the expectations of a kingly Messiah who would liberate 
Israel from foreign domination.
425
  
From its political context, the concept soon took on a more religious meaning in 
connection with the establishment of the “kingdom of God”. As Dermot Lane puts it, “in 
time, God’s promises became centred around the establishment of the kingdom of God on 
earth. The leading figure here was the Messiah who would be associated with the setting 
up of the kingdom of God”.
426
 Establishing this kingdom of God no longer entails waging 
wars of conquests, but leading people to seek repentance and forgiveness of sins. Here, the 
enemy would no longer be a foreign power but sin. As Messiah, Jesus’ role would be to 
save “fallen humanity” from the tyranny of sin and death. Thus, Jesus’ particular interest in 
preaching the reign or the kingdom of God, together with the miracles that accompanied 
his teachings convinced his disciples that he was the expected Messiah.  
O’Collins does not hesitate to add that while the miracles and wondrous deeds 
Jesus performed helped the first Christians to identify Jesus as the promised Messiah, Jesus 
himself also interpreted his person and activities messianically; in an unregal and 
unwarlike fashion.
427
 So, if Mark ascribes the title Messiah to Jesus, then he was simply 
expressing the experience of the first Christian community, of which he was constitutively 
part. Besides, the events of Jesus’ baptism and transfiguration in which the voice from 
heaven calls Jesus “my beloved son” (1:11 and 9:7) goes to confirm the close link between 
Jesus’ messianism and his identity as the “Son of God”. So in Mk 1:16 – 8:26, Mark then 
sets out to demonstrate to his readers, the truth about Jesus as the Messiah, the Son of God. 
If Jesus performs miracles and wonders, then it is as a consequence of his being the 
Messiah, the Son of God.  
                                                          
424
 O’Collins. Christology. 2009, p25 
425
 According to O’Collins, the rule of Yahweh is revealed in the rule of this messianic Davidic king who is 
also symbolized in the “one like the son of man.” (Ibid, p27, 25-28) 
426
 Dermot Lane. The Reality of Jesus. 1975, p13 
427
 O’Collins. Christology. 2009, p27 
125 
 
In this way, the reader soon discovers that after Jesus’ announcement of the 
imminence of “the kingdom of God” and the calling of some disciples, what immediately 
follows in succession are exorcisms, healings and the show of supernatural authority. Here, 
one finds the Messiah, the Son of God seriously at work by delivering the man with the 
unclean spirit (1:21ff), the healing of Simon’s mother in-law (1:29ff), other healings in 
Galilee (1:35ff), the cleansing of the leper (1:40ff), the healing of the paralytic (2:1ff) and 
the man with the withered hand (3:1ff), the calming of the storm (4:35ff), the deliverance 
of the Gerasene demoniac (5:1ff), raising of Ja’irus’ daughter back to life (5:21ff), the 
feeding of the five thousand (6:30ff), walking on the sea (6:45ff), the deliverance of the 
little girl with the unclean spirit (7:24ff), the cure of the deaf man (7:31ff), feeding the four 
thousand (8:1ff) and the cure of the blind man (8:22ff).  
These spectacular events by themselves evoked significant questions and responses 
on the part of the people who experienced or witnessed them. According to Hooker, “the 
events affect those who observe them with terror (4:41), amazement (5:20) and 
astonishment (5:42), for they can find no answer to the question posed in 4:41 ‘who can 
this be?’”
428
 The expressions: “what is this? A new teaching! With authority he commands 
even unclean spirits and they obey him” (1:7), “we have never seen anything like this” 
(2:12), “who then is this, that even the wind and sea obey him?” (4:41) and so forth,
429
 
somehow point to the extraordinariness of Jesus. The people’s amazement and 
acknowledgement of Jesus’ supernatural powers seem to point to the work of the Messiah 
whose picture Mark seeks to accentuate. Thus, Donald English could say that Mark’s 
“picture of the Messiah is made even more compelling by the demonstration, beyond 
words of preaching, in the miracles Jesus performed”.
430
  
In effect, it could be said that Mark’s reference to Jesus as the “Son of God” is not 
to be taken literally as the physical generation of a son, but as establishing the intimate 
relationship which existed between God and Jesus Christ. As Dunn pointed out, “when 
Christianity came to grapple with defining Jesus’ relationship with God, it was son of the 
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Father that emerged as the consensus way of doing so”.
431
 The reasons being that: first of 
all in the Gospels, Jesus expressed the relationship between himself and God in a “Father-
son” kind of relationship. For instance, he prayed to God as “Abba Father” (Mk 14: 36) 
which is a language of family intimacy. Secondly, the designation “Son of God” was used 
by the early Christians in their prayers and liturgy which supported their conviction that by 
faith in Jesus, they too were sharing in the same sense of sonship that “Abba” expressed.
432
 
Thus, the notion of divine sonship is not literal in the sense of God begetting a son.
433
  
The understanding of Jesus as the “Son of God” is perhaps one of the biggest 
stumbling block in Christian-Muslim dialogical relations. In Surah 6:101, the Qur’an says; 
“...how could He (God) have a son when He has no spouse, when he created all things and 
has full knowledge of all things?” In Surah 4:171, the Qur’an further says, “people of the 
Book; do not go to excess in your religion... God is only one God. He is far above having a 
son...”
434
 From these two texts and others, one gets the impression that the Qur’an 
perceives the Christian designation of Jesus as the “Son of God” in terms of physical 
generation – i.e. Christians believe that God has taken the Virgin Mary as His wife and 
somehow impregnated her, giving birth to His son Jesus Christ. But as we can see, when 
Christian theology conceives Jesus as the “Son of God”, this is viewed in a rather 
metaphorical sense which captures the special relationship which existed between Jesus 
and God. While this point will be further developed further in Chapter four, let us now turn 
to the meaning of the designation “Son of Man”.    
4.2.1.3. Jesus Christ as the “Son of Man” in Mark (8:31 – 15:47) 
The title “Son of Man” (ὁ υἱὸς τοὺ ἀνθρώπου) appears fourteen (14) times in Mark’s 
Gospel and out of these fourteen occasions, only two of these references (2:10-11 and 
2:27-28) appear in the “Son of God” narrative section (1:16 – 8:26). The rest of the twelve 
references can only be located in the second section of the Gospel (8:31 – 15:47). As one 
would notice, “the Son of Man” sayings are presented in Mark and the other synoptic 
Gospels as the title Jesus constantly applied in his self-reference. In Mark, these sayings 
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appear to gain their frequency and density immediately after knowing the views o the 
disciples concerning his identity: “who do people say I am?” (8:27-30). The responses 
from the people (8:28) and Peter’s confession (8:29) offered Jesus the hint at least to the 
minimum, that the people associated his work and mission to God. As Donald English puts 
it, Caesarea Philippi was for Jesus, a turning point in his ministry and Peter’s confession, a 
high point in the revelation of his identity.
435
 For Morna Hooker, “Mark’s careful ordering 
of the material makes it clear that Peter’s declaration at Caesarea Philippi marks a break-
through in the disciples understanding. For in contrast to those who, like Herod, think of 
Jesus as a prophet, Peter acknowledges Jesus to be ‘the Messiah.’”
436
  
Consequently, Donald English asserted that after Peter’s break-through, “the 
Master would from now on, concentrate increasingly on the preparation of the disciples on 
what lay ahead”
437
 i.e. the paschal mystery (the suffering, death and resurrection) – which 
would later give definitive meaning to Jesus’ identity and mission. Here, we would argue 
that Mark’s use of “the Son of Man” sayings in the second part of the Gospel inaugurates 
and brings to the fore, the humanity of Jesus as the “suffering servant” who redeems by 
dying and rising from the death. But the question is: what is the meaning and significance 
of the “Son of Man” title in Mark and how does it contribute to the understanding of 
Mark’s Christology?  
There are various disputed views as to what the title “Son of Man” frequently used 
by Jesus as a self-designation really means. For instance, Brown reports that while Géza 
Vermes argues that from the Aramaic Targums, “Son of Man” was used as a 
circumlocution for ‘I,’ Barnabas Lindars thinks that the “Son of Man” title is used to mean 
“a man such as I or a man in my position”.
438
 In Jack Kingsbury’s view, the title is without 
content as far as the identity of Jesus is concerned. Kingsbury attributes this to the fact that 
Jesus’ references to himself as the “Son of Man” does not break the secret of his identity. 
Thus, the title only functions as a “public title” by means of which Jesus’ referred to 
himself in the world. As a result, its meaning in Mark’s story captures the force of “this 
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man” or “this human being”.
439
 For James Dunn however, when seen in such ordinary 
sense as in the case of G. Vermes, B. Lindars and Jack Kingsbury, “Son of Man” does not 
seem to carry great theological or christological implications.
440
 However, it might convey 
a sense deeper than its force as “this man” or “this human being”.  
For Oscar Cullmann, the self-designation of Jesus as the “Son of Man” points to 
two categories of meaning: firstly, it points to the eschatological work that Jesus must fulfil 
in the future and secondly, it applies to his earthly task. The eschatological application 
represents a pronounced statement of majesty which corresponds to the Jewish view 
expressed in the OT, especially in Daniel 7:13-14. His primary function here is that of 
judgement. The earthly application relates to his incarnation and ministry which in 
themselves inaugurate the future eschatological experience. In this earthly task, his primary 
role is that of the suffering servant of God.
441
 Cullmann’s double sense proposition 
(eschatological work and earthly task) makes one wonder whether the views of Lindars, 
Vermes and Kingsbury are untenable. This is because its association to Jesus’ suffering, 
death, resurrection and to the future glory of the kingdom of God gives the title a deeper 
meaning. Thus, one could say that the Markan use of the title captures Mark’s attempt to 
acknowledge that Jesus, who is “the Christ, the Son of God”, is also a human being defined 
by his susceptibility to suffering and death like all other human beings. But unlike all other 
human beings, he will rise from the dead. Let us see how some texts in the OT help us 
understand Mark’s use of the title.  
In the OT, while the title “Son of Man” in Ps 8:5 refers to an ordinary human 
being,
442
 in Ezekiel 2:1, 3:1, 4:1, 5:1, it is used as a title for the prophet. However, in 
Daniel 7:13-14, it refers to a heavenly exalted figure who receives authority, glory and 
sovereign power. This exalted heavenly figure in Daniel, described as “one like the Son of 
Man” would be worshipped by all peoples and nations. His dominion is said to be 
everlasting and his kingdom is never to be destroyed. According to O’Collins, this image 
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of the “one like the Son of Man” in Daniel 7:13-14 could refer to the angels and/or the 
righteous and persecuted Jews who would be vindicated and given authority by God 
(Daniel 7:18, 21-22).
443
 However, in its usage in the Gospels as the self-designation of 
Jesus, the title draws in new contexts, meanings and implications. As his self-designation, 
Jesus used the title in three ways: (a) in his earthly work and its humble condition (Mk 
2:10); (b) in his impending suffering, death and resurrection (Mk 9:9); (c) in his future 
coming in heavenly glory to act with sovereign power at the final judgement (Mk 8:38).
444
   
Following O’Collins view, if the “one like the Son of Man” in Daniel 7 reflects 
some apocalyptic messianic interpretations, then it suggests that Mark’s identification of 
Jesus as “the Messiah” in the prologue (1:1) needs no further elucidation. Should one even 
argue that the “one like the Son of Man” in Daniel does not represent a heavenly individual 
figure, then the question would be: does the meaning associated to Daniel 7:13-14 prevent 
Jesus from taking an inherited expression and massively using it in his own way? The “Son 
of Man” title was Jesus’ own way of identifying himself.
445
  
Consequently, when one relates Mk 1:1 to the title “Son of Man”, one sees clearly 
the story Mark sought to share with his readers i.e. Mark wanted his readers to know that 
Jesus, who is the “the Messiah, the Son of God” walked the face of the earth as a human 
being (the Son of Man). He is not an abstract concept or a myth. Thus, it represents Mark’s 
way of telling his later readers that “the Son of God” walked the face of the earth as “the 
Son of Man” and this was demonstrated by his susceptibility to death and his power to rise 
from the dead on the third day, as he himself predicted. 
In Mark’s particular style, his “Son of Man” motif first of all fulfils his literary 
style (the messianic secrecy) which we shall take up in the succeeding section. Secondly, it 
also demonstrates how Gentiles (who form part of Mark’s readers) could come to know 
and believe in the true identity of Jesus as “the Son of God”. This is shown from the 
example of the Centurion (a Gentile), at the foot of the cross, who affirms Jesus’ divinity: 
“truly, this man is the Son of God” (Mk 15:39), in the same way that God Himself 
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affirmed this at the beginning of the story (Mk 1:11). Thus, Peter’s confession may be the 
high point of Mark’s Christology, but the centurion’s confession further demonstrates the 
depths of faith which Gentiles are capable of attaining in their believe in God. So, while 
Jesus is misunderstood, rejected and abandoned to die on the cross, even by his closest 
disciples, one man, a Gentile, still saw God in him (Mk 15:39).  
4.2.2. The Significance of the “Son of God” and “Son of Man” Motif 
First of all, we indicated that the opening lines of Mark’s prologue (1:1) betrayed his 
authorial intent. Whereas one can already find the christological titles of “Messiah” and 
“the Son of God” in this verse, its meaning, as a whole, makes it the foundational construct 
from which every chapter and verse is a further development. Thus, the recognition that the 
“Gospel” is about no other person but Jesus “the Christ”, “the Son of God” is very 
significant for Mark. In Mk 1:2-3, Mark draws continuity between Jesus, “the Messiah” 
and the work of God in the past, as can be found in Isaiah 40:3 – “a voice cries in the 
wilderness, prepare a way for our God”. By presenting Jesus as the fulfilment of the 
prophecies of Isaiah, Jesus is undoubtedly identified by Mark as the Messiah who fulfils 
the OT hopes (see 2Samuel 7:12-16). Secondly, the figure of John the Baptist and the 
“voice from heaven” further confirm this claim.  But how does the “Son of God” and “Son 
of Man” motif help in shaping the identity and mission of Jesus in Mark’s Gospel? 
When one considers the context of Mk 8:29-30, one realises that it presents a dual 
play which consists of Peter’s confession (8:29) and Jesus’ response to it – “tell no one 
about this” (8:30). This call to silence about his identity which Peter divulged, immediately 
leads to Jesus’ statement that “the Son of Man” must suffer and die, but would rise on the 
third day (8:31). So, we could deduce that in this pericope of Mark (8:29-30), Jesus 
acknowledges his Messianism by his affirmative silence
446
 on the matter and his request 
that they tell no one about it (Mk 8:30). Convinced that his disciples now know who he is, 
Mark proceeds to tell his readers the ultimate earthly task that Jesus still had to fulfil i.e. 
his suffering and death which would show forth his second nature, his humanity expressed 
in “the Son of Man” motif (Mk 8:31). That is, since suffering and death are by nature 
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human experiences, Jesus, who is also human, will equally experience these human 
realities. Only by virtue of his being divine (the Son of God), will Jesus, unlike all other 
humans, rise from death on the third day. So, in considering the use of the two titles in the 
Gospel, one gets the impression that Mark sought to communicate to his readers the 
message that: “Jesus Christ, the Son of God” can only fully be understood in the light of 
his identity also as the “Son of Man”.  
Though this appears to be plausible considering the arguments put forward so far, it 
is worthwhile to note that some scholars have identified and presented other reasons as the 
significance of Mark’s use of these titles in his Christology. Some of these reasons include: 
(a) Mark’s intention to correct an erroneous understanding of the Messiah at the time and 
(b) to present his story of Jesus Christ as a call to discipleship. As a corrective Christology, 
some scholars agree that Mark’s use of the two titles was in his interest to correct an 
erroneous understanding of the identity of Jesus Christ in the early Church.
447
 For Perrin, 
Mark sought to “teach the Christians of his day a true Christology in place of the false 
Christology that he felt they were in danger of accepting”.
448
 He achieved this through his 
unique style called the Messianic secrecy
449
 which rests between two poles of early 
Christian thoughts. One pole expressed the Christian belief that Jesus first became the 
Messiah only after the resurrection (e.g. Acts 2:36; Rom 1:4; Phil2:6-11). The other pole 
conceives that Jesus’ messianism is pre-existent in terms expressed in the Johannine 
Gospel (1:1-5).  
The contest between these two poles of Christological thought created an unhealthy 
tension in the early Church. Hence, in Wrede’s view, Mark diffuses this tension by 
situating his Christology between the two poles and welding them together.
450
 Thus, while 
Mark portrays Jesus as the Messiah in the prologue (1:1), he is also under the influence of 
the early Christian view on the post-resurrection experience of Jesus as the Christ of God. 
This makes Mark portray Jesus as keeping his messianic secret
451
 as is demonstrated by 
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Jesus’ “commands of silence” to demons (1:25, 3:4, 3:12), to persons he heals (1:43-45; 
5:43) and to the disciples (8:30, 9:9). In Morna Hooker’s view, Mark’s use of the 
messianic secret also serves to explain why Israel failed to recognize Jesus as “the 
Messiah”. ‘It serves as a pointer to the truth about Jesus’ identity which so many people 
failed to grasp. This truth is spelt out for us at the beginning of the Gospel in the prologue 
(1:1), in the middle at the transfiguration (9:2-13) and at the end in the words of the 
centurion (15:39).’ In this way, Mark seems to nudge his readers in the rib as if to say; 




As a call to discipleship, Irenaeus of Lyon reports that after the martyrdom of Peter 
and Paul, “Mark the companion of Peter, transmitted to us in writing what was preached by 
Peter”.
453
 Peter is said to have died around 65AD within the period of the persecution by 
Nero (64-67AD). If Irenaeus is right, then Mark’s Gospel must have been written within 
this period of persecution (65-70AD). While these persecutions went on in Rome, there 
were other persecutions in Jerusalem occasioned by the failure of the Jewish revolt which 
led to the destruction of the temple of Jerusalem (70AD). Thus, we could reasonably say 
that the context within which Mark wrote his Gospel was one of persecution, probably 
written for Roman readers (Gentile Christians). If his readers experienced persecution, then 
Mark’s work was a radical call to discipleship shaped by the story of “Jesus Christ, the Son 
of God” and “the Son of Man”. As “the Son of God”, Jesus has power and authority over 
the forces of nature and evil. But as the “the Son of Man”, his mission also involved 
suffering, dying and rising from the dead in obedience to the Father. Thus, Mark’s 
audience who experience persecution now may be given the hope and confidence that like 
Jesus, they too would experience future glory and victory as persecuted believers.   
In consequence, it must be emphasized that the Christology of Mark’s Gospel can 
only be located in his purpose, discerned by reading “Mark’s own expression of purpose 
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wherever he has tried to make it plain”.
454
 While one finds this in the first thirteen verses 
of the prologue, the rest of the narrative, which is a progressive development of the 
prologue, takes on a two-tier question framework: i.e. who is Jesus and how should the 
reader respond to him? Mark relies on his unique style of the messianic secret which 
involves the dialectic interplay of the two christological titles to respond to the above 
questions. We did argue that by the criteria of density, the two titles divide the main 
narrative into two parts: 1:14 – 8:26 and 8:31 – 15:47 – with Peter’s confession (8:27-30) 
being the watershed. Though divided into two parts, these two sections nonetheless 
constitute a composite narrative which adequately expresses the identity and mission of 
Jesus Christ. For Mark, Jesus is the Christ, “Son of God” who becomes the “Son of Man” 
in order to save fallen humanity.  
It is this Christological construct which the Church would continue to clarify in the 
Christological debates leading to the councils of Nicaea, Chalcedon and beyond. As Alan 
Spence indicated, once there are evidences of the attempts to conceptually pair the divinity 
and humanity of Jesus in Christian faith and theology, “the church finds itself facing, even 
as it continues to face today, a whole host of complex and baffling questions about his 
person”,
455
 to which she must make appropriate theological responses. Here, the 
theological task lies in “providing a coherent theological explanation of Jesus’ person in 
harmony with the scriptural testimony, which is able to account for his role in its worship 
and faith”.
456
 As Walter Kasper puts it, within Christian theology therefore, “when we say 
that Jesus is the Christ, we maintain that this unique, irreplaceable Jesus of Nazareth is at 
one and the same time the Christ sent by God”.
457
 In other words, as the Christ, Jesus is 
viewed as the saviour of the world and the eschatological fulfilment of history. So, the 
confession that “Jesus is the Christ is the basic statement of Christian belief and 
Christology is no more than the conscientious elucidation of that proposition”.
458
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Jesus’ identity as the “Son of God” and the “Son of Man” must always be at the 
heart of Christian faith and theology. Christian theology may be challenged to make this 
conceptual pairing (Son of God and Son of Man) comprehensible to the contemporary 
mind, but this does not entail replacing this tradition-specific conceptions (the two nature 
Christology) with some revisionary Christologies. For Walter Kasper, the Church’s effort 
to make Christology relevant to contemporary context poses a theological problematic. On 
the one hand, if the Church must preserve her identity by articulating her doctrines 
unambiguously in straightforward terms, she risks the loss of relevance. Yet on the other 
hand, if she struggles for relevance; she may end up forfeiting her identity.
459
 So, the way 
out of this impasse is for the Church to undergo profound reflections on her real basis, 
mission and significance in the world. Since the Church does not find her basis and 
mission in ideas, principles, programmes, moral or doctrinal injunctions, but on a person 
with a specific name – Jesus Christ,
460
 Christian theology must never lose sight of its task 
of articulating his identity and mission in fidelity to the scriptural testimonies which Mark 
for instance, makes plain. 
In the nutshell, a Christian-tradition-specific understanding of the identity and 
mission of Jesus Christ must reflect what Christian faith and theology has to say about 
Jesus. From the synoptic Gospels, Mark tells us that Jesus Christ is the “Son of God” and 
the “Son of Man” and constitutive saviour of the world. Though there were other opinions 
to the contrary in response to Jesus’ question – “who do people say I am and who do you 
say I am?” it was Peter’s response which received Jesus’ approval and commendation.
461
 
Hence, Christian faith and theology must never lose sight of this inherited faith or 
traditions. After all, “if tradition means the passing on of that which has been received, 
tradition is not bad. Quite the contrary, it is necessary in order for continuity to be 
preserved”.
462
 Though Christian faith and theology is called upon to make tradition 
relevant to contemporary situations, it must remain committed to the traditions from which 
it was formed and founded. 
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In chapter three, we asserted that commitment, openness, respect and equality 
together constitute the kind of dispositions that make constructive dialogues possible. In 
dialogue as an exercise in learning, the Christian dialogical partner must be convinced of 
and thus capable of articulating an authentic Christian understanding of the identity and 
mission of Jesus Christ as it pertains to Christian faith and theology. By this, we mean that 
one must be committed to the two-nature Christology which defines the identity of Jesus 
Christ within the context of his role as saviour of the world. This is significant for the 
success of dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the other. However, while 
exercising this aspect of commitment to the home tradition, the Christian party is also 
called upon to be open to what Muslims have to say about Jesus in their tradition-specific 
contexts. Hence, what follows below is Christology from an Islamic perspective. 
4.3. The Tradition-Specific Understanding of Christology in Islam 
In the preceding section, one gets the impression that Christology connotes a Christian 
theological articulation of the identity and mission of Jesus Christ, particularly on how 
Jesus’ divinity and humanity are articulated within the same person as the saviour of the 
world. So, the question then is: if Christology is essentially part of Christian theology, can 
the notion of an “Islamic Christology” be theologically justified? If yes, what is the ground 
for such a Christology? Although it is true that the Qur’an, the Hadiths and the Tafsir 
literature present Jesus Christ as a prophet of Allah, a human being without any divine 
attribution, Jesus is nonetheless highly respected in Islam and is given greater mention 
with honorific titles in the Qur’an than any of the prophets who preceded him.
463
 
Parrinder affirms that the name Isa (Jesus) occurs twenty-five times in the Qur’an 
and by combining this name with titles such as Messiah and Son of Mary in the Qur’an, 
“Jesus is spoken of some thirty-five times”.
464
 From these references to Jesus in the Qur’an 
one finds that the Qur’an itself contains narratives about Jesus Christ who occupies a 
central place in Christian faith and theology. The Qur’an provides answers as to who Jesus 
was, how he came to be and his mission. Thus, if Christology concerns the study of Jesus 
Christ in respect of his identity and mission, then Islam also has the resources that provide 
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for this study within its own religious context. Hence an “Islamic Christology” focuses on 
the Islamic understanding of the identity and role played by Jesus the Christ in the divine 
plan of Allah.  
It is from this perspective that Mahmoud Ayoub and other scholars define Islamic 
Christology as “an understanding of the role of Christ within the divine plan of human 
history, of Christ the man, one of the servants of God, but also of Christ, the Word of God, 
His Spirit and exalted friend”.
465
 According to Ayoub, these ideas are clearly stated in the 
Qur’an and therefore represent the framework within which an Islamic view about Jesus 
can be conceptualized. Whereas these views are in stark contra-distinction from the 
Christian tradition-specific understanding of Jesus Christ, the conception that Jesus is a 
prophet of Allah represents the authentic Islamic understanding of him. Thus, the story that 
Islam has to share about who Jesus is and the mission he fulfilled is the justifiable ground 
for an “Islamic Christology”.   
However, before delving into the issues that concern this christological category, it 
is worthwhile to draw attention to the interest and focus of this section on Islamic 
Christology. Since the purpose of this section is to develop a Christology that is uniquely 
Islamic, it will focus on identifying the prophetic role of Jesus within the context of the 
Qur’an and the Hadiths in the light of the overall Islamic conception of God, humanity and 
the world. From this standpoint, while Jesus would be identified as a prophet of Allah, we 
would seek to answer the questions – how did Jesus fulfil this role as prophet and, in what 
ways does he provide guidance to humanity in its response to God?  
We will start this section by firstly focusing on the theological framework within 
which an “Islamic Christology” can be situated. Here, we shall argue that the fundamental 
Islamic faith principle on the obligation to the Tawhid (the Oneness of God) defines and 
shapes the Islamic theological comprehension of the identity and mission of the “Messiah, 
Jesus, son of Mary” (Surah 4:171). Secondly, since Islamic Christology is predominantly 
centred on Jesus as a prophet, we shall focus on investigating the concept of prophecy in 
Islam, the role played by the prophets of Allah and the significant role Jesus plays within 
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this context. Until then, let us briefly delve into the meaning of Islam and how the Tawhid 
contributes to defining the theological context for understanding Islamic Christology. 
The word “Islam” comes from the Arabic word (al-ʾislām) which literally means 
“to surrender or to submit”. In a religious sense, it means the “submission or surrender of 
oneself to Allah (God)”.
466
 Murata and Chittick point out that “islam” carries a double-
connotation: the universal and the particular sense. From the universal sense, islam means 
“‘submission to God’ as an undeniable fact of existence”.
467
 This means that since God is 
the creator and sustainer of the universe, creation only functions properly if it submits itself 
to the will of the creator (God).
468
 Hence, from this universal perspective, every person 
who submits himself/herself to God is considered a muslim.  It is from this perspective that 
the Qur’an identifies Adam, Abraham, Jacob, Moses (Surah 2:131-133) and the disciples 
of Jesus as muslims (Surah 5:111).
469
 However, with the particular sense of the word, islam 
refers to the specific religion established by Allah through the Prophet Muhammad.  
Hence, from the universal and particular senses of the word, we could surmise that 
the word islam implies four basic meanings: (1) the submission of the whole of creation to 
God; (2) the submission of humanity to God through the guidance of His prophets; (3) the 
submission of humanity to Allah through the guidance of His Prophet Muhammad and (4) 
the submission of the followers of Muhammad to the will of Allah.  Within these four 
facets of meaning, the last two senses of the word properly refer to Islam as with the 
uppercase I as a religion.  
From the context of the Hadith of Gabriel which concerns the discourse between 
Muhammad and the Angel Gabriel who assesses Muhammad’s understanding about the 
three dimensions of Islam; scholars tend to divide the religious beliefs of Islam into three 
dimensions: that is, islam (submission), iman (Faith) and ihsan (perfection or excellence). 
These dimensions sum up its religious worldview. It must be said here that the use of the 
word dimension is a heuristic device intended for a better understanding of Islam as a 
complex religious structure. To understand this complex structure theologically, one needs 
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to approach it from its different parts (islam, iman and ihsan), aware that it is the overall 
constitution of these parts that truly define the religion. Thus, the use of dimension is an 
attempt to understand the religion as a whole in respect of its different aspects and the 
different aspects within the context of the whole. As Murata and Chittick puts it, the parts 
are “separated only to suggest that they fit together as a whole”.
470
 
In the discourse between Muhammad and the Angel Gabriel, Gabriel “cross-
examines” the prophet about his comprehension of the message of the Qur’an. This cross-
examination is found in the Hadith Jibril. The aspects of the Hadith which concern these 
three dimensions read as follows: 
“Umar ibn al-khattab said: One day when we were with God’s 
messenger, a man with very white clothing and very black hair came up 
to us. No mark of travel was visible on him and none of us recognize 
him. Sitting down before the Prophet, leaning his knees against his and 
placing his hands on his thighs, he said, ‘Tell me, Muhammad about 
submission.’ 
He replied, ‘Submission means that you should bear witness that there 
is no god but God and that Muhammad is God’s Messenger, that you 
should perform the ritual prayer, pay the alms tax, fast during Ramadan 
and make the pilgrimage to the house if you are able to go there.’ The 
man said, ‘you have spoken the truth.’ He said, ‘Now tell me about 
faith.’  
He replied, ‘Faith means that you have faith in God, his angels, his 
books, his messengers and the last day and that you have faith in the 
measuring out, both its good and its evil.’ Remarking that he had 
spoken the truth, he then said, ‘Now tell me about doing what is 
beautiful.’ 
He replied, ‘Doing what is beautiful means that you should worship 
God as if you see him, for even if you do not see him, He sees you”.
471
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In this hadith, islam as the first dimension consists of the confession of the Shahada, 
observing the Salat, the Zakat, Ramadan and Hajj. In other words, the first dimension 
relates to practice. It asks the question “what do Muslims do?” In response, Muslims are 
supposed to submit themselves to the one and true God (the Tawhid). This form of 
religious monotheism makes the Shahada the most fundamental faith principle in Islamic 
religiosity. If Muslims see Jesus as the prophet of Allah, this would be theologically 
justified within the context of the Tawhid. The second dimension (iman) focuses on the 
faith of the Muslim. From Muhammad’s response to the Angel Gabriel, “Faith means that 
you have faith in God, his Angels, his Books, his Messengers and the Last Day and that 
you have faith in the Measuring Out, both its good and its evil.’”
472
 Within these six 
articles of faith, it is the Tawhid which gives meaning to them because the rest of the other 
articles find their relevance in the light of God’s oneness. The third dimension (ihsan) 
focuses on the translation of one’s faith into good deeds and action. Ihsan is used in the 
Qur’an as an action verb which means; “to do what is beautiful and good, to do something 
well, to do something perfectly, to gain perfection and virtuous qualities”.
473
 Here, 
perfection and virtuous qualities are measured by one’s degree of commitment to the one 
God.  
Consequently, while islam directs one to the right practice of faith, iman focuses on 
faith and the understanding of it. Ihsan however, is a call to perfection and excellence; a 
sense of virtuous living informed by the religious convictions derived from islam and 
iman. All these dimensions make no sense if they are devoid of the obligation to the 
Tawhid. As we mentioned earlier, these dimension only represent the different aspects of 
Islam as a religion; for, the more a person harmoniously integrates faith, works and 
perfection, the closer the person is drawn to the life of submission to the will of Allah. In 
short, the emphasis is that Islamic Christology finds its tradition-specific meaning in the 
light of the Tawhid. What precisely is the Tawhid and how does it determine the 
understanding of Islamic Christology? 
 
                                                          
472
 Ibid, xxv 
473
 Williams C. Chittick. Faith and Practice of Islam: Three Thirteenth Century Sufi Text. 1992, p5 
140 
 
4.3.1. Islamic Christology in the light of the Tawhid 
The word Tawhid has its Arabic roots from wahid which means “God is one”. Hence, 
Tawhid takes on the meaning of “recognizing and acknowledging that God is One”. It is 
“‘the assertion of divine unity’ or ‘the declaration of God’s oneness.’”
474
 This oneness of 
God is expressed in the first part of the Shahada which states that “there is no god but 
God”. God here is seen as the creator and sustainer of everything that exists. Thus, the 
confession that “there is no god but one God” (Surah 5:73) underscores Islamic 
monotheism where Allah remains the transcendent Being who is the creator and source of 
everything in the world. He created the world in order that creation would submit to Him, 
by living according to His plan as the “master designer”. For God himself said in the 
Qur’an: “There is no god but I, so worship me” (Surah 21:25). The Qur’an further 
emphasizes that “God himself bears witness that there is no god but Him and so do the 
Angels and those who have knowledge” (Surah 3:18).  
As the creator and sustainer of the universe, Allah created everything for a purpose. 
He created humanity for the purpose of worshipping Him alone and being vicegerents to 
the rest of His creation. Consequently, to worship Allah alone is to have fundamentally 
fulfilled the purpose for one’s creation. Thus, Muslims view that all the prophets of Allah 
including Jesus, provided guidance in respect of the observance of the Tawhid – “there is 
no god but I. So worship me” (Surah 21:25). Worship here captures the sense of the total 
submission of the believer to Allah i.e. following what Allah commands through the 
guidance of His prophets. To submit oneself to anything apart from Allah is to follow 
misguidance.  
Thus, the statement “there is no god but God” (Surah 5:73; 4: 171) means that all 
gods whom people worship other than Allah are false: an act which is vehemently 
condemned in the Qur’an as Shirk. Here, shirk means to give God Partners or worship 
others along with God or exclusive of God.
475
 This act is condemned in the Qur’an (see 
Surah 4:36, 31:13, 6:19 and 13:36). So, shirk is nothing but the opposite of the Tawhid. 
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The Tawhid is the first principle and pillar of Islamic faith. Consequently, the emphasis on 
the avoidance of “associating others with God” forms a central tenet of Islamic faith 
understanding: to associate others with Allah would be to destroy the very foundations on 
which Islam rests. This, therefore, explains why shirk is viewed as a serious sin – “if 
someone associates any other with God, God would prohibit paradise to him” (Surah 5:72).  
For Islam therefore, humanity was created to know that “there is no god but God” 
and so to worship only Allah. Hence the Tawhid lies within human nature (fitra). Since the 
purpose of humanity is to worship only Allah, Allah sent His messengers to help humanity 
fulfil this purpose. So, to associate others with Allah is to go against the most fundamental 
instincts of the human species. It is, so to speak, “to betray human nature and even leave 
the domain of human existence”.
476
 The Tawhid therefore leaves no room for any Islamic 
theologizing about God outside the confines of strict monotheism.  
It is in the light of this faith principle (the Tawhid) that Jesus is understood as only 
a prophet of Allah. As a prophet of Allah vis-a-vis the rest of the other line of prophets, the 
Qur’an describes Jesus as the “closest friend of Allah” (Surah 3:45), “His Word directed to 
Mary and a Spirit from Him” (Surah 4:171). Christological titles such as Word of/from 
Allah, Spirit of Allah and Messiah resonate in Christian Christological discourses. The 
tendency, therefore, is to read Christian meanings into these titles thereby concluding that 
the ascription of these titles to Jesus in the Qur’an is an inevitable admission of Jesus’ 
divinity. For Islamic faith and theology, these honorific titles mean nothing more than that 
Jesus, the Messiah, is a prophet of Allah.  
Unlike Christianity which conceived God within the context of the Holy Trinity 
(three persons one God), Islam does not permit such theological constructions or doctrinal 
definitions. Islam perceives any attempt to articulate the nature of Allah which departs 
from His Oneness and transcendence as misguidance. For Islam, the fundamental truth 
about God is that He is One – “Your God is but one. So submit to Him” (Surah 22:34). So, 
the oneness of God (the Tawhid) is a nonnegotiable aspect of the religion. Hence, when 
engaging Muslims in dialogue, one must be aware of this aspect of the faith and respect the 
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views which emanate as a consequence of it. However, how did the prophets function 
within the context of this divine unity? 
4.3.2. Prophets, Messengers and Prophetic Guidance 
While prophecy forms the second part of the Shahada (Muhammadun rasul Allah), giving 
it a more specific context, Muhammad identifies the prophets as constitutively part of the 
articles of faith in his reply to the Angel Gabriel concerning iman (faith). From this hadith, 
the Angel said to Muhammad, “Now tell me about faith. He replied. Faith means that you 
have faith in God, His Angels, His Books, His Messengers, the last day and the measuring 
out. Whereas the Angel commended Muhammad for getting it right, we can say that 
between the hadith of Gabriel and the second part of the Shahada is the play of the 
universality and particularity of prophecy within Islamic theology. But before we address 
this dialectic, let us first of all understand what “prophet” and “messenger” means in Islam. 
The word “Prophet’ comes from the Arabic word nabi which has two basic 
meanings: (1) to utter a word, a sound or to inform or give news, (2) to be elevated by 
God.
477
 For Murata and Chittick, both senses of the word nabi, reflect the Islamic 
understanding of the word prophet: since in Islam a prophet is a person who is chosen by 
God and given a message which may either be personal or for an intended audience or 
both. The Qur’an employs four words to qualify this task: al-nabi (Prophet), rasul 
(Messenger), mursal (Envoy) and ulu’l-‘azm (possessor of steadfastness). Whereas envoy 
and messenger may be synonymous; prophet, messenger and the possessor of 
steadfastness, have fine distinctions. These differences are that: the prophets are persons 
chosen by God with a message; they only “proclaim Allah’s news. They are not given 
Books”.
478
 The messengers however are the prophets who established religious 
communities, preserving their message in an oral or written scripture. Thus, whereas 
messengers are prophets, not all prophets are messengers.
479
 The possessors of 
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steadfastness are the five messengers who established the major religions in history 
(namely, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad).
480
 
It is relevant to note here that unlike Christianity, Islam admits Adam as the first 
prophet of Allah in successive line with the prophet Muhammad as the final prophet. The 
admission of Adam into the line of prophecy contributes significantly to shaping and 
differentiating the Islamic worldview of human nature, sin and redemption. These views 
are not the same as the Christian notion of “original sin” (contracted through the fall in 
Genesis 3:1-23) and the redemption which Jesus achieved through the Paschal Mystery. As 
Mona Siddiqui indicates, “perhaps this is Islam’s biggest parting with Christian doctrine in 
that it does not have those defining moments of both alienation from God as in the fall and 
subsequent reconciliation with God, redemption through the death and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ”.
481
 If Islam rejects the belief that Jesus died on the cross and that his death 
and resurrection have no soteriological significance, this would be directly influenced by 
its theology of human nature, sin and redemption. We deem that knowledge of this 
theological turn is very significant for a comparative theological exercise in Christian-
Muslim dialogue on Christology. Let us see how Adam, as the first prophet of Allah, sets 
the stage for a fundamental distinction between the Christian and Islamic theology of 
redemption and how this contributes in defining the prophetic role of Jesus.        
4.3.2.1. Adam, Iblis and the Fall: the Question of Original Sin 
The Qur’an, like the Judeo-Christian scriptures also presents Adam as the first human 
being to be created by God. In Qur’anic usage Adam stands for what it means to be human, 
the problem of human nature in keeping with the Tawhid and the reason for prophetic 
guidance to humanity. Murata and Chittick locate the Qur’anic use of the word Trust 
(Amana) as that which sums up the distinctive characteristics between humanity and the 
rest of creation (Surah 33:72).
482
 Trust refers to the task of “Care-taking” or the human 
vocation to be vicegerents to the whole of creation. According to the Qur’an, this “care-
taker” task was not only given to Adam but to all his descendants, who unanimously 
                                                          
480
 Sachiko Murata & Williams C. Chittick. 1994, p134 
481
 Mona Siddiqui. Christians, Muslims & Jesus. 2013, p218 
482
 Sachiko Murata & Williams Chittick. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p135 
144 
 
agreed to the divine injunction as they said; “Yes, we bear witness” to God as our Lord 
(Surah 7:172). This event is commonly called the “Covenant of Alast”,
483
 whereby 
humanity made a compact with God to acknowledge the Tawhid. This established an 
innate disposition in humanity to acknowledge the Tawhid. This innate disposition is often 
referred to as the fitra.
484
 
However, the verse on Trust (Surah 33:72)
485
 concludes that the human being is 
“ignorant, a great wrongdoer”. For Murata and Chittick, this verse refers to the children of 
Adam who did not live up to the Trust. Though one might agree with this interpretation, it 
is rather plausible to trace the root of this “wrongdoing” also to the events leading to the 
Fall of Adam and Eve in the Garden (Surah 15:39-43). In this narrative, Iblis (Satan) is 
said to have previously disobeyed God (Surah 2:34 and 7:11-12) and was to be subjected 
to punishment (Surah 7:13). However, Iblis made a deal with God for the postponement of 
his punishment until the Day of Resurrection (Surah 7:14-15). This postponement seems to 
buy him time to attempt to lead all God’s loyal servants astray.
486
 According to the Qur’an 
God agrees to Iblis’ deal, aware that “Iblis shall have no authority over them, except those 
who choose to follow him” (Surah 15:43).  
Now, the “choice to follow Iblis” in the above text demonstrates that although 
humanity has the innate disposition to acknowledge the Tawhid (fitra), God’s gift of free 
will to humanity also opens up the possibility of human disobedience to the divine will. 
Thus, the innate disposition to obey God (fitra) and the gift of free will constitute what it 
means to be truly human. As Murata and Chittick puts it, “to be human is to be faced with 
the choice between right and wrong, obedience and disobedience”.
487
 So one would see 
that in Surah 7:20, Iblis would lure Adam and Eve into disobedience to the divine 
command (Surah 7:19) leading to the Fall –Iblis said; “your Lord only forbade you this 
tree to prevent you from becoming angels and immortals”. Thus, Allah’s question “did I 
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not prohibit you two from this tree?” (Surah 7:22), confirms that “Adam disobeyed his 
Lord” (Surah 20:121).  
However, the immediate response of regret and repentance from Adam and Eve 
after the Fall is very significant here. It is said that “they were immediately shocked at 
what they had done and with one voice the two of them said, ‘we have wronged ourselves 
and unless you forgive us and have mercy on us, we shall surely be among the lost’” 
(Surah 7:23). From this act of repentance and the search for forgiveness, Adam and Eve 
were forgiven by Allah who restored them back to the state of “grace” so to speak – “Then 
Adam received some words from His Lord and He accepted his repentance” (Surah 2:37). 
Thus, Murata and Chittick indicate that the fundamental difference between Adam and 
Iblis’ disobedience lies in how each responded to God after the fall. “Whereas Iblis refused 
to admit that he had done something wrong by blaming God for leading him astray (Surah 
7:16), Adam and Eve admitted their fault and asked God to forgive them”
488
 and Allah 
forgave them. So, within this story of the fall, we find two significant differences between 
the Islamic and the Christian accounts of the events.  
First of all, within the Islamic context, the fall of Adam is not understood in the 
same way as the Christian doctrine of Original sin. For Christianity, the disobedience of 
Adam and Eve brought irrecoverable damnation on the human race. For instance, Christian 
theology asserts that “on account of their disobedience, human beings exist in a state of 
corruption from which they are unable to extricate themselves. If redemption is to take 
place, it must be on the basis of a new obedience on the part of humanity”.
489
 But since 
humanity is unable to break free from its entanglement to sin, it could only take God in 
Jesus Christ to set it free from this bond of sin, through Jesus’ death and resurrection.
490
 
However, for Islam there is no such thing as Original sin, because God immediately 
forgave Adam and Eve for their disobedience when they sought for mercy (Surah 2:37). As 
the Qur’an confirms, God did not only forgive them, but “His Lord Chose him” (Surah 
20:122).  
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Consequently, Adam was made a true prophet of Allah and both he and Hauwa 
(Eve) were the first true Muslims.
491
 If for Islam, Adam was forgiven by God and was 
made the first true Muslim, then there is no original sin. Without the concept of original 
sin, the notion of Jesus’ death and resurrection as atonement for sin loses its soteriological 
pertinency. So the fall underscores God’s divine power to restore His creation to normalcy 
without the need to suffer, die and resurrect in order to redeem. In Islam then, the 
significance of Jesus does not lie in “a death and resurrection as atonement for original sin” 
but in the role he played as a prophet of Allah providing guidance in the acknowledgement 
of the Tawhid. 
Secondly, the “sending out” of Adam and Eve from the Garden is not seen within 
Islam as constituting a punishment from God for their transgressions. Within the Christian 
account, the departure from the Garden gives the impression that it is constitutively part of 
the consequences of the fall. So in Genesis 3:16-24, God said to the woman: because you 
have done this, “I will greatly multiply your pains in childbearing...” Then God said to the 
man: “because you have listened to your wife and have eaten of the tree... cursed is the 
ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it...” The text then says that God 
subsequently drove the man and his wife out of the Garden of Eden and took measures to 
prevent them from coming back to the Garden again (Gen 3:22-24),  
From the Qur’anic perspective, Adam was intended to be God’s vicegerent to the 
“heavens and the earth and the mountains” (Surah 33:72). This explains why Allah thought 
him the names of all created reality (Surah 2:30-33). Hence, living in the Garden of Eden 
was therefore a preparatory process for his later job as the vicegerent of creation. Here, 
Murata and Chittick affirm that “God put Adam and Eve in the Garden so that they could 
gain strength for the hardships that would follow once they were placed at a great distance 
from Him, in the earth”.
492
 So, whereas in the Christian context, the separation from Eden 
is seen as part of the punishment meted out to Adam and Eve, for Islam, the separation is 
not a consequence of their sins, but a necessary act which commences Adam’s task as 
God’s vicegerent.  
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In consequence, Islam sees man as God’s Khalifa on earth. Though it 
acknowledges that humanity is not perfect; for only Allah is perfect; it does not have the 
concept of original sin. The question of the free will of man and the continual presence of 
Iblis show that there is the human propensity for sin (understood as heedlessness or 
misguidance). If humanity is to accomplish its task of vicegerency and the 
acknowledgement of the Tawhid, then it would need the guidance of the prophets. It is for 
this reason that God in his kindness provides the prophets who give right guidance to 
humanity. This brings us to the significance of prophetic guidance in Islam.    
4.3.2.2. The Nature and Significance of Prophetic Guidance 
Like Christianity, Islam also believes that God sent prophets at various stages of human 
history to provide guidance to humanity. The Qur’an testifies that these prophets were 
raised from among every race and nation – “We sent a Messenger to every community 
saying; ‘worship God and shun false gods.’” (Surah 16:36). The Qur’an further states that: 
“Muslims say: ‘we believe in God and in what was sent down to us and in what was sent 
down to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob and the tribes and what was given to Moses, Jesus 
and all the prophets by their Lord’” (Surah 2:136). As messengers of Allah, all the 
prophets are presented by the Qur’an as worthy of belief. To “deny the Prophethood of any 
of them constitutes disbelief”
493
 – for their message comes from Allah who is all-knowing. 
Islam conceives each of these prophets as fundamentally communicating the obligation to 
acknowledge the Tawhid.  
So, as the first prophet of Allah, Adam heeded and submitted himself to Allah as 
the only true God and Creator of all after the fall. However, some of his offspring refused 
to follow Allah’s teachings and committed shirk.
494
 Consequently, God raised up prophets 
to give right guidance to humanity on the straight path to Allah. These prophets 
accomplished this through Dhikr (remembrance) and Huda (guidance).
495
 Dhikr is not just 
limited to the sense of “remembering”, but takes on the meaning of “mentioning” and 
“reminding” as well. In the Tawhid, the work of the prophets as Dhikr was not just limited 
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to reminding people about the Oneness of God and the human obligation to submit to Him, 
but it also centred on helping people to confess the Tawhid (mention). Those who respond 
to the prophets appropriately are muslims and those who refuse are the truth-concealers. In 
consequence, Dhikr represents the drama of prophecy and the human response to it.
496
  
Huda (guidance), however, defines God’s reason and motivation for sending the 
prophets. As we saw earlier, since Iblis’ intention and task was to promote misguidance 
(Surah 7:16-18), God in His Mercy sends the prophets as guides to the actualization of the 
fitra. To actualize the fitra is to actualize one’s human potential and the actualization of 
one’s potential is the key to happiness and peace.
497
 Hence, the reason for the guidance 
provided by the prophets from Adam to Muhammad was to lead humanity to a total 
submission to the will of Allah – expressed in the Tawhid. Among these prophets of Allah 
are: Adam, Noah, Moses, Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, David, Elijah, Elisha, 
Jonah, Zachariah, Jesus and Muhammad. Their universal task was to direct humanity to 
observe the Tawhid – “There is no god but one God” (Surah 21:25). The Tawhid is the 
basic message of each of these prophets. As a result, the Qur’an affirms that “...that which 
was given to Moses and Jesus and the other prophets by their Lord, We make no 
distinction among any of them” (Surah 2:136 and 3:84). 
Thus, it is considered an act of disbelief for a Muslim to despise the message of any 
of the prophets of Allah for they all served to bring right guidance to humanity in its 
response to the Tawhid (See Surah 5:48). In consequence, even though Islamic theology 
views Jesus as a prophet who provided right guidance to the children of Israel with a new 
Scripture (the Gospels), it could be said that this guidance does not contradict the human 
obligation to the Tawhid. In this way, the message of Jesus is not just significant to 
Christians only, but it is for Muslims as well since it concerns the obligation to the Tawhid. 
For Islam, faith in one God demands the observation of the Tawhid which constitutes the 
fundamental message of the prophets of Allah (including Jesus). How does Jesus function 
within this context of the Tawhid?    
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4.3.3. Qur’anic Christology: Jesus as the Prophet of Allah 
The interest in this area of Qur’anic Christology is to carefully analyse and present some of 
the references concerning the relationship between Jesus, the Holy Spirit and Allah in the 
Qur’an and how this relationship contributes in defining the role Jesus played in Allah’s 
divine plan. Since there are many texts which relate to Jesus in the Qur’an, we shall focus 
particular attention on Surah 2:87; 2:253 and 5:110.  
The reasons for selecting these particular texts are that: first of all, these texts 
capture the identity of Jesus in the Qur’an, asserting his prophetic role within the whole 
context of Islamic prophecy. Secondly, these texts equally highlight a unique relationship 
between Jesus and the Holy Spirit (Ruh al-qudus), who would later be the guide to the 
prophet Muhammad in his reception of the Qur’an. Though there are other texts of equal 
importance, we reckon that these texts contain, in themselves, the support we need for a 
careful reflection on what is today called a “Qur’anic Christology”.
498
 We shall approach 
the above texts thematically, by focusing on the unique relationship between Jesus and the 
Holy Spirit and how this contributes to defining his identity and mission.  
Our interest in the theme of the Holy Spirit is first of all, informed by the argument 
that the Holy Spirit constitutes that significant agent who remains instrumental in the life 
of Jesus in the Qur’an, right from his birth, his public ministry to his final end. 
Consequently, a careful study of the relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit would 
help elicit his identity and the role he played within the divine plan of Allah. It would also 
provide the appropriate context for a better interpretation and understanding of the 
christological titles ascribed to Jesus in the Qur’an. As a significant agent in the life and 
ministry of Jesus, the Holy Spirit teaches Jesus the Injil (The Gospel) and communicates 
the Qur’an to the Prophet Muhammad. So, by virtue of His origin as a messenger of Allah 
and His involvement in the prophetic missions of Jesus and Muhammad, the Holy Spirit 
places a stamp of authenticity on the message received by the Qur’anic Jesus and the 
message of the Qur’an: for both derive their source from Allah. In other words, the Holy 
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Spirit could be seen as a principal agent in the communication of message of the Injil and 
the Qur’an.  
It will become clearer as the discourse unfolds that the message of the Qur’anic 
Jesus as can be found in the Qur’an is fundamentally about the observance of the Tawhid. 
Jesus in the Qur’an said; “I have come to you to confirm the truth of the Torah which 
preceded me... I have come to you with a sign from your Lord. Be mindful of God, obey 
me. God is my Lord and your Lord, so serve Him – that is the straight path” (Surah 3:50-
51). Here, one finds an immediate connection between Jesus’ message in the Qur’an and 
the message of the prophets who preceded him. Since it is the Holy Spirit who is the 
principal agent through whom Allah communicated His message to His prophets, then the 
Holy Spirit remains an important agent when reflecting on the identity and mission of the 
Qur’anic Jesus.  
Consequently, our interest would be to investigate the relationship between Jesus 
and the Holy Spirit and how this contributes to defining his identity and role as a prophet 
of God. The significant question here is: if the Holy Spirit is the medium through whom 
God provides guidance to humanity through the message of His prophets, then how does 
the message of Jesus in the Qur’an contribute to providing this guidance? We shall 
commence this section by first considering the identity of the Holy Spirit in the Qur’an and 
His relationship with Jesus in the light of Surah 2:87, 2:253 and 5:110. 
4.3.3.1. The Identity of the Holy Spirit in the Qur’an 
According to O’Shaughnessy, “Spirit as a symbol of divine power is a term of unique 
importance in the religions of both the Semitic people and of the nations directly 
influenced by them”.
499
 It represents the tangible means by which the supreme Deity of 
both the Judeo-Christian religions and the nature religions of Babylonia, Assyria, Egypt 
e.t.c exercises control over humanity and the cosmos. For O’Shaughnessy, although this 
idea of the Spirit may be unique to these religions, it nonetheless represents a natural 
solution to the problem of how the divine communicates life force to man.  
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Since respiration is universally observed to be coextensive with life and ceases with 
its cessation, then breath becomes the concrete manifestation of life imparted to humanity 
through the supreme Deity.
500
 Thus, the Spirit is viewed as the “Divine breath” and the 
“unseen power” that moves the cosmic forces and gives life to humanity and the entirety of 
creation. For the Judeo-Christian religions, Ruh is the breath of Yahweh, the life-giving 
spirit in man and the mysterious power at work in the natural phenomena of the universe. 
According to O’Shaughnessy, in pre-Islamic Arabic poetry the term ruh means “breath or 




In the Qur’an the word Ruh (Spirit) is used about 20 times.
502
 From the 
chronological study of Ruh, William Shellabear asserts that there are different ways in 
which Ruh is used in the Qur’an. Firstly, at the start of Muhammad’s mission at Mecca, 
Ruh (Ruh al-Quddus) was used to refer to the Angel Gabriel (Surah 70:4, 78:38 and 97:4). 
Secondly, in the later Meccan Surahs, Ruh was used in connection with the creation of 
Adam (Surah 15:29, 38:72, 32:8) and the conception of Jesus (Surah 21:91, 19:17, 66:12). 
Thirdly, in the Surahs believed to be delivered in Mecca nearer the time of the Hijra, Ruh 
was used in four occasions in connection to the amr (a Command, an Order – Surah 16:2, 
17:87, 40:15).
503
 Finally, “in the Medina Surahs it is stated three times that Jesus was aided 
with the Holy Spirit (Ruh al-qudus Surah 2:87, 2:53 and 5:110), once that Jesus was 
himself a spirit from Allah (Surah 4:171) and once that the believers had been aided with a 
spirit from Allah (Surah 58:22).”
504
  
From these different forms of usage, though the word Ruh appears to mean: 
something distinct from the angels and yet in some way associated with them or something 
associated to the creation of Adam and Jesus,
505
 the spirit is that force which gives life 
through the command of Allah. When referred to as Ruh al-Quddus, Samuel Schlorff 
                                                          
500
 Ibid, p9 
501
 Thomas O’Shaughnessy. The Development of the Meaning of Spirit in the Koran. 1953, p11 
502
 Ibid, p13-15 
503
 Williams G. Shellabear. “The Development of the word ‘Spirit’ as Used in the Koran” in The Muslim 
World. 22 (4), 1932, p355 
504
 Ibid, p356 
505
 Ibid, p356 
152 
 
asserts that without exception Muslims identify it with Gabriel, the Angel of revelation. 
Hence, “when the Qur’an states that Jesus, Muhammad and others, were strengthened by 
the Holy Spirit, it is clearly referring to the Angel Gabriel in the process of revelation”.
506
 
Indeed, the word Spirit or al-Ruh may be taken to mean the “soul”, the “breath of life” or 
as “intangibility”. However, when specifically mentioned as “Ruh al-Quddus” in the 
Qur’an, many Islamic scholars are of the view that it refers to the Angel Gabriel. Let us see 
how the relationship between Jesus and the Angel Gabriel (the Holy Spirit) helps us arrive 
at a better understanding of the identity and mission of Jesus. 
4.3.3.2.The Relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit 
The discourse here is centred on three Qur’anic texts: Surah 2:87; 2:253 and 5:110. 
Whereas each of these three verses state that Jesus was “strengthened by the Holy Spirit”, 
our interest is to investigate what this phrase means within the Qur’an. We shall do this 
through the exegetical views of three Islamic scholars – namely Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn 
Jarir al-Tabari, Abu al-Qasim Mahmud ibn Umar al-Zamakhshari and Abu Abdullah 
Muhammad ibn Umar ibn al-Husayn al-Taymi al-Bakri al-Tabaristani Fakhr al-Din al-
Razi; because of the lengthy nature of these names we shall adopt their fully recognised 
shorter forms such as al-Tabari, al-Zamakhshari and al-Razi for simple referencing.  
The reasons for the recourse to these three classical Islamic commentators are that 
on the one hand, they enjoy some degree of historical proximity to the beginning stages of 
the development of Islam and therefore have the privilege of being classical commentators. 
Yet on the other hand, their commitment to the religion of Islam, coupled with their desire 
to learn more about the religion through the application of linguistics, philosophical and 
exegetical tools, brings freshness to the issues of textual interpretations in the Qur’an. In 
other words, these commentators provide the insiders’ point of view in respect of the 
interpretations of the above Qur’anic texts. The texts under consideration are: 
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Surah 2:87 – We gave Moses the scriptures and We sent messengers after him in 
succession. We gave Jesus, son of Mary, clear signs and strengthened him with the 
Holy Spirit. So now, how is it that whenever a messenger brings you something, 
you don’t like, you become arrogant, calling some imposters and killing others?” 
Surah 2:253 – We favoured some of the messengers above others. We gave Jesus, 
son of Mary our clear signs and strengthened him with the Holy Spirit.  
Surah 5:110 – Then God will say, ‘Jesus, son of Mary! Remember my favour to 
you and your mother: how I strengthened you with the Holy Spirit, so that you 
spoke in your infancy and as a grown man; how I taught you the Scriptures and the 
wisdom, the Torah and the Gospel; how by My leave, you fashioned the shape of a 
bird out of clay, breathed into it and it became by My leave a bird; how by My 
leave, you brought the dead back to life; how by My leave, I retrained the children 
of Israel from harming you when you brought them the clear signs and those of 
them who disbelieved said, ‘This is clearly nothing but sorcery.
507
 
The underlined sentences and phrases will be part of our primary exegetical concern. Let 
us see how the contributions of al-Tabari, al-Zamakhshari and al-Razi help us to 
understand the relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit and the identity and mission 
this relationship underscores.  
(i) Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (224/838 – 310/923) 
Al-Tabari was an orthodox Muslim of Sunni belonging, very scrupulous in his 
predilections on the type of material he relied on for his commentary on the Qur’an. He 
was very dogmatic in his thoughts which found intellectual resonance with the Islamic 
school of Ibn Hanbal in Bagdad where he studied.
508
 According to Franz Rosenthal, al-
Tabari memorized the Qur’an at the age of seven and qualified as a religious leader at eight 
and started learning the tradition of the prophets at nine.
509
 From this wealth of knowledge, 
he employed a methodology centred on the collection of disparate traditions and the 
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critical analysis of the chain of transmitters so as to verify the authenticity of the tradition 
concerned.  
 According to Neal Robinson, al-Tabari “comments on the whole Qur’an in 
sequence dividing each Surah into subsections which vary in length. He introduces each 
subsection with a phrase which reminds the reader that it is God’s word”.
510
  He then 
presents the text with its paraphrase and quotes other texts in the Qur’an to explain the 
meaning of the text. He proceeds to render his personal view based on the analysis. One 
body of work which is attributed to him is: Jāmi’ al-Bayān fί Tafsir al-Qur’an (Collection 
of Explanations for Interpretation of the Qur’an). According to Ayoub, al-Tabari’s work is 
the “first major work in the development of traditional Qur’anic sciences”.
511
 For Jane 
McAuliffe, this work showcased the classical era of Qur’anic exegesis.
512
 
According to al-Tabari, the phrase “strengthen him with the Holy Spirit,” connects 
Jesus to the Holy Spirit in Surah 2:87 and Surah 2:253. But this phrase is preceded by; 
“We gave Jesus, son of Mary the sign”. The sign refers to the miracles Jesus performed. 
These were meant to authenticate the truthfulness of his claim to be the prophet of Allah. 
His power to raise the dead back to life, to breathe life into clay birds and heal the sick, 
adds up as evidence to this claim. Jesus’ ability to inform people about what was 
happening in their homes testified to his knowledge of the unseen. On the question of 
strengthening, al-Tabari suggests two meanings: first of all, it could mean that God 
empowered Jesus with unique characteristics that supported him in facing challenges of all 
kinds. Secondly, it could also mean that God gave Jesus the Injil since both the Qur’an and 
the Injil are viewed as having their source from God.
513
 
In his analysis of Surah 5:110, al-Tabari concluded that the Holy Spirit could only 
be identified as the Angel Gabriel because, if in this verse, Jesus is strengthened by the 
Holy Spirit and given the Injil then two things (the Holy Spirit and the Gospel) are given to 
Jesus and not one; because the Holy Spirit and the Gospel could not mean one and the 
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 Al-Tabari’s identification of Gabriel as the Holy Spirit is further sustained 
by His argument that Gabriel is the Angel of revelation from God to all the other prophets. 
Hence, Gabriel’s primary function was to assists Jesus by teaching him the Torah, the 
Wisdom, the Injil and endowing him with power to perform wondrous signs.
515
 In 
consequence, al-Tabari concludes that the Holy Spirit is the Angel Gabriel who assist Jesus 
in the performance of the miracles. Gabriel’s relationship with Jesus therefore remains 
instrumental in substantiating Jesus’ prophetic claims. Having seen what al-Tabari makes 
of these texts (Surah 2:87, 2: 253 and 5: 110), how does al-Zamakhshari interpret them in 
the light of the identities of Jesus and the Holy Spirit on the one hand and the relationship 
between them on the other?      
(ii) Abu al-Qasim Mahmud ibn Umar al-Zamakhshari (467/1075 – 537/1144) 
Umar al-Zamakhshari is an Iranian Muslim who belongs to the Mu’tazillite theological 
school.
516
 He was a renowned philologist who considered Arabic as the queen of 
languages. According to Mohammad Khaleel, “he journeyed to Mecca, studied there for a 
while... It was in this city, on a second visit that he wrote his famous Tafsir, completing the 
work in two years attributable, he said, to the spiritual influence of his environs”.
517
 
Despite his Mu’tazilli persuasion, Ayoub intimates that the Tafsir of al-Zamakhshari is 
even regarded by the Sunni ulama as one of the most significant works of Tafsir.
518
 Islamic 
scholars of every rank and file have tremendous respect for him, even though some 
disagree with some of his ideas because of their hint of Mu’tazillite theology.
519
 It is said 
that al-Zamakhshari steers his Islamic theological concepts and opinions carefully, 
bringing out a sense of novelty and freshness and opening up windows to alternative 
interpretations.  
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In his interpretation of sign in the three texts named above, al-Zamakhshari 
indicates that sign here refers to the miracles Jesus performed and the disputations he 
engaged in as he tried to point out the right way to worship Allah. Like al-Tabari, al-
Zamakhshari contends that these signs authenticated the prophetic identity of Jesus.
520
 
Jesus is therefore strengthened by the Holy Spirit who emanates from God, for the purpose 
of carrying out the divine will. For al-Zamakhshari, there is no fusion or unity of substance 
in the relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit.
521
 The Spirit is only Allah’s living 
breath which animates the life of Jesus through Allah’s favour.
522
 Al-Zamakhshari views 
the interpretation of Surah 2:253 as practically the same as Surah 2:87. 
In respect to Surah 5:110 he observes that the discourse between Jesus and Allah is 
not about Jesus per se, but meant to re-orientate the people of Israel to the right path as a 
result of their rejection of Jesus and his message. In Surah 5:110, while some rejected 
Jesus’ prophetic claims, others interpreted the signs he performed as pure sorcery. Yet 
others even went on further to divinize him. So by questioning Jesus on his divine status, 
Allah sought to correct the wrongdoers who divinised him as God or Son of God.
523
 Al-
Zamakhshari then concludes that since Jesus was animated by Ruh al-Qudus from birth, 
his whole life is marked by purity from sin and wrongdoing.
524
 Thus, the understanding of 
Jesus as the spirit of Allah only points to the fact that Jesus came into being through a 
special intervention of Allah, without human seed or substance.
525
 Like al-Tabari, al-
Zamakhshari also asserts that the Holy Spirit refers to the Angel Gabriel.  
Consequently, in al-Zamakhshari, we find two significant interpretive assertions 
which introduce some freshness to Qur’anic Christology. First of all, al-Zamakhshari 
identifies the Holy Spirit also as the pure breathe of Allah. Since the Holy Spirit 
symbolises purity then His presence in the life of Jesus from beginning to end suggests that 
Jesus’ whole life was marked by purity (the absence of sin and wrongdoing). Secondly and 
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worth noting is al-Zamakhshari’s assertion that the dialogue between Jesus and Allah in 
Surah 5:110 was meant to re-orient the people of Israel to right guidance on the identity 
and prophetic task of Jesus.  If one pieces together the element of his purity with his task as 
a prophet of Allah, one finds a fine prophet who demonstrates an unwavering commitment 
to providing guidance in the acknowledgement of the Tawhid.  
(iii) Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Umar Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (534/1149 – 
606/1209) 
Commonly known as Fakhruddin Razi, al-Razi was a Persian Sunni theologian and 
philosopher, born in 1149 in Iran and died in 1209 in Afghanistan. His commentaries on 
the Qur’an are known to be unique because of their context of varied and multi-sided 
approached to the text. Two of his major works are; the Tafsir-e Kabir (The Great 
Commentary) and the Mafatih al-Ghayb (The Keys to the Unknown). Al-Razi was a 
rationalist who believed in the “self sufficiency of the human intellect” and its power to 
unravel truths. Even though he considered that proofs based on the hadiths only lead to 
presumptions, he nonetheless gradually acknowledged the primacy of the truths of the 




Unlike al-Tabari who was very orthodox – restricting himself to the hadiths and 
other recognised Islamic traditions in his interpretations, al-Razi approaches these verses 
(Surah 2:87, Surah 2: 253 and Surah 5: 110) from a more philosophical perspective, 
rendering his exegetical style in layers of arguments and counter-arguments.
527
 In doing 
this, al-Razi does not only seek evidence of meaning in the texts, but seeks to discern the 
deeper meaning of the texts. He starts by first providing a translation of a Qur’anic 
paragraph followed by the disputes surrounding its meaning and status, abrogated or 
otherwise. He then correlates the various positions of the earliest Arabic Qur’anic 
commentators, seeking knowledge of the reasons for the revelation of the verse and 
knowledge of what God intended as its meaning. According to Ayoub, al-Razi’s work is 
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one of Tafsir and Ta’wil where “Tafsir concerns the translation of tradition, while Ta’wil 
seeks a deeper comprehension of the inner meaning of the sacred text.”
528
 According to 
Ayoub, one finds an effective play of these exegetical styles in his Tafsir al-Kabir (The 
Great Commentary) and Mafatih al-Ghayb (Keys to the Unknown).
529
  
In respect of the interpretation of the above three verses, al-Razi first draws a link 
of continuity between the prophet Moses and Jesus from the beginning statement of Surah 
2:87 – “We gave Moses the scriptures and We sent messengers after him in succession”. 
Here, al-Razi asserts that divine guidance was given by Allah for the Jews through Moses. 
However, the Jews later disagreed among themselves leading to civil strife and the general 
perversion of their faith. Consequently, God sent successive messengers to remind them 
about the message of Moses and to provide them with right guidance. This continued until 
the advent of Jesus. According to al-Razi, while all the other prophets after Moses were 
committed to the content of the Mosaic message, Jesus brought in a new shari’a, a new law 
and path – the Injil. This new law had to be proven through the miracles Jesus performed 
in his infancy and public ministry.
530
   
In his interpretations of Ruh al-Quddus, al-Razi does not differ from the views of 
al-Tabari and al-Zamakhshari. For him the Holy Spirit is the same as the Angel Gabriel 
who emanates from Allah but is not part of Allah.
531
 Gabriel is created by God as His 
messenger who animates Allah’s servants. Al-Razi also views Ruh al-Quddus as Allah’s 
life-giving breath, breathed into man.
532
 The Angel Gabriel is created by Allah to obey 
Allah’s commands and carry them out.
533
 Al-Razi intimates that Gabriel as an Angel is 
exulted above the rest of the Angels on the basis of two realities: first of all, he is the 
intermediary between God and all the messengers of God communicating the revelation of 
God to them.
534
 It is Gabriel who teaches Jesus the Torah, the wisdom and the Injil (Surah 
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Thus, it is the Holy Spirit who brings the truths of Allah to the prophets. This is 
supported by Surah 16:102 when the Qur’an says; “Say, the Holy Spirit has brought the 
revelation with the Truth step by step from your Lord to strengthen the believers and as 
guidance and good news to the devout”. Similar to the views of al-Zamakhshari, al-Razi 
also asserts that the verse in Surah 5:110 is the consequence of the two modes of 
misunderstanding connected to the association of divinity to Jesus. The first mode of 
misapprehension is the Jewish disbelief in Jesus as a prophet of Allah despite the signs he 
performed to prove his prophetic calling. The second mode of misunderstanding is the later 
Christian deification of Jesus as divine.
536
  
In his esoteric interpretation of the ta’wil of Surah 5:110, al-Razi intimates that Ruh 
or Spirit essentially has two natures: “the pure and luminous spirit” and “the wicked and 
tyrannical spirit” who have the power to rule over an individual or be a means by which 
others are ruled. Ruh can therefore be luminous or dark. So, if Jesus is referred to as “a 
Spirit from Allah” it is because he is a Spirit that is wholly pure and luminous from Allah. 
His ontological constitution as a pure spirit from Allah establishes the relationship between 
him and Gabriel,
537
 for Gabriel was identified as al-Quddus because he is created from 
pure light.
538
 By connecting the purity of Gabriel with that of Jesus, al-Razi then concluded 
that in the history of prophecy no prophet ever possessed the qualities that Jesus had. In al-
Razi one sees a sustained argument for the unparalleled uniqueness of Jesus vis-avis the 
other prophets who preceded him.  
In conclusion, when one considers the views of the above three Islamic 
commentators on Surah 2:87, Surah 2:253 and Surah 5:110, one is given a clearer 
understanding of what Muslims mean when they talk about the Holy Spirit and the sort of 
relationship that existed between him and the Qur’anic Jesus. Here, all three commentators 
(al-Tabari, al-Zamakhshari and al-Razi) concur that the Holy Spirit is the same as the 
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Angel Gabriel. Islam views the Angel Gabriel as over-ranking the other angels and is the 
agent who communicates God’s revealed message to His messengers. The commentators 
also agree that Gabriel is referred to as al-qudus (purity) because he is created from pure 
light.
539
 In this way, we could say that if Jesus is referred to as a spirit from Allah, it could 
be because of his life of purity and holiness.  
Furthermore, from all three commentators one realizes that it is the Angel Gabriel 
who constantly assisted Jesus in the performance of his miracles and these miracles were 
signs intended to authenticate Jesus’ role as a messenger of Allah. Only al-Razi indicates 
that Jesus remains unique from the other prophets who preceded him, because he brings in 
a new Shariah, a new law to the people of Israel. Al-Zamakhshari and al-Razi also agree 
that the dialogue between Allah and Jesus (in Surah 5:110) is meant to correct a wrong 
“Christology” in practice among the Jews and Christians. Firstly, while the Jews rejected 
the authenticity of Jesus’ prophetic calling and rejected the miracles he performed as pure 
sorcery, Allah’s dialogue with Jesus in Surah 5:110 had the purpose of re-orienting them to 
the authenticity of Jesus’ claim as a prophet of Allah. Secondly, while Christians accepted 
Jesus’ miracles as authentic; they nonetheless interpreted these miracles as signs which 
pointed to his divinity as God and Son of God, giving Jesus the same divine status as God. 
Consequently, al-Zamakhshari and al-Razi agree that the dialogue in Surah 5:110 was 
meant to correct this Christian deification of Jesus as the “Son of God”. 
In the nutshell, one could say that the Christology of the Qur’an is built on the 
relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit identified as the Angel Gabriel. It is Gabriel 
who teaches guides, strengthens and assists Jesus in doing what he was sent to do as a 
messenger of Allah. As al-Tabarsi puts it, if it is asked why Jesus was specially mentioned 
among all the prophets as being supported by Gabriel even though every prophet was also 
supported by him, it would be because “Gabriel accompanied him from his youth to his 
manhood. He was with him wherever he went, so that when the Jews conspired to kill him, 
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4.4. Conclusion to the Christian and Muslim Perspectives on Christology 
Both the Qur’an and the Bible respectively shape the way faithful Muslims and Christians 
understand the nature of God and interpret reality. For Islam, there is no god but One God 
(Tawhid). The one God is the creator and sustainer of everything that exists. As the creator, 
He transcends His creation (Tanzih) and yet is immanent to His creation (Tashbih). He 
created humanity for one sole purpose – to worship Him and be good vicegerents to the 
rest of creation. To help humanity fulfil this purpose, God sent messengers to provide them 
with the right guidance. Among these messengers was Jesus, the Messiah, the son of Mary. 
From the context of the Tawhid, though Jesus is given reverential designations such as 
Messiah, Spirit of/from God, Word of/from God and the friend of God among others, these 
titles only define his role as a prophet or messenger of Allah. Here, Jesus succeeded in 
performing his prophetic task through his intimate connection with the Holy Spirit. 
For Christianity, although God is one, Jesus Christ is the second person of the 
triune God (the Holy Trinity) who took on human nature through the incarnation in order 
to redeem fallen humanity from its bondage of sin and death. Through his death and 
resurrection Jesus Christ atoned for the sins of fallen humanity (see Genesis 3:1-24) and 
therefore made salvation possible for all believers. It could only take the sinless one to 
redeem the sinful (Rom 5:12, 18-19). Though he walked the face of the earth as a human 
being (the Son of Man), he was nonetheless God (the Son of God). This explains why it is 
impossible to speak of God within the parameters of Christian theology without relating 
such statements to the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
541
 
In consequence, the Christian and Islamic tradition-specific understandings of 
Christology demonstrate that each religious tradition has a theological framework which 
supports a coherent articulation of their respective perspective on the identity and mission 
of Jesus Christ. For Islam, Jesus is only a prophet or messenger of Allah because Allah is 
only one and none is comparable to Him (Tawhid). For Christian theology, Jesus is both 
God and man, the second person of the Holy Trinity because God is one in three persons. 
Thus, we could say that the Tawhid and the Holy Trinity constitute the two theological 
                                                          
541
 Alister McGrath. Christian Theology. 1997, p324 
162 
 
constructs which set apart the Islamic and Christian views on the identity and mission of 
Jesus Christ. 
Up till now, dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the other demands 
that these views should be fully shared, clearly understood and deeply respected as 
essential to the Christian and Islamic theologizing about Jesus. Not only do they represent 
Christian and Islamic tradition-specific understandings of the identity and mission of Jesus, 
but they contribute in shaping how Christians and Muslims view and interpret God and 
reality. As different systems of belief (the Tawhid and the Holy Trinity), one system 
cannot be used as the standard of measurement for the truthfulness of the other. What is 
rather possible and beneficial, is to engage in a dialogue whose purpose is geared towards 
learning from and about what the other has to say about Jesus Christ through the method of 
comparative theology. In this way, our next task in chapter five shall be to critically 
correlate some Christian and Islamic christological themes and titles which we have all 
along “‘passed-over’ in silence” in this chapter. The purpose would be to see how they 
contribute in shaping the identity and mission of Jesus Christ in Islam and Christianity on 
the one hand and, on the other hand, how this might offer learning examples for Christian-













5. COMPARATIVE THEOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM DIALOGUE 
ON CHRISTOLOGY AS AN EXERCISE IN LEARNING 
5.1. Introduction 
The fact that Jesus Christ remains the central figure in Christian faith and theology and yet 
is significantly referenced in the Qur’an presents a common ground for undertaking a 
comparative theological exercise between “Qur’anic Christology” and the Christology of 
the Synoptic Gospels. The interest is to engage Christians and Muslims in dialogue as an 
exercise in learning, where each learns and understands the other’s point of view on the 
identity and mission of Jesus Christ and how this learning can help them to interrelate 
more friendly and peacefully and collaborate in the living out of values espoused by the 
message of Jesus in their respective traditions. We hope to embark on this comparative 
theological exercise through the critical correlation of some key christological titles and 
themes derived from the Qur’an and the Synoptic Gospels.  
In his assessment of earlier researches on Christian-Muslim dialogue on 
Christology, Mahmoud Ayoub indicated that “earlier research on the subject of Jesus in 
Islam has been comparative and usually, the yardstick being the New Testament record of 
the life, teachings and significance of Jesus, the Christ. Useful as this research may have 
been... it had often harboured old prejudices and fostered new hostilities”.
542
 For Hamilton 
Gibb, the reason for these hostilities is because such comparative assessments do not do 
justice to Islam as “an autonomous expression of religious thoughts and experiences which 
must be viewed in and through its own principles and standards”.
543
 In our contemporary 
context which is characterised by an all-pervading context of otherness, the voice of the 
other can no longer be silenced by totalitarian and hegemonic philosophies and systems of 
belief. In other words, it is no longer acceptable to give Christian interpretations to 
theological themes and concepts which are particularly Islamic. In the same way, one 
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cannot also read the Synoptic Gospels with an Islamic bias.
544
 To do so, is to ignore the 
fact the Bible and the Qur’an have different historical contexts and modes of revelation; 
and as such, have different theological frameworks within which the identity and mission 
of Jesus Christ are construed. 
Thus, for Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology to be successful as an exercise 
in learning, the other must be viewed as an original source of self-understanding, capable 
of communicating a unique experience.
545
 Gadamer emphasized this same claim when he 
asserted that “in human relations the important thing is to experience the Thou truly as a 
Thou, not to overlook his claims, but to let him truly say something to us”.
546
 The interest 
in learning from and about the other can genuinely take place when we allow the other to 
say something to us about themselves and about who they conceive Jesus to be and that 
which inspires these conceptions. As Panikkar understands, “to cross the boundaries of 
one’s culture without realizing that the other may have a radically different approach to 
reality is today no longer admissible. If still consciously done, it would be philosophically 
naïve, politically outrageous and religiously sinful”.
547
 
In consequence, while chapter four sought to create the space for Islam and 
Christianity to communicate their respective understandings on Christology, this chapter 
seeks to critically correlate some of the key christological titles, themes and concepts 
which emerged within the process. The purpose here is to further learn and understand 
their meaning within their specific contexts and how this may provide learning examples 
for Christian-Muslim dialogue of life and dialogue of common action. Hence, this current 
chapter is a development of that which preceded it. In this work of critical correlation, our 
attention shall be on the following Christological titles and themes: Messiah, Word of/from 
God, Spirit of/from God, Son of God, the Trinity, the Death and Resurrection, the Virginal 
Conception, the Ascension and Second Coming of Jesus, among others. The critical 
correlations of these themes and titles may disclose the significant place Jesus occupies in 
each tradition and how this context of “Jesus-significance” could points to certain religious 
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values within each tradition. While this area would be the focus of chapter six, the purpose 
would be to see how these religious values (espoused by the life and mission of Jesus), 
could become contexts for Christian-Muslim dialogue of life and the dialogue of common 
action.  
5.2. Correlation of Key Christological titles in Islam and Christianity 
Just as the NT designates multiple Christological titles to Jesus Christ,
548
 so also the 
Qur’anic portrait of Jesus accord him some honorific titles,
549
 some of which appear to be 
similar to the NT designations. It will be the task of this section to try to understand these 
titles or themes within their Christian and Islamic tradition-specific contexts. While Jesus 
Christ is construed as “Son of God” in Christianity, he is considered a “messenger of 
Allah” in Islam. Thus, the work of critical correlation would focus on clarifying the 
meanings of the titles ascribed to Jesus in Christianity and Islam. We shall focus on three 
of these christological titles – namely Messiah, Spirit of/from God and Word of/from God. 
5.2.1. Jesus as Al-Masih (Messiah or the Christ) 
According to Parrinder, Jesus is referred as al-Masih eleven (11) times in the Qur’an. All 
these verses appear in the Medinan Surahs.
550
 But the meaning it associates with this title 
is different from the heavily loaded soteriological implications it carries within Christian 
theology.
551
 In Surah 3:45, which concerns the annunciation of Jesus’ birth, Jesus is 
referred to as Messiah – “the Angel said to Mary, God gives you news of a Word from 
Him, whose name will be the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary..”. In Surah 5:72, the title is 
used as a personal name for Jesus – “the Messiah himself said; children of Israel, worship 
God, my Lord and your Lord”. So, the title Messiah is used in reference to Jesus at all 
periods of his life – from his birth to his final exaltation.
552
 However, though Parrinder 
asserts that there seems to be no explanation as to what this title conceptually means, the 
title nonetheless appears to have a particular sense, demonstrated by the injunction in 
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Surah 4:171 – “people of the Book, do not go to excess in your religion and do not say 
anything about God except the truth; the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, was nothing more 
than a messenger of God”. To reaffirm this claim, the Qur’an in Surah 5:17 also says – 
“those who say God is the Messiah, the son of Mary, are defying the truth”. 
Consequently, Parrinder says that “while there is no Qur’anic etymological 
explanation of the word Masih, it was not difficult for the commentators to find a number 
of meanings”
553
 associated with the term. Though there seems to be no specific etymology 
about the concept in Islam, other than the understanding that it means “anointing”, what 
one can emphatically say about the title Messiah is that in Islam, the title has no divine 
connotations. It simply means Jesus was “anointed”
554
 by Allah from birth for a special 
mission as His prophet. If one takes serious considerations of the claims in Surah 4:171, 
then one could say that the title “Messiah” in the Qur’an designates the personal name of 
Jesus who is a prophet or messenger of Allah. However, while Islamic commentators like 
al-Zamakhshari and al-Baidawi concede that the title Messiah is a foreign word in 
Arabic,
555
 some later Islamic commentators considered the Arabic al-Masih to mean 
“King, righteous, pure” or “one anointed with sacred oil from birth”. In Moucarry’s view, 
al-malik (King) and al-siddik (righteous one) might be more appropriate in reference to the 
meaning of the title Messiah.
556
 
Having said this, it is worthwhile to mention that though the title Messiah does not 
add divine connotations to the identity of Jesus, Shi’i Islam seem to present what Ayoub 
calls a “quasi soteriological Christology in the doctrine and role of the Imams, the spiritual 
heads of the community”.
557
 According to Ayoub, Ali the first Imam compared himself to 
Jesus in Shi’i Islam. By first declaring God as One, Ali talks about himself and his 
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descendants (the remaining eleven Imams) as being created by God’s word.
558
 What is 
significant here is that these twelve Imams are seen as the mediators between God and 
humanity. As Ayoub puts it, “they are a source of salvation on the Day of Reckoning for 
those who accept their status as the friends of God and true heirs of the prophets”.
559
 These 
Imams are supposed to return at the end of time and the twelfth Imam would be the 
Messiah who would establish divine rule over the earth, with Jesus assisting him in his 
final act of redemption and judgement.
560
 Even though Ayoub acknowledges that Islam 
really has no concept of sin and redemption analogous of the Christian view, he 
nonetheless asserts that as a messenger of God, Jesus could be viewed as “a saviour in that 
he, by his message, helped to guide humanity from error and to guide its footsteps on the 
path to God”.
561
 This notwithstanding, one must always be reminded that in nowhere in 
Islamic scholarship, does Jesus’ title as Messiah carry divine connotations.   
Within the context of Christian faith and theology, as we saw in chapter four, Mark 
from the unset, declares his Christological intent in the prologue of the Gospel – “the 
beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the son of God” (1:1). Whereas we know that the 
title Messiah is a Hebrew term which means the “anointed one”, the use of Christos 
(Christ) here is the Greek equivalent of the Hebrew Messiah. This title has a history 
beginning from the time of Abraham through to the time of the post-exilic prophets and 
John the Baptist. In this history, God brought Israel’s attention to certain expectations in 
terms of different strands of future divine actions that will establish justice and peace. With 
Abraham, God established a covenant, stating that all the people of the earth shall be 
blessed in him (Gen 22:15-18). Here, the Messianic promise is more or less, the awaiting 
of the messianic era than the promise of the person of the Messiah. 
However, the expectation of this future divine event became associated with some 
of Abraham’s descendants, namely the Davidic line of kings.
562
 King David (1Samuel 
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16:1ff) is known for his excellent kingship. After David and Solomon, God promises Israel 
an Ideal Davidic king who will establish perfect peace and justice. This longing for the 
ideal Davidic king became associated with the prophecies of the anointed one who will 
destroy the enemies of Israel.
563
 Later on, these messianic utterances became intertwined 
with popular consciousness (the unfaithfulness of Israel’s kings) leading to the prophecies 
which indicated that God himself was going to be their liberator.
564
 These prophecies gave 
rise to the association of divinity to the status of the Messiah (Isaiah 9:5-6), the virginity of 
his mother (Isaiah 7:14) and his place of birth (Micah 5:2-3). From then on, Israel awaited 
the coming of the promised Messiah. 
Consequently, after having experienced Jesus personally, Peter made a 
breakthrough on the way to Caesarea-Philippi by identifying Jesus as the Christ (Mark 
8:29). Without having to repeat what was said in chapter four, what is worth-noting here is 
that in Christian faith and theology, the ascription of the title Messiah to Jesus Christ 
points to the fact that Jesus Christ is the son of God and saviour of the world. As McGrath 
puts it, to assert that Jesus Christ makes salvation possible, is not to deny the possibility of 
other modes of salvation, but “to insist that within the Christian tradition, the distinctively 
Christian understanding of what salvation is can only be realized on the basis of Jesus 
Christ”.
565
 So, while the prophecies in the OT (See Isaiah 7:14, 9:5-6, Isaiah 52:13 – 53:12 
and Daniel 7: 13-14) predicted the coming of the anointed one who will bring liberation to 
the people of Israel,
566
 the Synoptic Gospels see Jesus Christ as the fulfilment of these 
prophecies.  
In consequence, while Messiah in Islam depicts the identity of Jesus as a prophet of 
Allah, in Christianity this title has a soteriological import. It identifies Jesus Christ as the 
son of God and saviour of the world. Jesus Christ as the Messiah in the Qur’an also 
suggests that Jesus is blessed and honoured by God (Surah 3:45), protected from Satan 
from birth (Surah 3:31) and blessed with a special birth (Surah 7:171-172). Furthermore, 
from the Arabic word msh which means “to touch”, the Messiah is seen as “one whose 
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touch purifies from all faults, being himself provided with protection from the divine and 
anointed with the blessed oil (Surah 3:43, 49)”.
567
 Thus, when one considers the above 
text, one could say that the title Messiah in the Qur’an is not just a loose title but conveys 
the precise identity of Jesus as the anointed prophet of Allah who was very faithful to the 
task given to him by Allah.  
We stated in chapter four concerning Adam and the fall that Allah forgave Adam 
after the fall and made him his first prophet. Islam therefore has no concept of sin and 
redemption similar to the fundamental Christian view of fallen humanity and its need for 
redemption.
568
 So, what will the Messiah in Islam be saving, when there is nothing to save 
except to provide guidance on the straight path to Allah? In Christianity however, the fall 
of Adam (original sin) brought depravity to the entirety of humanity, for which sinful 
humanity could not save itself unless through a sinless one. It therefore took the sinlessness 
of Jesus Christ to save sinful humanity. This gives the title a soteriological significance in 
Christianity. 
Thus, Ayoub concludes that “the Christ of Muslim piety has continued to be a 
living personality, humble and pious, forever thundering against the wrongs of society”.
569
 
The question then is: what could be learnt from the identity of Jesus as Messiah in Islam 
and in Christianity? It is here that a focus on the message of Jesus in the Qur’an and in the 
NT becomes significant for dialogue as an exercise in earning. As a prophet in Islam, 
Jesus’ message on the Tawhid contributes to guiding humanity from all error by guiding 
them in the practice of true submission to the One God. As Ayoub conceived, “by his 
message, Jesus helped to save humanity from all error and guided its steps further on the 
path to God, to whom all belong and to whom we shall all return (Surah 2:156)”.
570
 As the 
“Son of God” in Christianity, Jesus’ message in the Gospels does not only provide 
guidance on how to live morally good lives, but his death and resurrection brought 
redemption for all Christians. How can the messages of Jesus the Messiah be a context for 
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Christian-Muslim dialogue of life and dialogue of common action? Chapter six will serve 
as the response to this question. 
5.2.2. Jesus as Ruh (Spirit) of/from Allah 
According to Parrinder, even though the encyclopaedia of Islam reports that the Qur’anic 
use of the term Spirit is a bit obscure, Spirit is used seven times in the Qur’an (some 
examples are Surah 2:87, 4:171, 5:110, 19:17 and Surah 21:91) in reference to Jesus.
571
 In 
some of these verses, Jesus is referred to as a Spirit from Allah. Among the six prophets 
who are dignified with special titles
572
 Jesus is identified as “the Spirit of God”. What does 
this designation mean in Islam? For the modern Islamic commentator Yusuf Ali, it means 
“Christ was a spirit proceeding from God”.
573
 For S. M. Seale, “It means the spirit was 
sent to him by divine command”.
574
 But, in Samuel Schlorff’s view, “Spirit from Allah” 
should not be seen in divine terms because the Qur’anic understanding of the Holy Spirit is 
different from the Biblical deification of him. According to Schlorff, even though the 
Qur’an makes references to the Spirit in terms such as the “Holy Spirit” (Ruh-al-Qudus – 
Surah 2:87), “a Spirit from Allah” (Surah 4:171), “a Faithful Spirit” (al-Ruh-al-almin – 
Surah 26:193), these are not symmetrical to Christian theological understanding of the 
Holy Spirit. Islam identifies the Holy Spirit as Gabriel the Angel of revelation who 
strengthens and guides the prophets and messengers of Allah.
 575
 
In the commentaries on Surah 2:87, 2:253 and 5:110 in chapter four, al-Tabari, al-
Zamakhshari and al-Razi helped us understand the relationship between Jesus and the Holy 
Spirit (the Angel Gabriel) who is God’s messenger of revelation. In Islam, Angels are not 
divine beings but are created by God from pure light, to serve God as his messengers.
576
 
Consequently, the Angel Gabriel is not a divine being, but a messenger of God’s revelation 
to his prophets. Since the Qur’an reports that Jesus was supported by the Holy Spirit from 
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cradle to his final end, one would imagine that God’s favour was continuously with him 
from the moment of his birth to his final exaltation. Hence, al-Tabarsi could state 
emphatically that if it is asked why Jesus was specially mentioned among all the prophets 
as being supported by Gabriel, even though every prophet was also supported by him, it 
would be because “Gabriel accompanied him from his youth to his final end.”
577
 
Consequently, to say that Jesus is the “Spirit of/from God” carries no divine 
connotations. It rather emphasizes on the one hand, how Jesus came to be born through 
Allah’s express command (Be! and he was Surah 19:35) and on the other, how he was 
continually supported by the Angel Gabriel from the cradle to his final exaltation. As al-
Zamakhshari indicated, the understanding of Jesus as the spirit of Allah only point to the 
fact that Jesus came into being through a special intervention of Allah without human seed 
or substance.
578
 According to al-Zamakhshari, since the Holy Spirit is the pure breath of 
Allah (symbolizing purity), then His presence in the life of Jesus from beginning to end 
suggests that Jesus’ whole life was marked by purity (the absence of sin and wrongdoing) 
and hence could be called the Spirit of God. 
From the perspective of Christian faith and theology, even though one does not find 
references to Jesus as a Spirit of/from God, the Synoptic Gospels also present a picture of 
Jesus Christ which depicts his relationship with the Holy Spirit. For instance, Mt1:18 
reports how through the power of the Holy Spirit, Mary was to conceive and bear a son. 
Though the Gospel of Mark has no narrative on the annunciation it does report of the 
descent of the Holy Spirit on Jesus at his baptism (Mk 1:10). It was the same Holy Spirit 
who drove Jesus into the wilderness and supported him during his temptation (Mk1:12-13). 
Thus, Mona Hooker indicates that though Mark does not report of the outcome of the 
temptation in the way Matthew and Luke do, what is clear is that Jesus was victorious over 
the devil through the support he received from the Holy Spirit. In this way, “his future 
actions and words would be governed by the Spirit, not by Satan”.
579
 Thus, the descent of 
the Holy Spirit on Jesus at his Baptism (Lk 3:22) and the working of the Holy Spirit in his 
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ministry (Lk 4:14-18), demonstrate that the Holy Spirit was continually active in the 
ministry of Jesus Christ from the beginning to the end. 
However, unlike Islam which identifies the Holy Spirit as the Angel Gabriel, 
Christian faith and theology identifies the Holy Spirit here as a divine being, the third 
person of the Holy Trinity. Whereas the Islamic obligation to the Tawhid asserts the unity 
and transcendence of God and forbids the association of God to other beings, the Christian 
experience of God as Creator (the Father), as Redeemer (Jesus Christ) and as Sanctifier 
(the Holy Spirit), provides the context for conceptualizing God as One in three divine 
persons., Thus, for Christian faith and theology, the Holy Spirit who is active in the 
ministry of Jesus Christ from the beginning to the end was none other than the third person 
of the Holy Trinity, a divine Being. 
It could therefore be said that in Islam, the understanding that the Holy Spirit who 
emanates from God was constantly at work in Jesus’ life and ministry is worth noting, 
though the Holy Spirit here is identified as the Angel Gabriel. In Christianity too, even 
though the Holy Spirit is identified as the third person of the Holy Trinity, one nonetheless 
finds him actively involved in the ministry of Jesus, the “Messiah, the son of God”. So in 
both the Qur’an and in the New Testament, one finds that the Holy Spirit though 
understood differently, nonetheless supported Jesus in the task he performed as a “prophet 
of Allah” in Islam and as the “Son of God” in Christianity. If the Holy Spirit emanates 
from God (as messenger in Islam and as proceeding from God as the third person of the 
Trinity); then it could be said that all that Jesus said and did in the Qur’an and in the NT 
had God’s divine approval. In this way, what then can Muslims and Christians learn from 
the message and exemplary life of Jesus (as prophet and as Son of God) for their living 
relationships? While this question would be attended to in chapter six, let us investigate 
into the meaning of Jesus as the “Word from God or Word of God” in Islam and in 
Christianity. 
5.2.3. Jesus as the “Word from God” or “Word of God” (Kalimatim-minallah) 
Two of the texts that refer to Jesus as “a Word from Allah” are: “the Angel said, Mary, 
God gives you news of a Word from Him, whose name will be the Messiah, Jesus, the son 
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of Mary who will be held in honour in this world and the next…” (Surah 3:45); and  
“People of the Book, do not go to excess in your religion and do not say anything about 
God except the truth: the Messiah, Jesus, Son of Mary, was nothing more than a messenger 
of God, His Word directed to Mary and a Spirit from Him” (Surah 4:171). The key word 
for our interest here is: Kalimatuhun (His Word). What does this mean?  
From the ordinary sense of the phrase – if “His” here refers to Allah, then “His 
Word” means that Jesus is in some unique way, God’s own Word. This sense of the word 
becomes clearer when Surah 3:45 is considered in the light of Surah 3:39: “the Angel 
called out to him (Zachariah), while he stood praying in the sanctuary: God gives you news 
of John (Yahya) who will confirm a Word from God” (kalimatim-minallah). So, if the 
same Angel announces the conception of Jesus to Mary as “kalimatim-minhu” (a Word 
from Him) in Surah 3:45, then one could say that Jesus is God’s Word whom John heralds. 
But what does Jesus as “kalimatim-minallah” (A Word from God) mean in Islam? 
It must be said that the Qur’anic understanding of Jesus as a Word from Allah or 
the Word of God is not synonymous to the Johannine logos Christological 
understanding.
580
 Though the tendency is for Christian scholars to conclude in Johannine 
christological terms that the title “Word from God or Word of God” (Surah 3:39 and 3:45) 
means that Jesus is the “incarnate word of God,”
581
 one needs to understand this title in the 
light of Surah 4:171. In this text the Qur’an is unequivocal in its definition of the identity 
of Jesus – “People of the Book, do not go to excess in your religion and do not say 
anything about God except the truth: the Messiah, Jesus, Son of Mary, was nothing more 
than a messenger of God…” This text, coupled with the overall Islamic obligation to the 
Tawhid, implies that the title of Jesus as “a Word from God or the Word of God” could not 
be construed in logos Christological terms. Having said this, what interpretations do 
Muslim commentators give to this seemingly dense christological title?  
Among the Qur’anic interpreters, Yusuf Ali focuses attention on Surah 3:39 and 
3:45 finding explanations to the designation of Jesus as “a Word from God” in Surah 3:59 
where the Qur’an says: “In God’s eyes, Jesus is just like Adam. He created him from dust 
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and said to him, ‘Be,’ and he was (.Kun fayakuun)”. According to Yusuf, this text implies 
that Adam and Jesus were both created by the single word of God.
582
 Hence, if divinity can 
be derived from this notion of Jesus as the “Word from God”, then Adam could be 
considered divine as well. For Yusuf, to say that Jesus is a “Word from Allah” does not 
imply that he is the pre-existent Word of God per the Johannine Logos Christology. It 
means that Jesus is a messenger of God, created for a special purpose. In al-Baydawi’s 
view too, Jesus is referred to as “a word from God” because he came into being without a 
Father. For al-Razi, Jesus was called “word of God” because he was created by the express 
command of Allah: “Be and he was”. Other commentators also think that Jesus is referred 
to as “a Word from God” because he came as the effect of the word of God which He cast 




Though there may be divergent views as to what this phrase (a Word from God) 
definitively means in Islam, it is noteworthy that each of these views renders an 
interpretation that honours and respects the uniqueness of Jesus, devoid of divine 
connotations. Hence, many Islamic commentaries on the designation of Jesus as “a Word 
from God” converge on the meaning associated to Surah 19:35 in which God creates by 
simply saying: “‘Be!’ and it is”. In other words, Jesus is referred to as “a Word from God” 
because he came into being through the creative Word of God. Hence, many agree that 
Jesus was created uniquely through Allah’s divine command just as Adam was created 
(Surah 3:59). However, Jesus is different from Adam in that whereas Adam is partially 
created from dust and disobeyed God at some point in history (Surah 7:19-23), Jesus was 
created not from dust but by the Word of God cast upon Mary and he never disobeyed the 
commands of Allah. 
Besides, nowhere in the Qur’an is the designation “Word from God” used to 
describe any of the prophets except for Jesus. This exclusive use of the phrase in reference 
to Jesus suggests that there must be something more about the person of Jesus himself that 
warrants this exclusivity. In some sense, could it be because Jesus is the only prophet of 
                                                          
582
 Yusuf Ali Abdullah. The Holy Qur’an. 2001, p132 
583
 Al-Tabari quoted in Parrinder, G. 1965, p47 
175 
 
Allah who is known to have been gifted with the Injil, the Torah and the Wisdom (Surah 
3:48) at the same time? In the Qur’an, none of the messengers of God is known to have 
taught all these scriptures which are known to be from God (God’s Word). Hence, if the 
Qur’an (Surah 3:48) reports that “God will teach him (Jesus) the Scriptures and Wisdom, 
the Torah and the Gospel”, then Jesus by this very fact, possessed in considerable measure 
the “Word from God” or “Word of God” in a unique way. In Islam, this uniqueness does 
not point to his divinity, but to his role as a faithful prophet of Allah. 
Within the context of the NT, “Word of God” (the Logos) is one of the most 
significant titles designated to Jesus Christ. Though Jesus as the Logos is not used 
elaborately in the Synoptic Gospels, the Gospel of John uses this title in unequivocal 
terms: “In the beginning was the Word. And the Word was with God. And the Word was 
God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came to be through him” (John 1:1-2). 
According to Parrinder, linking the Logos to creation takes us back to the creation story in 
the book of Genesis where creation came into being through the creative Word of God.
584
 
Though the word Logos is the Greek derivative of the Hebrew Dābār (Word) Logos was 
first used by Philo of Alexandria to refer to “the Divine Reason, intermediate between God 
and the world”.
585
 However, in the Johannine account, Logos is not used in the sense that 
Philo used it. Here, it refers to God himself who pre-existed creation and hence does not 
belong to the created order. It is this Logos which became incarnated in Jesus Christ – 
“And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth” (John 1:14). 
In consequence, Christian faith and theology holds that by virtue of the incarnation, 
the Word of God (Jesus) became flesh through the conception of the Virgin Mary. After 
the incarnation Jesus Christ as the “Word of God”, retained two natures: the human and the 
divine, in one prosopon (person). As McGrath intimated, within Christian faith and 
theology “the importance of the confession ‘Jesus is Lord’ is not only that Jesus is divine, 
but that God is Christ-like”.
586
 For Abdul-Haqq, there is no doubt as to the identity of 
Jesus as the “Word from God” whom John came to announce to Israel. In the expression 
“Word from Him”, the participle (from) “Min” signifies a generic relationship between the 
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noun and pronoun linked together by it. Therefore it means that “the Word” is of the same 
divine essence as Him (hun) - God.
587
 For Samuel Zwemer, if Christ in Christianity were a 
mere Word from God then it would be clear that He was only one expression of God’s 
will. But since God Himself calls Him “the Word of God” it is clear that He must be the 
one and only perfect expression of God's will and the only perfect manifestation of God.
588
 
So, in Christianity, to say that Jesus Christ is the “Word of God” is to admit that this Jesus 
is divine: truly God and truly Man, the second person of the Holy Trinity. 
Having considered the Islamic and the Christian understandings of the title “Word 
from God or Word of God”, we could conclude that the title is exclusively designated to 
Jesus in both the Qur’an and the Gospel of John. However, while it is interpreted in Islam 
as emphasizing the unique creation of Jesus through Allah’s divine command – “Be and it 
is”, (Surah 19: 35); in Christianity, Jesus Christ as the “Word of God” relates to the 
incarnation in which Jesus in his pre-existence took on human form and was born of the 
Blessed Virgin Mary (God with us). Here, he is not created by God but predates creation 
and is the source of it. Having said this, what can we learn from these two forms of 
Christologizing about Jesus on the basis of the “Word of God Word from God” title?  
Since Islam understands that Jesus is a messenger of Allah, we know that every 
messenger of Allah is sent with a message that emphasizes on the human obligation to 
observe the Tawhid.
589
 In Christianity however, Jesus Christ is the “proclaimed word” i.e. 
the incarnate Word. Consequently, whether understood as a bearer of God’s Word (the 
messenger in Islam) or the content of that very Word (the Incarnate Word in Christianity), 
Jesus still provides guidance to all who seek to submit themselves to God through his 
message. Thus, it could be asked: If Jesus is viewed as the “Word from Allah” in the 
Qur’an and the “Word of God” in the Gospels, what is the message of Jesus for Christians 
and Muslims in terms of “submission to God” and issues relating to social justice? Do 
these provide contexts for Christian-Muslim dialogue of life and the dialogue of common 
action? 
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In conclusion, it must be said that the purpose for engaging in this brief work of 
critical correlation on the above Christological titles (Messiah, Spirit of God and Word 
from God) is to give an overview of the differences that exist between the Islamic and 
Christian interpretations of the titles and the meanings that are associated with them as a 
result of these interpretations. In the course of doing this, the critical analysis opened up 
some significant questions some of which include: as Messiah, how can the messages of 
Jesus in the Qur’an and the Gospels become contexts for Christian-Muslim dialogue of life 
and dialogue of common action? As Spirit of/from God, what can Muslims and Christians 
learn from the message and exemplary life of Jesus, for their mutual relationships? As the 
Word of/from God, what is this message of Jesus for Christians and Muslims in respect of 
the submission to the will of God and the pursuit of issues of social justice? While these 
questions will be attended to in chapter six, they nonetheless demonstrate how the identity 
and mission of Jesus have the potential to stimulate Christians-Muslim conversations about 
fidelity to God and the response to issues of social justice. 
5.3. Jesus Christ as Bridge and Barrier to Christian-Muslim Dialogue 
So far, we have seen that the problem between Christians and Muslims is the divinity of 
Jesus Christ. For Christians, Jesus Christ is the Son of God and saviour of the world. But 
for Muslims, he is only a messenger of Allah whose task was to provide right guidance to 
the people of the Book. This context of claim and counterclaim on the identity and mission 
of Jesus, makes Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology a daunting task. Thus, 
Beaumont conceives that unless Muslims develop a more dynamic concept of the 
transcendence of God, they will never admit to the Christian notion of the divinity of 
Christ. “Muslims for their part are pleased when Christians give up the idea of divine 




While the identity and mission of Jesus still remains contentious in Christian-
Muslim circles, some scholars propose that a focus on the ethics of Jesus would help 
lighten the tensions that exist between Christians and Muslims when it comes to dialogue 
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about him. But as we indicated in chapter four, Christian-Muslim dialogue on the ethics of 
Jesus will not be more straightforward than dialogue on his status because the authority of 
his teachings may have to be faced when a clash between his teachings and Islamic 
tradition emerge. As Beaumont puts it, “whether Muslims will be prepared to grant him the 
authority to challenge Islamic norms is a difficult question to answer”.
591
  
However, the understanding that dialogue on Christology must begin first from the 
status of Jesus and then proceed to his ethics makes sense. This is because Jesus did what 
he succeeded in doing because of who he was. So, if Christians and Muslims want to have 
a dialogue which reflects an honest engagement intended for the benefit of learning from 
and about the other, then it must begin from who they each construe Jesus to be. Islam may 
deny the doctrines of the incarnation, the death and resurrection of Jesus, but it also has 
accounts which concern the “Virginal Conception”, the “miracles Jesus performed”, the 
“Ascension” and the “Second Coming”. Since these events concern Jesus Christ, one 
could say that this Jesus appears to be both barrier and bridge in Christian-Muslim 
relations. Whereas the barrier represents that which divides them christologically, the 
bridge underscores the common christological themes they share. To engage in dialogue as 
an exercise in learning, one needs to know the meanings of these themes in their tradition-
specific contexts and the lessons they may offer Christian-Muslim dialogue of life and the 
dialogue of common action. Let us investigate into the Christological themes which we 
heuristically refer to as bridge and barrier to Christian-Muslim relations.   
5.3.1.  Jesus as Barrier to Dialogue 
The meaning of the concept barrier can either be seen in physical or non-physical terms. It 
is viewed in a physical sense when it refers to “a set of object(s) used to separate, 
demarcate or barricade a passage from one point to another”. From this sense, we can 
think of a fence, a highway barrier or a roadblock. From the non-physical perspective, a 
barrier can also mean “a regulation that is intended to set apart and differentiate one thing 
from another”. Here, we can think of the ethics of a profession, rules of courtesy, religious 
rules and doctrines and so forth. From these two definitions we could say that the goal of 
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every barrier is to maintain the status-quo, to regulate conduct, to maintain law and order 
or ensure the maintenance of originality or particularity. Hence, barriers pose no problems 
once one respects and observes that which they seek to preserve. Situating this within the 
context of Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology, barrier here is used as a heuristic 
device intended to help us understand the christological issues which seem to set a dividing 
line between the Christian and the Muslim way of theologizing about Jesus.  
Hence, to say that Jesus remains a barrier to Christian-Muslim dialogue is to 
maintain that there are stark differences in the way Christians and Muslims theologize 
about Jesus of Nazareth. These differences need to be respected. As we indicated in 
chapter four, while Islamic Christology is guided by its obligation to the Tawhid, the 
Christian view of Jesus Christ as “Son of God” finds its meaning in the Christian 
experience of God as Trinity. Thus, the context of Tawhid and Trinity set the parenthesis 
within which Christology finds its articulation in Islam and Christianity respectively. In 
this way, the Tawhid and the Trinity define the barriers within which the Qur’anic Jesus 
and Jesus of the NT are to be understood. Two of these barriers are: Jesus as the Son of 
God and death and resurrection of Jesus. The emphasis here is that, for dialogue as an 
exercise in learning to succeed, the barriers that separate the religions need to be respected. 
Let us delve into some of these barriers. 
5.3.1.1.The Holy Trinity and Tawhid 
The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is a theological articulation of the Christian experience of 
God as One in three divine persons – God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy 
Spirit. These three divine persons are distinct, but are of one substance, one essence or one 
nature. While their personhood focuses on who they are, their nature defines what they 
are.
592
 Thus, the three persons of the Holy Trinity are said to be distinct from one another 
in their relations of origin, but co-equal, consubstantial and co-eternal in their nature.
593
 
But the basic question is: how can God be One and at the same time Three? It is this same 
question that continues to vex every theological discourse on the doctrine of the Holy 
Trinity. Whereas the effort here is to emphasize that the Holy Trinity is the central non-
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negotiable mystery of Christian faith and life, we shall do this by briefly addressing 
questions which relate to: how God revealed himself through the mystery of the Holy 
Trinity and how the Church articulated this revelation. 
 First of all, it must be said that the Christian experience and knowledge of God is 
informed by two premises: the knowledge of who God is and what God has done. In the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, these two areas are distinguished as theologia 
(theology) and oikonomia (economy). Whereas theologia refers to the mystery of God’s 
innermost life, oikonomia refers to all the work by which God reveals and communicates 
his life. In this way, “God’s works reveal who he is in himself and the mystery of his 
inmost being enlightens our understanding of all his works... A person discloses himself in 
his actions and the better we know a person, the better we understand his actions”.
594
 Thus, 
through the oikonomia, the theologia is revealed to us, while the theologia illuminates the 
whole oikonomia. 
But how did God reveal himself to Christians as Trinity and how did the Church 
articulate this revelation? From the onset, it must be said that God is Holy Mystery. This 
means that God cannot be fully and absolutely comprehended by the human mind (reason). 
His incomprehensibility defines him as God. Consequently, Christian faith and theology 
perceives the Holy Trinity (the Father, the Son and Holy Spirit) as part of the mystery of 
God who is partially known through what he chooses to reveal. Thus, the Holy Trinity 
comes as part of that which God chose to make known to the Christian Church. Just as in 
some religions God is called Father so also in the OT: Israel referred to God as Father 
because he created the world and sustains it (Deut 32:6). By the establishment of the 
covenant between God and Israel, Israel was known as God’s ‘first born son” (Exodus 
4:22). Besides, God was known to be the Father of the kings of Israel, Father of the poor, 
the widowed and orphans.
595
 So by calling God “Father”, the language of faith indicates 
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Through the testimonies of Jesus Christ, God is further revealed not only as Father 
in the sense of being creator, but also in the sense of being eternally Father in relation to 
his son who is also eternally son in relation to his Father.
597
 For this reason, Jesus affirms 
that “No one knows the Son except the Father and no one knows the Father except the Son 
and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him” (Matthew 11:27). Not only does 
Jesus express the connection between him and the Father as based on his knowledge of 
him but in John 10:30 and 17:21, Jesus affirms that he and the Father are one. It is this 
eternal being of the Father and the Son which is expressed in the prologue of John’s 
Gospel (John 1:1) – “In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the 
Word was God”. 
Reflecting on the John 10:30 and 17:21, while Mullins affirms that Jesus’ prayer in 
John 17:21 was intended as a special gift for his disciples which was a life of intimacy with 
God, this gift nonetheless reflects the communion between Jesus himself and his Father. 
According to Mullins, this communion is “not a matter then, of simple union of a moral 
kind, but a unity at the level of being; a unity that has as its model and permanent source, 
the oneness of the Father and the son”.
598
 It is on the basis of this oneness 
(consubstantiation) that the councils of Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381) affirmed 
Jesus Christ as “the only-begotten Son of God, eternally begotten of the Father, light from 
light, true God from true God, begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father”.
599
  
In Christian faith and theology therefore, even though it is acknowledged that God 
has revealed himself in many and diverse ways, Jesus Christ is known to be the definitive 
revelation of God to humanity. As Walter Kasper puts it, “the fact that the one God has 
once only, yet wholly, definitively and unreservedly communicated himself historically in 
Jesus Christ is the basic conviction of the Fathers of the church reflected in the church’s 
ancient tradition”.
600
 Consequently, in Jesus Christ resides the Christian experience of the 
fullness of God’s revelation to humanity. 
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In John 14:16, shortly before his Passover, Jesus announced the coming of the Holy 
Spirit as Paraclete (Advocate) to the disciples – “I will ask the Father and he will give you 
another Paraclete to be with you forever”. According to Mullins, when Jesus promised to 
send another Paraclete, he spoke in terms of “another Paraclete” which suggests that the 
latter Paraclete will be performing the same function or carrying out the same agenda as 
the former.
601
 Who is the former Paraclete and what was his function?  
For Mullins, the concept Paraclete has different meanings in the Hebrew and in the 
Greco-Roman traditions and the Johannine presentation draws on both senses. In the 
Hebrew sense, it refers to the biblical tradition in which God is said to be the comforter or 
consoler of Israel (See Isaiah 52:12). Jesus also introduces himself as the one who offers 
this comfort – “the Spirit of the Lord is upon me, he has anointed me and sent me to bring 
good news to the poor, to bind up hearts that are broken” (Luke 4:18-25). So for Mullins, 
Paraclêsis means “comforting actions, words and writings”.
602
 Here, if “God is the first 
Paraclete, comforting the people through word and deed. Jesus is by implication, a 
Paraclete in his acting and speaking on behalf of the Father”.
603
  
From the Greco-Roman sense, Mullins asserts that “a Paraclete is seen in terms of a 
legal advisor, helper or advocate in court”.
604
 For Mullins, as Jesus encountered trials and 
called witnesses like the Father, John the Baptist and the Scriptures to his defence, so he 
envisaged that his disciples would also encounter trials and would need the support of a 
helper or an advocate. Jesus’ promise of this helper, whom he called the Spirit of truth, 
shall come from the Father (John 14:26) just as he came from the Father.  His task will not 
just be to comfort them but also, “to prepare and instruct them for their role as disciples 
and witnesses after Jesus’ lifetime”.
605
 In this way the phrase “another Paraclete”, implies 
that the Holy Spirit was going to perform the same function or carry out the same agenda 
as Jesus did. Hence, the Catechism of the Catholic Church says: “having previously 
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‘spoken through the prophets,’ the Spirit will now be with and in the disciples, to teach 
them and guide them ‘into all the truth.’”
606
  
If the Holy Spirit is equal to this task, then he must share the same being with the 
Father and Jesus to be able to accomplish this function. Since the being of the Father and 
the Son is divine, then the Holy Spirit is revealed as another divine person (another 
Paraclete) with Jesus and the Father. Thus, the Catechism of the Catholic Church could say 
that “the eternal origin of the Holy Spirit is revealed in his mission in time. The Spirit is 
sent to the apostles and to the Church both by the Father in the name of the Son and by the 
Son in person, once he had returned to the Father” (CCC #244). In this way, one begins to 
see a clearer picture of the mystery of the Holy Trinity in the faith experience of the 
Church. Even though the Holy Trinity as a concept, cannot be found in the Christian 
Scriptures, the Christian experience of God as three persons in one God, supported the use 
of the Latin word Trinitas (meaning triad or threefold) as defining this Christian 
experience.   
From the perspective of oikonomia (the functions of the Holy Trinity), God the 
Father is said to be the creator of all things, God the Son (Jesus Christ) is the redeemer of 
creation and God the Holy Spirit is the sanctifier of creation; and yet the whole drama of 
creation, redemption and sanctification is seen as a single operation common to them.
607
 
Hence, this experience of God as Trinity in the early Church reflected its usage of the 
trinitarian formulation in blessings and baptisms (Mt 28:19). Evidence of God working as 
Trinity in Scripture goes back to the beginning of creation in the Genesis account where 
God created the world by His Word. In doing this, Gen 1:2 says that “the Spirit of God 
hovered over the waters”. In this account, the Church sees the Creator as God the Father, 
the creative Word as God the Son and the hovering Spirit as God the Holy Spirit.  
There are other biblical evidences which further support the Church’s belief in the 
Holy Trinity. For instance, at the baptism of Jesus in the prologue of Mark 1:9-11 the Holy 
Spirit came upon him in the form of a dove and a voice from heaven said; “this is my 
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beloved Son in whom I am well pleased”. As we indicated earlier, the mystery of the Holy 
Trinity is the central mystery of the Christian life and faith. Christians are baptized “in the 
name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit”. Hence, Christian faith rests on 
the Holy Trinity; as it represents the Christian experience of God as Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit.  
However, within the Islamic context, the obligation to the Tawhid (there is no god 
but one God - Surah 5:73) expresses the Islamic monotheistic experience of God. For 
Islam, God is the source of creation and transcends everything in the world. Everything is 
nothing but subject to Him as His creatures. Thus, the first part of the Shahada which 
contains the sentence of the Tawhid states that “there is no god but God” (La ilaha illa 
Allah). For Murata and Chittick, this means that “There is only a single true and worthy 
object of worship, God. All other objects of worship and service are false. To serve 
anything else is to fall into error and misguidance”.
608
 For Muslims, to conceive anything 
as equal to Allah is to commit Shirk. Here, the Qur’an states that “Do not associate others 
with God; to associate others with God is a mighty wrong” (Surah 31:13). 
So, the avoidance of associating others with God is a central nerve in the message 
of the Qur’an. Shirk is therefore nothing but the reversal of the Tawhid and a reversed 
Tawhid leads to the annihilation of Islam. This is why the theological formulation of God 
as Holy Trinity is perceived by Islam as unacceptable. The Qur’an says: “Those who say 
that God is a third of three are truth-concealers” (Surah 5:73). In relation to Jesus the 
Qur’an warns, “the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary is only the messenger of God... So have 
faith in God and do not say, ‘Three.’ Refrain... God is only One God” (Surah 4:171). These 
texts therefore reaffirm the fundamental Islamic faith principle which lies at the heart the 
Tawhid. One would even find Jesus in the Qur’an affirming this oneness of God when he 
said: “God is my Lord and your Lord, so serve Him – that is the straight path” (Surah 
3:51).  
So, when the Qur’an criticises followers of other religions, it very often does so on 
the basis of a perceived distortion to the Tawhid. Here, the Christian concept of Holy 
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Trinity is but one of such examples. Since the Trinity and the Tawhid touch the core of the 
Christian and Islamic belief-systems respectively, Christian-Muslim dialogue as an 
exercise in learning offers the opportunity for the interlocutors to understand why each 
tradition construe Jesus the way they do. With such mutual understandings, the 
interlocutors may find themselves in better positions to respect and appreciate the views of 
the other. When the interlocutors begin to show genuine respect for the traditions of the 
other as a result of dialogue, then the dialogue could be considered as successful on the 
basis of its goal.  
5.3.1.2. Jesus as the “Son of God” 
In our discourse in chapter four concerning the identity of Jesus as the “Son of God”, we 
asserted that this designation is not to be taken literally as God physically generating a son, 
but metaphorically as establishing the intimate relationship between Jesus Christ and God 
the Father. As James Dunn indicated, “when Christianity came to grapple with defining 
Jesus’ relationship with God, it was son of the Father that emerged as the consensus way of 
doing so”.
609
 According to Dunn, the reasons for this christological designation were first 
of all because Jesus saw the relationship between him and God as a “Father-son” one. His 
prayer to God as “Abba Father” (Mk 14:36) is evocative of the language of family 
intimacy. Reference to this “Father-son relationship” is very dense in John 17:1-24. 
Secondly, Dunn intimates that the designation “son of God” was used by the early 
Christians in their prayers and liturgy. Here, it became a source of inspiration to them in 
the sense that by their faith in Jesus, they believed that they too were sharing in the same 
sense of sonship that ‘Abba’ expressed.
610
  
In consequence, if one takes Dunn’s views into consideration, the conclusion one 
may reach is that the designation “son of God” was Jesus’ way of expressing his 
relationship with God, as well as a unique way in which the early Christians interpreted 
their faith relationship with God (Rom 8:17). Thus, the notion of divine sonship is not 
literal in the sense of God begetting a son, since the Church unequivocally declared its 
stand on this matter against the Arians in the Council of Nicaea (325 A.D). In Nicaea, the 
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Church categorically declaimed the non-orthodoxy of any theological constructions that 
suggest the physical generation of Jesus by the Father.
611
  Hence, the divine sonship of 
Jesus is not literal but metaphorical. 
In a particularly Islamic context, the charge of Islam against Christianity on the 
above designation in the Qur’an is that: “The Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, was only the 
messenger of Allah... God is only one; He is far above having a son” (Surah 4:171). A 
clearer Qur’anic charge on this designation is also found in Surah 9:30. It is significant to 
note here that the Tawhid remains the bedrock against which the designation of Jesus as 
“son of God” is interpreted. As al-Tabari (923 A.D) puts it, “the naming of Jesus as God’s 
son undermines the unity of God. By introducing concepts of Fatherhood and sonship, 
Christians...reduce God’s freedom and power”.
612
 For al-Razi, it takes away “some of the 
greatness from God because he would have to carry some of the seed of his Father”.
613
 
Hence, al-Razi suggested that it might be more appropriate for Christians to refer to Jesus 
as “the servant of God” instead of “God’s son”. The prophet Muhammad also stated his 
disbelief in the divine sonship when he said in the Qur’an: “if the Lord of Mercy had a son, 
I will be the first to worship him, but blessed be the Lord... He is far above their false 
descriptions” (Surah 43:81-82). 
 From the above verses, one gets the strong impression that Muslims understand the 
Christian conception of the “divine sonship of Jesus”, not in symbolic or metaphoric terms, 
but in the sense of biological generation. Even though this constitute the way Muslims 
presents the Christian view of Jesus’ identity as “Son of God”, dialogue as an exercise in 
learning offers Christians the opportunity to clarify their beliefs in the divine sonship of 
Jesus Christ to Muslims. Through these clarifications, the Muslim who understands the 
metaphoricity of the Christian interpretation of the “divine sonship” may find 
himself/herself in a completely different place than those who still conceive that the 
Christian understanding of the divine sonship is literally interpreted.  
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Mahmoud Ayoub did challenge the Islamic interpretation of the Christian belief in 
the divine sonship as implying biological generation. For him, the Qur’an does not use the 
term walad (offspring)
614
 to refer to Jesus, but ittakhadha (took unto himself),
615
 and 
ittakhadha does not suggest the physical generation of Jesus, but a relationship of 
adoption.
616
 Ayoub then concluded that “the Qur’an nowhere accuses Christians of calling 
Jesus the walad of God”.
617
 If Muslims cling to this interpretation, it does not find support 
in the Qur’an. While Ayoub’s contribution appears to resolve the matter, one wonders 
whether the majority of Muslims share this understanding and whether it truly captures the 
Qur’anic response to the divine sonship (Surah 4:171 and 19:35). So, dialogue as an 
exercise in learning therefore offers Christians and Muslims the opportunity to clarify the 
Christian position on the divine sonship and the Muslim response to it.  
In conclusion, we could say that Christian faith and theology understands the 
reality of Jesus’ divine sonship as only an expression of the intimate relationship between 
him and God.
618
 This relationship is fully expressed in the Trinity, in what Christian 
theology calls the trinitarian koinonia (the communion of the trinity). So, a dialogue that 
seeks mutual understanding will invite Christians to respect the Islamic obligation to the 
Tawhid which forbids divine sonship interpretations. It also offers Muslims the opportunity 
to understand what Christians mean when the talk about the divine sonship of Jesus. In the 
final analysis, when this form of dialogue leads to mutual respect and appreciation of the 
traditions of the other, then dialogue could be considered as successful on the basis of its 
interest i.e. the desire to learn from and about the other. 
5.3.1.3. The Suffering, Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ 
The event of Jesus’ suffering, death and Resurrection, also referred to as the Paschal 
mystery, is central to Christian faith and theology. Without the intention to engage in the 
debates concerning whether or not Jesus really died and rose from the dead, it must be said 
that first of all, all the four Gospels give detailed accounts of the veracity of the event 
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(Mark 14:32 – 16:12, Matthew 26:47 – 28:16 and Luke 22:47 – 24:50). Secondly, the 
impact of the event in the lives of those who experienced it further underscores its 
factuality. This is demonstrated by its revelatory and redemptive effects in the lives of the 
early Christians.  
For its revelatory significance, O’Collins indicates that the resurrection of Jesus 
“vindicated the certainty of the powerful future of the kingdom of God (Mark 14:25)”
619
i.e. 
Jesus’ preaching and miracles which manifested the presence of the kingdom of God 
suffered an apparent defeat by the death on the cross. However, the power of the kingdom 
was strikingly reasserted “through the resurrection and the gift of the Holy Spirit. This 
denouement fully justified the personal authority with which Jesus had spoken of the 
kingdom and which he had claimed over the Sabbath, the Temple, the law, forgiveness of 
sins, final judgement, and human salvation.”
620
 Furthermore, the resurrection also showed 
that, “far from being cursed by the God whom he called ‘Abba father’ (Galatians 3:13), 
Jesus had been divinely vindicated in himself, in his preaching, and in that utter fidelity to 
his vocation for which he sacrificed everything, even life itself.”
621
 In consequence, the 
resurrection fully and finally disclosed “the meaning and truth of Christ’s life, person, 
work and death. It set a divine seal on Jesus and his ministry.”
622
  
For its redemptive significance, O’Collins points out that Jesus’ preaching 
challenged the first Christians to rethink their understandings about the law, the Sabbath, 
forgiveness of sin and the Temple. Here, Jesus invited them “to accept the disconcerting 
reality that their relationship to him was determinative for their situation before God, both 
here and hereafter.”
623
 During this process, he predicted and defined his imminent death as 
the establishment of a “new covenant” (Luke 22:20) between God and humanity. Thus, he 
was crucified at the time of the “Passover feast.”
624
 These events made the early Christians 
go beyond their Jewish belief that the deliverance from Egypt, the covenant at Sinai and 
the entrance into the promised land were the only divine acts of redemption, to the 
                                                          
619
 Gerald O’Collins. Christology. 2009, p104 
620
 Ibid, p104 
621
 Ibid, p104 
622
 Ibid, p104 
623
 Gerald O’Collins. Christology. 2009, p110 
624
 Ibid, p110 
189 
 
understanding that the “events of Good Friday and Easter Sunday, together with the 
coming of the Holy Spirit, constituted God’s decisive and final act of salvation.”
625
 
In consequence, they understood that the risen Christ is the last Adam, the powerful 
son of God and saviour of the world. This further explains why Jesus’ death on the cross is 
seen as the perfect sacrifice that restores humanity back to God (Rom 3:25).
626
 By His 
death and Resurrection, Jesus gained victory over sin, eternal death and Satan.
627
 As 
McGrath puts it, the victory of the cross provided the basis by which God is enabled to 
forgive sins.
628
 It is also a moral example for Christians in the way Jesus demonstrates a 
selfless love of God for humanity. In this way, the cross evokes a Christian response of 
love, guided by this act of selflessness.
629
 That is why Christian faith and theology views 
salvation as “manifested in and through and constituted on the basis of the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ”.
630
 
However, from an Islamic point of view, Jesus never died. The Islamic belief on 
the fate of Jesus reflects the Qur’anic attestation that: “...they did not kill him nor crucified 
him, though it was made to appear like that to them... No! God raised him to Himself” 
(Surah 4:157). The Qur’an further affirms that: “God said, Jesus, I will take you back and 
raise you up to me. I will purify you of the unbelievers” (Surah 3:55). Another Qur’anic 
text of remarkable importance here is where Jesus himself said; “Peace was on me the day 
I was born and peace will be on me the day I die and the day I am raised to life again” 
(Surah 19:33). Jesus also said – “I was a witness to them as long as I was with them. But 
ever since you took my soul, you were their overseer” (Surah 5:117).  
From the above texts, it is evident that there are different claims as to whether or 
not Jesus actually died. Thus, the controversies surrounding the death and resurrection of 
Jesus have prompted Islamic scholars to investigate what actually happened to Jesus 
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according to the Qur’anic narratives.
631
 While some Christian apologists attempt to justify 
the claim that the Qur’an does not actually reject the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, Leirvik 
provides exegetical, theological and political reasons for the standard Muslim rejection of 
the crucifixion of Jesus and the cross.
632
 Exegetically, Leirvik intimates that “what the 
Qur’an actually says about the crucifixion remains unresolved”.
633
 Even Muslim 
interpreters are said to hold different interpretations on the matter. Theologically, the 
question of the crucifixion seems to be “inseparable from what Muslims have perceived as 
non-acceptable implications of the cross as a religious symbol, like the idea of vicarious 
suffering and redemption”.
634
 And politically, the cross was the symbol of the rising 
Byzantine Empire in its formative period with the cross later becoming the symbol of the 
invading crusaders.
635
 Though the above views may represent reasons for the standard 
Muslim rejections of the crucifixion, how did classical Islamic commentators interpret 
some of the text listed above in respect to the death and resurrection of Jesus?  
Let us consider the commentaries of some classical Islamic scholars like al-Tabari, 
al-Razi, al-Zamakhshari and al-Baydawi on the final end of Jesus. The views of these 
scholars revolve around the substitution theory or the swoon theory. As we intimated in 
chapter four, when al-Tabari undertakes a project on the interpretations of Qur’anic verses 
which are open to multiple interpretations, his frequent practice is “to list in order, each of 
the options which are presented in the traditions of which he is aware of. Then, having 
listed these legitimate options, he then states the text which is most likely or has the greater 
weight of evidence in its favour”.
636
 In his analysis of the meaning of mutawaffi (meaning 
“taken away”) in Surah 3:55, al-Tabari said that Islamic exegetes have differed on the 
meaning of tawaffa (death).
637
 While some scholars consider that tawaffa here means 
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“sleep” (i.e. I am causing you to sleep and raising you to myself in your sleep”), others 
think that tawaffa means “seizing” (i.e. “I am seizing you to myself and raising you to 
heaven”.). Yet, others still think that tawaffa really means “real death” (i.e. “I am causing 
you to really die”).
638
  
Al-Tabari indicated that since some commentators think that “death” here has no 
chronological order, tawaffa could mean “I am raising you to myself and cleansing you of 
the unbelievers and I will cause you to die after I send you back to earth at the end of 
time”.
639
 Having considered these four theories (sleeping, seizing, real death and the 
nonchronological arrangement), al-Tabari concluded that the theory that gains legitimate 
support in Islamic exegesis is the seizing theory: i.e. “I am seizing you from the earth alive 
to be close to me and taking you to be with me without death and raising you from the 
unbelievers”.
640
 With his interpretation of Surah 4:157, al-Tabari said that it was not Jesus 
who died on the cross, but God transformed someone to look like him (shubbiha la-
hum)
641
 and it was this person who died on the cross.
642
  
Al-Razi focused attention on Surah 4:157 where the Jews seem to claim that they 
killed the Messiah. In refutation the Qur’an says – “they did not kill him, nor did they 
crucify him, though it was made to appear like that to them”. From this text, al-Razi 
supported the substitution theory, listing five different possibilities by which the 
substitution could have occurred. According to him, it is first of all possible that the Jews 
crucified someone like Jesus and lied about it. Secondly, it is possible that Judas sent 
Titanus to kill Jesus and Titanus was arrested and crucified instead. Thirdly, maybe a man 
who was guarding Jesus was transformed to look like him and it was him they killed. 
Fourthly, Jesus asked one of his disciples to volunteer and one of them did. Finally, al-Razi 
thinks that a hypocritical disciple who sought to betray Jesus was made to look like him 
                                                          
638
 Joseph Cumming. “Did Jesus die on the Cross?” 2001, p7 
639
 See Abu Ja'far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari cited in Joseph Cumming. “Did Jesus die on the Cross?” 
2001, p8, and in Neil Robinson. Christ in Islam and Christianity. 1991, p122 
640
 Joseph Cumming. “Did Jesus die on the Cross?” 2001, p7-8 
641
 See Neil Robinson. Christ in Islam and Christianity. 1991, p127-133 
642





 Having considered these possibilities in the light of the exegetical 
considerations of “I am causing you to die” (mutawaffika) in Surah 3:55,
644
 al-Razi 
concluded that the text of Surah 4:157 implies that some kind of substitution must have 
taken place.
645
 So, Jesus did not die, but Allah took him to himself. 
 According to Joseph Cumming, the commentaries of al-Baydawi “are among the 
most popular and well trusted in the world today”.
646
 Like al-Tabari and al-Razi, al-
Baydawi also listed various legitimate interpretations of a given verse, without indicating 
their origins or his particular preferences. In his commentary on Surah 3:55 he provides 
five interpretations to the clause “I am causing you to die” (mutawaffika). These are: 
bringing an end to your lifespan, seizing you from the earth, causing you to sleep, death to 
earthly desires and actual death.
647
 In his commentary on Surah 4:157, al-Baydawi 
provides two substitution theories: Jesus asked a volunteer to take his place when he knew 
that the Jews were coming to kill him in revenge for God turning a band of Jewish revilers 
into apes and pigs; or a Jew named Titanus was the victim.
648
  
Though al-Baydawi seem to have problems with the substitution theology
649
 he 
nonetheless believes, like most Muslims do, that God could not possibly have allowed his 
prophet to die such a shameful death. Hence, God took him to himself, “projecting his 
likeness onto someone else.”
650
 Though many commentators tend to have different 
interpretations regarding whether or not Jesus died on the cross, standard Muslim belief 
has it that Jesus did not die on the cross. God took him to himself. For Leirvik, “in the 
Qur’an, everything is aimed at convincing the Believer that he will experience victory over 
the forces of evil”.
651
 Islam therefore refuses to accept the tragic image of the passion, 
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because the passion implies in its eyes that God had failed. Thus, Edwin Calverley could 
say that for Muslims, “the prevention of the death of Jesus was another marked proof of 
Allah’s care for His prophets, His apostle, His word and His Spirit”.
652
  
In this way, we could conclude that all three commentators converge on the claim 
that Jesus did not die, but God raised him to himself. If there was no death, it means that 
there was no resurrection either. It must be reiterated here again that while Jesus’ death and 
resurrection from a Christian point of view, was in view of saving fallen humanity from 
the depravity of original sin, Islam however has no concept of original sin because Allah 
forgave Adam and Eve after the fall. So, even if Jesus died and rose from the death, this act 
bears no soteriological significance for Islam. In this way, one can see that the idea of the 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ sets a separation between the Christian view and the 
Muslim perspective. As Mona Siddiqui points out, it is perhaps on this theology of 
redemption that Islam parts company with Christianity.
653
 
However, what could be learnt from these two perspectives on the death and 
resurrection of Jesus? Although Christians believe that Jesus died and rose from the dead 
and Muslims hold that Jesus did not die at all, what could be learnt from these two 
positions about Jesus is that whether or not the crucifixion took place, Jesus ascended to 
heaven by virtue of God’s divine intervention. For Islam, this intervention raised Jesus to 
heaven without dying on the cross and for Christianity; this divine intervention raised him 
to life after the death.
654
 In other words, both religious communities agree that there was 
God’s divine power in the life of Jesus which prevented him from experiencing the 
shamefulness of death. For Islam, Jesus did not die as a consequence of this and for 
Christianity; he died but rose from the dead as a consequence of this divine power. Thus, if 
God’s divine power enabled Jesus to accomplish the divine will in this remarkable way, 
how can Jesus’ life and teachings provide learning examples in their response to God and 
to human flourishing? While this question will be taken up in chapter six, let us delve into 
the Christological issues that serve as bridge to Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology. 
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5.3.2.  Jesus as Bridge to Dialogue 
The concept bridge connotes the sense of a structure built for the purpose of providing 
passage over physical obstacles such as water, roads, valleys, rift and so on. Thus, it serves 
the purpose of linking two points that were initially separated by a perceived abyss or 
ditch. Within the context of Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology, bridge is used here 
as a heuristic device intended to define some of the narrative accounts about Jesus in the 
Qur’an and the Gospels which appear to bear some similarities. It is widely acknowledged 
that Christianity and Islam are the only two religions which have narratives about the life 
and mission Jesus Christ. Accounts such as the virginal conception, the miracles of Jesus, 
the Ascension and the Second Coming are few examples. It is these accounts which we 
consider as building bridges in Christian-Muslim conversations. Let us see how some of 
these christological themes also serve as fruitful contexts for Christian-Muslim 
conversations. 
5.3.2.1.The Virginal Conception 
The virginal conception and the virginal birth of Jesus are essentially part of the Christian 
story about the life of Jesus. Though many scholars seem to use one to refer to the other, 
they nonetheless have fine distinctions. While the virginal conception means that Mary 
conceived Jesus without the aid of a human Father (virginitas in partu); the virginal birth 
means that Mary remained virgin after the birth of Jesus (virginitas post partum or 
perpetual virginity). In other words, Jesus’ birth did not cause a rupture of the hymen or 
bodily lesions.
655
 Whereas these two concepts define the pre and post parturient state of 
Mary’s virginity within a particularly orthodox Christian understanding, they both mean 
one and the same thing i.e. the Christian belief that Mary gave birth to Jesus through the 
power of the Holy Spirit without the lost of her virginity. For easy comprehension of the 
subject matter, we shall limit ourselves to the use of virginal conception; and by its use, it 
takes on both the virginitas in partu and the virginitas post partum implications of it. In 
other words, by use of the virginal conception, we mean that in addition to conceiving 
Jesus while a virgin, Mary remained a virgin after the birth of Jesus. 
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This belief finds expression in the Scriptures – first foretold in the Old Testament 
by the prophet Isaiah (Isa 7:14-16) finding its fulfilment in the New Testament in the 
nativity narratives (Matthew 1:18-25 and Luke 1:26-38). Whiles Matthew and Luke 
present in detail the events leading to Jesus’ birth, the Gospels of Mark and John together 
with the letters of St Paul are silent on the matter. Coupled with this silence are also some 
differences in the way Matthew and Luke present this account. For instance, while 
Matthew’s account includes the betrothal, Luke’s account does not make reference to it 
(Matthew 1:18-25 and Luke 1:26-35). So, while the virginal conception is communicated 
to Joseph in Matthew’s account (1:21-23), in Luke’s account, it is communicated to Mary 
herself (1:31). As a consequence, some scholars tend to question the historical veracity of 
this event.
656
 However, what is common between Matthew and Luke’s account is the 
common acceptance and affirmation that the “virginal conception” was the work of the 
Holy Spirit, exclusive of any form of marital conjugation.  
It is the above understanding which received universal recognition and acceptance 
in the Christian church by the turn of the 2
nd
 century and was incorporated into the 
Apostles’ Creed. In the Roman Catholicism of the West and in the Eastern Orthodox 
Church and protestant circles, the “Virginal conception” was never strongly disputed, 
although some protestant thinkers see it as not relevant for Christian faith.
657
 This claim on 
the universal acceptability of the virginal conception of Jesus does not however sideline 
the fact that there were already psilanthropists
658
 whose views were a challenge to the 
virginal birth of Jesus in the 2
nd
 Century even up to the present. For example, Celsus the 
Greek philosopher contested the virginal birth in the second century, as did Samuel Taylor 
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 Even today people, like Richard Dawkins, reject this belief 
on the basis that it cannot be biologically proven.
660
  
Irrespective of the position people take in respect of the virginal conception, the 
church continues to unequivocally define its stand on the matter.
661
 According to Michael 
Schmaus, the Church believes that Mary conceived Jesus of the Holy Spirit without a 
human principle of generation. “It is the constant teaching of the church from the 
beginning, that she gave birth to Jesus without violation of her integrity and that she 
remained ever virgin”.
662
 This is indeed part of the Church’s profession of faith.
663
 This 
faith is not just an abstract theological construction without its basis in Scripture; since the 
Gospels of Luke and Matthew do testify to it. However, where does Islam stand in respect 
to this acclaimed historical reality? 
The Qur’an also has its narratives about the birth of Jesus and the virginal state of 
Mary after his birth. According to Fatoohi, the Qur’an makes explicitly clear that “Mary 
conceived Jesus without having a relation with a man. This is clear in the story of the 
annunciation, the story of the birth of Jesus and some other verses”.
664
 We find some of 
these affirmations in the two annunciation narratives in Surah 3:42-47 and Surah 19:16-22, 
where the Angel Gabriel is said to have told Mary about God’s intended plans for her. 
Thus the Qur’an says, “the Angel said to Mary: ‘Mary, God has chosen you and made you 
pure. He has truly chosen you above all women” (Surah 3:42). In Surah 3:45, “The Angel 
said, ‘Mary, God gives you news of a Word from Him, whose name will be the Messiah, 
Jesus, son of Mary”. In Surah 19:19-22 the Angel said “‘I am but a Messenger from your 
Lord, to announce to you the gift of a pure son.’ She said, ‘how can I have a son when no 
man has touched me? I have not been unchaste,’ and he said, ‘This is what your Lord said; 
‘it is easy for me”.  
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The above texts demonstrate a Qur’anic narrative of the account of the 
annunciation. While Jackson Montell contends that the accounts of Surah 19:16-22 share 
similarities with the Lukan account of the annunciation and birth of Jesus,
665
 one finds that 
the two texts are not exactly the same. For instance, while the Qur’an reports that Mary 
first secluded herself from her family before her encounter with the Angel (Surah 19:16-
17), the report in Luke’s Gospel (Lk 1:26-27) is silent on the exact location where the 
encounter occurred except for the mention of Nazareth. The text is silent on the question of 
where exactly in Nazareth. Secondly, Surah 19:16-22 does not have the opening greetings 
of the Angel as expressed in the Gospel of Luke – “Hail full of grace, the Lord is with 
you” (Lk 1:28). Apart from these differences, which some scholars may consider 
insignificant, the rest of the message of the annunciation narrative in Surah 19:16-22 seem 
to find resonance in Luke 1:26-31. This is by no means implying that they are the same. 
For Parrinder, though similar to the canonical Gospels, the Qur’anic narratives on the 
annunciation are more linked to the apocryphal sources.
666
  
 The tendency to overlook these differences when comparing the two narratives is 
held in check by Leirvik Oddbjørn cautions that one must always be sensitive to the 
functions of these texts in their respective contexts.
667
 This is because as Leirvik puts it, 
“superficial similarities between two signs may conceal profound differences in the 
meaning that a certain conception is attributed within the different systems of meaning”.
668
 
Thus, it could only be proper to say that though different, Christians and Muslims could 
identify themselves with the Biblical and Qur’anic narratives about the “virginal 
conception” in that not only is the Angel Gabriel the announcer of God’s intended purpose 
for Mary, but God himself was going to aid Mary accomplish this purpose without the 
need for a human Father. Here, both accounts confirm that Jesus’ birth was an express act 
of God – “Be! And He was” (Surah 3:47). In Surah 21:91 and Surah 66:12, the Qur’an 
reports that God “breathed His Spirit” into Mary while she was still chaste. In the 
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Matthew’s Gospel, the Angel said to Joseph; “what is conceived in her (Mary) is by the 
Holy Spirit” (Matthew 1:20).  
Interpretations to the above texts from Islamic commentators further support the 
argument that the Qur’an affirms the “Virginal conception of Jesus”. For instance, al-Razi 
intimates that there was no question of a human Father involved in Jesus’ conception for 
either God breathed His Spirit into Mary or the Angel Gabriel did.
669
 For Yusuf Ali, “Mary 
the mother of Jesus was unique in that she gave birth to a son by a special miracle without 
the intervention of the customary physical means”.
670
 In consequence, it could be said that 
whereas the Qur’an contains accounts of the virginal conception and virginal birth of 
Jesus, it is wrong to quickly read divine implications into them. This is because in Islam, 
there is only one God and Jesus is his prophet. Hence the Qur’an emphasizes that “in 
God’s eyes, Jesus is just like Adam: He created him from the dust and said to him, ‘Be,’ 
and he was” (Surah 3:59). Consequently, what could be said about the Qur’anic and 
Biblical accounts about the “virginal conception” is that, the two accounts point to the 
extraordinary nature of Jesus’ birth and how this contributes to authenticating his later role 
as the “prophet of Allah” and the “Son of God” respectively. Having faithfully fulfilled 
these roles in the Qur’an and the Gospels, what might Christians and Muslims learn from 
each other about Jesus the prophet of Allah and Jesus Christ the Son of God?  
5.3.2.2. Jesus’ Miraculous Powers 
Dermot Lane in The Reality of Jesus
671
 asserted that within the self-consciousness or 
experience of the disciples, Jesus’ divinity was fully construed after the resurrection. But 
before they came to this point, they understood Jesus Christ initially as a prophet, a Rabbi 
and the Messiah. The accounts of Mk 8:27-29 and Lk 9:18-20 demonstrate the varied 
perceptions these disciples of Jesus had about him and the mission he fulfilled in their 
midst. That is, the conviction with which Jesus preached his message and the signs and 
wonders that accompanied his preaching, initially, provoked the thinking of the disciples 
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that Jesus was not just an ordinary Jewish man, like the rest, but that God was with him 
affirming his message through the signs and wonders performed.  
 As we indicated in chapter four on “Markan Christology”, Mark presented the 
wondrous signs performed by Jesus as affirmations of his status as the “Son of God. What 
Jesus said and did was all due to who he was – the “Son of God”. Thus, the reader in 
Mark’s Gospel soon discovers in the narratives concerning Jesus Christ as the “Son of 
God” (Mk 1:16 – 8:26) that after Jesus’ announcement of the imminence of the kingdom of 
God and the calling of some disciples, what immediately follows in succession are 
exorcisms, healings, deliverances and the show of supernatural authority. As Donald 
English intimated, these signs and wonders made Mark’s picture of the Messiah more 
compelling because Jesus did not only preach to the people but he accompanied his 
preaching with miracles of healing, deliverance and raising people from the dead. 
Furthermore, Géza Vermes indicated that Luke shows that Jesus himself defined the nature 
of his ministry through these healings and exorcisms.
672
 For Christian faith and theology, 
therefore, Jesus Christ accomplished this task because of who he was: “the Christ, the son 
of the living God” (Mk 8:29). 
In a particularly Islamic context, God is the source of Jesus’ power. This is 
copiously acknowledged in the Qur’an when the Angel told Mary, “God will teach Jesus, 
the Messiah “the Wisdom, the Torah and the Gospel, He will send him as a Messenger to 
the people of Israel. I have come to you with a sign from your Lord... I will heal the blind, 
the leper and bring the dead back to life with God’s permission” (Surah 3:48-49). The 
Qur’an also says: “Then God will say, Jesus, son of Mary! Remember my favour to you 
and to your mother: how I strengthened you with the Holy Spirit... How by my leave, you 
fashioned the shape of a bird out of clay, breathed into it and it became a bird; how by my 
leave, you healed the blind and the leper; how by my leave, you brought the dead back to 
life” (Surah 5:110). From the preceding texts, the Qur’an explicitly affirms that Jesus 
succeeded in doing what he did because God’s favour was with him – for by God’s leave, 
he healed the blind, the lepers and raised the dead to live (Surah 5:110). 
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  As may be recalled, we argued in chapter four in the section relating to “The 
Relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit”
673
 that from a Qur’anic context, the 
intimate relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit accounts for Jesus’ ability to 
function as an outstanding prophet and messenger of Allah. We saw that al-Tabari, al-
Zamakhshari and al-Razi all concede that Jesus’ miracles were signs which served to 
authenticate his status as the prophet of Allah.
674
 So, by correlating the two theological 
positions on the miracles of Jesus one realises that whereas Christianity asserts that Jesus 
performed his miracles as a consequence of who he was (the son of God), for Islam, Jesus 
performed these miracles through God’s power invested in him.  
In a dialogical context, however, both religions, first of all, acknowledge that Jesus 
indeed performed these miracles. Secondly, from an Islamic context, if the Holy Spirit is 
known to have been with Jesus from the beginning to his final end, then the Holy Spirit 
supported Jesus because it fulfilled the divine command of Allah. Understood as the Angel 
Gabriel, it is the Holy Spirit who teaches, guides, strengthens and assists Jesus in doing 
what he was sent to do as a messenger of Allah. This means that God was instrumental in 
helping Jesus accomplish his mission through the aid of the Angel Gabriel. It is therefore 
significant to note here that through the Miracles Jesus performed, Allah alleviated the 
suffering, the alienation through death and the pain of his people. The question then is: 
how can Jesus’ life and mission inspire Christians and Muslims to collectively undertake 
acts that would promote human flourishing?    
It is true that the Islamic obligation to the Tawhid does not support the reading of 
divine implications into the miracles of Jesus. To contest the reading of divine implications 
into the miracles of Jesus, Abu Isa al-Warraq argued in the 9
th
 Century that, if Christians 
claim that the Miracles of Jesus are suggestive of his divinity, then Moses must have been 
divine because he also performed miracles (Surah 2:60; 7:107; 7:117).
675
 For Islam, the 
Tawhid always remains its faith defining principle. The belief that God is one, unique and 
transcendent is the fundamental theological premise of Islamic faith. Though for Christian 
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faith and theology the divinity of Jesus constitutes the basis for his miracles, Christians and 
Muslims can at least focus on Jesus’ concern for the poor and the marginalized and use 
that as a common context for collective actions in response to their needs and concerns. 
We shall see how this aspect of interfaith action could be possible in chapter six.  
5.3.2.3. The Ascension and Second Coming of Jesus Christ 
The Ascension is the Christian belief that after the resurrection Jesus Christ was taken up 
into heaven in His glorious resurrected body. This event is said to have occurred 40 days 
after the Resurrection (Acts 1:3). According to Kasper, Luke inserts a period of 40 days 
between the Resurrection and the Ascension. Hence, the Ascension occurred within the 
context of a post-Resurrection appearance. As Kasper understands it, Luke’s Forty is a 
sacred number (the Israelites journey in the wilderness; Jesus sojourn in the wilderness). It 
designates a holy period of a considerable length of time; the time during which Jesus 
appeared to the disciples after the Resurrection.
676
  
While Luke 24:50-53 and Mk 16:19 present a succinct description of the event, the 
Acts of the Apostles (especially Acts 1:9-11), presents a more picturesque account of 
Jesus’ Ascension to heaven.
677
 For Mark the Ascension occurred after a meal (16:19). In 
Luke, it occurred in Bethany not far from Jerusalem (24:50), while Acts gives a precise 
location – “on the Mount of Olives” (Acts 1:12). Though these Evangelists seem to present 
different accounts about Jesus’ Ascension, what remains significantly common to them is 
the fact that indeed the Ascension did occur.  
For Christian faith and theology, the significance of this event of the Ascension lies 
in the fact that whereas the Resurrection presupposes the crucifixion, it also serves as the 
foundation from which the Ascension finds its authenticity – for if Jesus did not die, he 
could not have risen from the dead and if he did not rise from the dead, he could not have 
ascended to heaven. In retrospect, if the Ascension did occur, then one could say that Jesus 
must have resurrected from the dead before he could ascend to heaven. If all these took 
place (the crucifixion, death, Resurrection and Ascension), then they contribute in 
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affirming the Christian belief that Jesus is the “son of God” and thus, had an eternal 
existence. It is therefore the Church’s belief that having ascended to heaven, Jesus “will 
come again in glory to judge the living and the dead”.
678
 This notion of the Return brings 
to the fore the Church’s doctrine of the Second Coming of Jesus Christ (the Parousia).  
Known in Christian theology as the Parousia, the second coming of Jesus Christ is 
an eschatological event recounted in both Christianity and Islam. Within the context of the 
New Testament the word Parousia is used 18 times in the sense of “the second coming of 
Christ” or “the day of the Lord”.
679
 Apart from the name Parousia, the “Second coming of 
Jesus” is also referred to as the epiphany (2Thes 2:8) or the apocalypse (1Pet 4:13). As 
Alister McGrath pointed out, the event of the Second Coming of Jesus is “closely 
connected to the execution of final judgement”.
680
 This is fully expressed in the Nicene 
Creed which says: “He will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead and his 
kingdom will have no end”. From the Gospel accounts, Jesus did not only predict this 
event but he also presented a graphic picture of the nature of this event and how it will 
occur (see Matthew 24:29-41; Mark 13:28ff; Luke 17:20ff).  
 As we indicated earlier, the Qur’an denies the crucifixion and death of Jesus (Surah 
4:157-159). For orthodox Islamic commentators like al-Tabari and al-Razi, while the Jews 
plotted to kill Jesus, God raised him to Himself in heaven; making one to appear like Jesus 
and it was this person who was crucified.
681
 Many Islamic scholars and commentators 
concur that the phrase “raising Jesus unto himself” means that God took Jesus bodily into 
heaven. So, Jesus’ Ascension to heaven is widely attested to, in both the Qur’an and in 
Tafsir literature.
682
 As Mark Beaumont intimated, the consequence of the denial of the 
death of Jesus on the cross has been the assumption of many scholars that “Jesus was 
raised up without going through the process of death. This is seen in al-Tabari’s 
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Hence, in the denial of the crucifixion and death of Jesus on the cross, is the 
affirmation of the fact of the Ascension narrative. Here, both the Qur’an and post-Qur’anic 
literature acknowledge the Ascension and Second Coming of Jesus (Surah 4:158 and 
43:61). Whereas the above Qur’anic texts suggest the “Second Coming of Jesus” at the 
Last Hour, the hadiths also give a clearer account on the matter with some hadiths even 
indicating where and how the “Second Coming of Jesus” will occur. For instance, 
according to the hadith Sahih al-Bukhari, “the Hour will not be established until Jesus 
descends as a ruler”.
684
 The Hour here refers to “the Day of Resurrection and Judgement” 
when Allah will assess everyone according to their deeds. Hence, the “Hour” defines the 
“Day of Reckoning, the Last Day or the End Time” (Surah 71:18).  
But this important event can only occur after Jesus’ Second Coming; eliciting the 
significance of Jesus’ second Coming in Islamic eschatology. According to the hadith 
Sahih al-Bukhari, the Second Coming of Jesus will be in the midst of wars that are fought 
by the Mahdi (the righteous) against the Anti-Christ (Dajjal or false Messiah) and all his 
followers. During these wars, Jesus is expected to descend on the East of Damascus and be 
anointed while wearing yellow robes. He will then join the Mahdi in the fight against the 
Anti-Christ. He will follow the Islamic teachings as a Muslim. His conquests over the 
Anti-Christ and his followers will be a sign to the “People of the Book” who will then 
believe in him, leading to the formation of one community, the community of Islam.
685
 
Jesus will assume leadership of this community bringing about universal peace.
686
 In this 
Second Coming, Jesus will pray as a Muslim and God, in response to His prayers will kill 
Gog and Magog (the gods responsible for disharmony in the Universe).
687
 Having ruled 
this community for 40 years, Jesus will die and will be buried as a Muslim in Mecca in an 
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As we intimated earlier, Jesus’ Second Coming which is directly connected to The 
Hour is a significant eschatological concept for Muslims and Christians. In Islam, The 
Hour is directly linked to “Yawm al-Qiyāmah” (the Day of Resurrection) or “Yawm ad-
Dīn” (the Day of Judgement). These eschatological events constitute the “End Time” for 
all life, followed by the resurrection and Allah’s assessment of the conduct of very human 
being (Judgement).
689
 But the Hadith (Sahih al-Bukhari) says that The Hour will not be 
established without Jesus’ Second Coming, thus demonstrating the significance of the 
event. As an eschatological event, Christians and Muslims believe that associated to the 
“Second Coming of Jesus” is the “Last Hour”, the “Day of Judgement”. The judgement of 
the individual believer would centre on how one submitted oneself to the will of God.  
While Muslims believe that God will be the final judge in this event and Jesus will 
only be a witness, Christians on the other hand, believe that Jesus as God will judge both 
the living and the dead. Consequently, from a correlational perspective, we could say that 
at the Second Coming Jesus would either be the judge for Christians or would be a witness 
in judgement for Muslims. In either way, Jesus would play a significant role in 
determining the fate of every believer (either as judge or witness in judgement). Hence, for 
both Islam and Christianity, it is those who remain faithful and committed to God to the 
end who would find God’s mercies. So, if Jesus Christ will be a witness in judgement (for 
Islam) or judge (for Christianity) on the Last Day (the day of judgement), how can his 
message contribute in providing guidance to Muslims and Christians in their response to 
God and to issues of social justice such that by their adherence to it, they may find God’s 
mercies on the Day of Judgement?  
5.4. Conclusion 
Having journeyed through the above comparative theological work of correlation between 
Qur’anic Christology and the Christology of the NT, one could to some extent say that 
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Jesus is both bridge and barrier to Christian-Muslim dialogue. This is because the Qur’an 
both affirms and denies aspect of his life in the accounts of the Gospels. As Mark 
Beaumont conceptualizes, the Virginal Conception may be accepted as true but the 
Christian interpretation of the incarnation as a consequence of it is denied. The Miracles of 
Jesus are affirmed but the Christian understanding of these miracles as a consequence of 
his divinity is denied.
690
  Furthermore, while Jesus’ Ascension to heaven and His Second 
Coming is affirmed in both the Qur’an and in some of the Hadiths, the Christian 
interpretations of these events as intrinsically linked to the mystery of his death and 
Resurrection is denied. The references to Jesus as “the Word of God”, “Messiah” and “the 
Spirit of God” maybe affirmed in the Qur’an but the Christian interpretations of these titles 
as suggestive of Jesus’ divinity are categorically denied. As it were, the basis for these 
denials is to be found in the Tawhid which remains a nonnegotiable faith principle in Islam 
– “There is no god but one God” (Surah 5:73).  
 Though the doctrines of the Holy Trinity, the divine sonship of Jesus and his death 
and resurrection are seen as barriers to Christian-Muslim dialogue, they nonetheless serve 
as contexts for learning when genuine respect for the Christologies of the other becomes 
the consequence of the interlocutors’ comprehension of the tradition-specificity of their 
respective christologies and the theological foundations which support these christologies. 
Apart from these barriers, Islam and Christianity also have christological themes which 
seem to serve as bridges in their dialogical relations. These themes include the virginal 
conception, the miracles of Jesus, the Ascension and the second coming. Even though 
there are differences to the meanings and interpretations of these themes in each tradition, 
they nevertheless point to the common grounds these narratives provide for Christian-
Muslim conversations on issues of social justice.  
Consequently, in a project of dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the 
other, how can the Jesus of the Qur’an and the Jesus of the NT contribute to Christian-
Muslim dialogue of life and the dialogue of common action? In other words, if submission 
to the will of God is also expressed in the “love of God and love of neighbour”, how does 
the life and mission of Jesus Christ become learning examples for Christian-Muslim 
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collective response to “the love of God and love of neighbour” through the dialogues of 
life and dialogue of common action? We reckon that a critical response to the above 
questions could contribute to further reflections on how Christians and Muslims can 
embark on projects such as Christian-Muslim prayers for peace and peaceful co-existence, 
Christian-Muslim collective responses to the value of marriage and family life and to the 
needs of the poor and the marginalized in society. We consider these as significant issues 
(values) which touch the core of both religions.  
In the chapter that follows, we hope to analyse some of these “values” in the light 
of how they are construed in the philosophical and theological traditions of both faiths, 
how the message, the life and mission of Jesus Christ in the Qur’an and the Gospels 
contribute in fleshing out their significance within their tradition-specific contexts and how 
they could serve as common contexts for Christian-Muslims collective actions through the 















                                                     CHAPTER SIX 
6. CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM DIALOGUE ON CHRISTOLOGY FOR THE 
PROMOTION OF COMMON VALUES 
6.1. Introduction 
From the discourses in chapters four and five, one may begin to appreciate the fact that 
though Jesus Christ is the “Son of God” in Christianity and the “prophet of Allah” in 
Islam, it is not just enough to merely allude to these designations without careful 
reflections on their deeper meaning in respect of the theological frameworks which support 
these meanings in each tradition. From the context of the Qur’an, Jesus is presented as the 
“Messiah” (Surah 5:72), “Word of/from God” (Surah 3:45), a “Spirit of/from God” (Surah 
4:171) and the “closest friend of God who will be held in honour in this world and the 
next” (Surah 3:45). Though some of these designations appear to be similar to the 
Christian presentations of him, their meanings do not approximate to the divine 
interpretations associated to them within Christian faith and theology.  
As we indicated earlier, to fully understand the theological grounds which support 
the Islamic tradition-specific understanding of Jesus Christ, one needs to turn to the 
Tawhid (Surah 5:73). Islamic faith and theology is built on the knowledge of the unicity 
and transcendence of Allah. The life of every good Muslim is guided by the belief in God’s 
uniqueness and transcendence. Consequently, to turn the Tawhid on its head would amount 
to destroying the very foundation on which Islam as a religion is built. For this reason, no 
matter the honorific titles that are ascribed to Jesus in the Qur’an, he only functions as a 
prophet of Allah. From the perspective of Christian faith and theology, the designation of 
Jesus Christ as the “Son of God” is part of the Christian experience of God and finds its 
theological articulation in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity.  
The Holy Trinity defines the Christian experience of God’s revelation as “three 
persons in One God”. God the Father created the world, God the Son (Jesus Christ) 
redeemed the world and God the Holy Spirit sanctifies the world. Here, the Father is 
revealed by the Son and the Father and the Son together revealed the Holy Spirit. As the 
second person of the Holy Trinity, Jesus Christ is the reason for Christianity. In other 
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words, as McGrath puts it, “it is impossible to speak of ‘God’ within the parameters of the 
Christian tradition without relating such statements to the person and work of Jesus 
Christ”.
691
 In this way, between Islam and Christianity lie the Tawhid and the Holy Trinity 
which define and shape their respective understanding of the identity and mission of Jesus 
Christ. Different as they are, they define the parameters within which their respective 
Christologies are construed. 
However, in narrating the stories regarding their respective perspectives on the 
identity and mission of Jesus Christ, one also finds some degree of similarities in these 
narratives. In chapter five, we saw examples of such christological themes such as: “the 
virginal conception” (Luke 1:26-35 versus Surah 19:16-22), “the miracles of Jesus” (Mark 
1:21 – 8:22 versus Surah 3:48-49 and 5:110), “the Ascension and Second coming of Jesus” 
(Mark 16:19 versus Surah 4:158).
692
 However, though these themes appear to be similar, 
one must not lose sight of the fact that their meanings and interpretations are done against 
the background of the Tawhid and the Holy Trinity. Here, while the Qur’an affirms, adds 
to and denies aspects of the life of Christ in the Gospels, the NT image of Jesus Christ is 
starkly different from the Qur’anic presentations of him. As Mark Beaumont puts it, in the 
Qur’an “the virginal conception is accepted as true, but the Christian understanding of the 
incarnation is ruled out. The miraculous work of Jesus is affirmed but not a Christian 
veneration of Jesus’ miraculous powers as proof of his divinity”.
693
 
The crucial question of dialogue in the midst of these Christological affirmations 
and denials is: how can these affirmations and denials become fruitful contexts for 
Christian-Muslim dialogues of life and of common action? In other words, Jesus as a 
“prophet of Allah” in Islam and as the “Son of God” in Christianity proclaimed a unique 
message about God in the Qur’an and in the NT Gospels. What is the centrality of the 
message? How can this message of the prophet and the son of God lead Christians and 
Muslims in a collective response to the call to submit to the will of God and to foster 
human flourishing? In order to reach a greater appreciation of the message of Jesus the 
“prophet of Allah” and Jesus Christ the “Son of God”, we shall undertake a succinct 
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investigation into the significant places he occupies in both traditions. The purpose is to lay 
the foundation for teasing out the possibility of common values as a result of this varying 
significance. 
6.2.The Significance of Jesus to Christian Faith and Theology 
As we indicated earlier on, Jesus Christ is the reason for Christian faith and theology. 
Without him there is no Christianity. In other words, for Christian faith and theology, Jesus 
Christ does not just reveal something of importance to Christians, but he achieves it – 
something without which salvation would be impossible and Christianity would never have 
come into existence. Hence, it is difficult for one to talk about the significance of Jesus 
Christ for Christianity in a rather limited space in this section. However, for the purpose of 
stating the Christian claim on Jesus Christ as the “Son of God and saviour of the world”, 
we would attempt a brief presentation of his significance by focusing on some significant 
milestones in his life. These include: the nativity, the baptism, the transfiguration, the 
crucifixion, death and resurrection, the Ascension and the second coming. Even with these, 
one is in danger of undermining the significance of other important events in the life of 
Jesus Christ.  
However, it could be said that a comprehensive elucidation of the above 
“significant milestones” eventually leads to other aspects of Jesus’ life and mission. For 
instance, while the nativity points to the doctrine of the Incarnation, the events of the 
baptism and the transfiguration – especially “the voice from heaven” (Mark 1:11 and 9:7) – 
further attest to Jesus’ eternal Sonship with the Father. More so, while the crucifixion, 
death and resurrection are viewed as redemptive,
694
 the Ascension and the Second Coming 
reinforce the belief that Jesus Christ is the eternal son of God who returns to his place of 
glory, after having accomplished his mission (the salvation of the world). From there, he 
will come again to judge the living and the dead.  
Consequently, the other events which occur within and in-between these 
“significant milestones” contribute to giving a complete Christian picture of the identity 
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and mission of Jesus Christ on the one hand, and his significance to Christian faith and 
theology on the other.
695
 What can then be said about the place of Jesus Christ in Christian 
faith and theology? First of all, it must be repeated that Jesus Christ is the reason for the 
existence of Christianity as a religion. He is the historical point of departure and 
culmination for Christian faith and theology. As McGrath puts it, Christianity represents a 
“sustained response to the questions raised by the life, death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ”.
696
 Following the views of Alister McGrath, it could be said that the central place 
of Jesus Christ in Christian faith and theology consist in the understanding that: (1) Jesus 
Christ is the fullest revelation of God for Christianity. (2) He is the bearer of salvation for 
Christians (3) and he defines the shape of the redeemed life.  
 First of all, to say that “Jesus reveals God” means that Jesus makes God known in 
a particular and specific manner distinctive to Christianity, and to say that “Jesus Christ 
makes God known” is to imply that he is God and to see him is to have seen God (John 
14:7, 9). Hence, McGrath asserted that “the confession that ‘Jesus is Lord,’ is not only that 
Jesus is divine, but that God is Christ-like”.
697
 This, however, does not imply that all other 
conceptions of God outside Christ are wrong. It is to affirm that within Christian faith and 
theology, “it is impossible to speak of ‘God’ within the parameters of the Christian 
tradition without relating such statements to the person and mission of Jesus Christ”.
698
 
Secondly, to say that “Jesus Christ is the bearer of salvation” is to affirm that Jesus 
Christ makes salvation possible. He is the source of salvation for the Christian. It means 
salvation is “manifested in and through and constituted on the basis of the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ”.
699
 It conveys the sense of what Jesus said to Martha in John’s 
Gospel: “I am the resurrection and the life. Whoever believes in me will live, even though 
he die; and whoever lives and believes in me will never die” (John 11:25-26). Hence, to 
say that “‘Jesus makes salvation possible’ is not to deny that other modes of salvation are 
accessible by other means; it is simply to insist that within the Christian tradition, the 
Christian understanding of what salvation is can only be realised on the basis of Jesus 
                                                          
695
 Alister E. McGrath. Christian Theology. 1997, p388 
696
 Ibid, p322 
697
 Ibid, p323 
698
 Ibid, p324 
699





 It is as Saint Paul declared, “if Christ had not risen from the dead, our faith 
would have been in vain and we would have remained in our sins” (1Cor 15:17).  
Thirdly, to say that Jesus defines the shape of the redeemed life means that not only 
does Jesus Christ make the redeemed life possible, but he also determines it. The 
“redeemed life” relates to the salvation brought about by the death and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ (atonement for sin), the new life made available to the believer (2Cor 5:17) 
and the believer’s commitment to living out the message of Jesus Christ which gives 
guidance to this life. In other words, having become Christian, the believer now sees Christ 
and his message as defining the kind of relationship he/she is called to develop with God 
and neighbour. This new relationship is defined by one’s love for God and love for 
neighbour (Mark 12:30-31). In this way, living the redeemed life then entails conformity to 
the message of Jesus Christ. Here, one tries to shape one’s life according to the message 
and exemplary life of Jesus Christ.  
As we pointed out earlier, Jesus is the reason for Christian faith and theology. As 
the “Son of God”, he fully, definitively and constitutively discloses God within the context 
Christian faith and theology. Through his death and resurrection he has opened the way to 
salvation for all who seek him and determines how the redeemed life should be lived 
through the message of the Gospels. Having said this, what then could be said about the 
significance of Jesus in the Qur’an and Islam as a whole? While Jesus is considered second 
in significance to the prophet Muhammad in Islam, what could be the significant role of 
Jesus as a prophet of Allah in Islam? As we indicated earlier, by focusing on the 
significance of Jesus Christ in Islam and Christianity, the purpose is to see how this could 
offer common grounds for teasing out common values between Christianity and Islam. 
These values will then be proposed for Christian-Muslim dialogues of life and of common 
action. 
6.3. The Significance of Jesus in the Qur’an and in Islam 
Despite the doctrinal and theological differences that exist between the Christian and 
Islamic understanding of Jesus Christ, many Muslims and Muslim scholars, do 





acknowledge that Jesus is a unique prophet of Allah, “His closest friend (Surah 3:45), a 
Spirit from Him and His Word sent to Mary (Surah 4:171)”. Jesus is seen as a great 
teacher, a great leader and one of the greatest influences for good the world has ever 
known among the line of prophets. According to the Qur'an, Jesus is “the greatest above all 
in this world and in the world to come” (Surah 3:45).  
With all these honorific titles and accolades ascribed to Jesus in the Qur’an, what 
could be the significant place of Jesus as a prophet of Allah in Islam? As a prophet, is his 
message strictly meant for only the People of the Book? Or its emphasis on the obligation 
to the Tawhid makes it relevant for Muslims whose fundamental faith principle lies in the 
acknowledgement and confession of the Tawhid? Let us delve into this area by use of some 
of the titles designated to Jesus in the Qur’an as our point of entry into the significant place 
Jesus occupies in Islam as a prophet of Allah. 
6.3.1. The Significance of Jesus as the “Messenger of Allah” 
…the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, was nothing more than a messenger of 
God…and a Spirit from Him. So believe in God and in His messengers” (Surah 
4:171). 
We intimated earlier that the word “islam” means submission to the will of God revealed 
through His prophets and messengers. The Qur’an names some of these prophets and 
messengers as: Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad (Surah 
3:84). Concerning the place of Jesus as messenger, Allah says in the Qur’an that “We sent 
Jesus, son of Mary in their footsteps to confirm the Torah that had been sent before him: 
we gave him the Gospels with guidance and light for those who take heed of God” (Surah 
5:46). Hence, if to be truly “muslim”, is to be a committed follower of the message of 
revelation given to the prophets and messengers, among whom is Jesus; then the message 
of Jesus in the Qur’an could provide “guidance” to all those who desire to submit 
themselves to the will of God.  
The Islamic understanding that Adam is the first messenger of Allah and 
Muhammad the final messenger is very significant for the religion – for in Adam, God 
established the Trust (amana) for all humanity and in Muhammad, God brings to 
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conclusion the communication of His message to humanity through prophetic guidance. As 
Mona Siddiqui indicated, Muhammad is viewed by Muslims as the final prophet in 
prophetic chronology, but his message is essentially the same as that of his predecessors. 
“Once distilled to its fundamentals, the message is of the oneness, mercy and sovereignty 
of God”.
701
 Thus, if the message of Jesus in the Qur’an contributes to giving guidance on 
the obligation to the Tawhid (Surah 3:51) then, though secondary to the prophet 
Muhammad, the Qur’anic Jesus could contribute to directing Muslims to the  straight path 
which leads to Allah (Surah 19:30).  
Though the Qur’an indicates that the details of the message of the prophets differ, it 
nevertheless mentions in several verses that the message of succeeding prophets confirm 
those of the past: “step by step, He has sent the Scriptures down to you with the Truth, 
confirming what went before: He sent down the Torah and the Gospel earlier as a guide for 
the people and He has sent down the distinction between right and wrong” (Surah 3:3-4). 
As Mona Siddiqui indicated; “despite the unique place of Muhammad in Muslim piety and 
veneration, Muhammad’s prophecy in the Qur’an lies in the wider context and mission of 
previous prophets”.
702
 Hence, as a messenger of Allah, Jesus first of all stands as that 
pivotal point that links Muhammad to the rest of the prophets and messengers of Allah 
before him. He is that significant part of the chain of prophecy, from which the 
Prophethood of Muhammad finds its authentic link; for after Jesus would come the prophet 
Muhammad.  
In consequence, the Qur’an does not only see Jesus as preceding the prophet 
Muhammad, but it also conceives him as the precursor and guarantor of the coming of 
Muhammad – thus Jesus, son of Mary said, “‘children of Israel, I am sent to you by God 
confirming the Torah that came before me and bringing good news of a messenger to 
follow me whose name will be Ahmad” (Surah 61:6). Furthermore, as a messenger of 
Allah, Jesus in the Qur’an also proclaimed the Gospel inviting all to submit to the will of 
God (Surah 3:50-51). Hence, one sees that the message and life of Jesus provide guidance 
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to the life of the good Muslim. It is therefore not out of place that Islam considers those 
who despise the message of the prophets an act of disbelief (Surah 3:84). 
6.3.2. The significance of Jesus as the “Servant of Allah”  
“He [Jesus] said; ‘I am a servant of God. He has granted me the Scripture; made me 
a prophet, made me blessed wherever I may be…” (Surah 19:30-32). 
As a messenger of Allah, the Qur’an further refers to Jesus as the “Servant of Allah” (abd-
allah) as we can see in the above text. Other references to this title include Surah 4:172 and 
43:59. According to Parrinder, the word abd means a servant in the sense of one who is 
totally submissive to the will of God.
703
 The submission of oneself totally to God is what is 
referred to as islam and the person who conducts himself/herself this way, is referred to as 
a muslim. As Chittick and Murata puts it, “such a person is called a servant (abd) of God 
and servanthood is looked upon as the highest and most praiseworthy human condition. In 
a sense, it is even higher than vicegerency and prophecy, since being God’s messenger 
depends on being his servant”.
704
 To be a servant of God is to worship, obey, show 
humility and be submissive to God (ibada).
705
 
While Muhammad is referred to as the servant of God in the Qur’an more than any 
other prophet (Surah 72:19), Jesus in the Qur’an also said; “I am the servant of God, He 
has given me the Book and made me a prophet” (Surah 19:30). Here, Jesus is not only 
known to be a “servant of God”, but is one who truly dedicated his life in serving God. As 
the Qur’an says, “He (Jesus) is a servant We favoured and have made an example for the 
children of Israel” (Surah 43:59). Commenting on this text, Muhammad Ali indicated that 
not only was Jesus a righteous servant of God who received divine favours, but he was also 
an example of virtue for the Israelites.
706
  
Thus, it could be said that Jesus’ life of virtue could also be exemplary to Muslims 
because Islam understands that “to be a servant of God is to do His bidding and His 
bidding is set down in the Scriptures and in the words of His prophets. Hence, to be a 
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servant of God is to submit oneself freely to God”.
707
 This form of submission is necessary 
for one to be a good Muslim and many Muslims aspire to live this form of holiness of life. 
If many Muslims today are called Abdullah, could it not be that the motivation for taking 
on this name is because of the interest to be Allah’s faithful servants? The life of Jesus in 
this context could be an example for them. 
6.3.3. The Significance of Jesus as a “Sign from God”  
“...I have come to you with a sign from your Lord. Be mindful of God, obey me. 
God is your Lord and my Lord, so serve Him – that is the straight path” (Surah 
3:50-51) 
Other references to Jesus as a sign in the Qur’an can be found in Surah 19:21, 21:91 and 
23:50. Murata and Chittick indicate that the word sign appears in the Qur’an about 400 
times, with three different uses.
708
 These different usages range from a more general sense 
such as anything which gives news of something else (Surah 51:20-21), to a slightly 
specific sense such as the miracles and scriptures that are given to the prophets as proofs 
that they have come with messages from God (Surah 11:96-97) and in a more specific 
sense in that  “the Qur’an refers to its own words as signs (aya), with the term being 
applied technically to each of the subunits of the Surah” (Surah 12:1-2).
709
 Hence, an aya 
is a proof of God’s presence in His creation, in His message to the prophets and in His 
Word (the Scriptures). 
Consequently, if Jesus in the Qur’an is referred to as a “sign from God”, it goes 
without saying that by that very designation, Jesus remains an authentic pointer to the 
existence of God and a proof that the message of the Injil as has its source from God. 
There is great convergence of opinion among Islamic commentators like al-Tabari, al-
Zamakhshari and al-Razi that the designation of Jesus as a “sign from God” refers to the 
miracles that he performed which were meant to authenticate his claim to prophecy. As al-
Tabari puts it, the sign refers to the miracles Jesus performed to demonstrate to people the 
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truthfulness of his claim that he is the prophet of Allah. His power to raise the dead to life, 
to breathe life into clay birds and to heal the sick all add up as evidence to this claim.
710
  
According to Murata and Chittick, the Qur’an itself is perceived by Muslims as the 
speech of God, a direct divine sign of God to humanity; for whatever God says in the 
Qur’an is an expression of Himself.
711
 To understand the Qur’an, therefore, is to 
understand what God is saying to humanity. Hence, in studying the Qur’an, Muslim 
scholars see every chapter, verse, every word and every letter of the Qur’an as God’s self-
expression.
712
 If the same Qur’an affirms Jesus as a “sign from God” (ayatollah) in some 
of its chapters and verses, then what message is the “sign” communicating? From the 
discussions concerning the identity and mission of Jesus as the “prophet of Allah” in the 
Qur’an, one will not be incorrect to assert that the central thesis of the message of the 
Qur’anic Jesus is that of the Oneness of God and the human obligation to submit to him. 
In conclusion, it could be said that though construed differently as “Son of God” (in 
Christianity) and the prophet of Allah (in Islam), Jesus Christ towers in significance within 
the tradition-specific contexts of Christianity and Islam. As God and the “Son of God” in 
Christianity, Jesus is not only the revelation of God and the bearer of salvation but he also 
defines and shapes the redeemed life. As the prophet of Allah in Islam, Jesus contributes to 
giving guidance to all who seek to submit themselves entirely to the will of Allah. He does 
not only achieve this through his message but also through his exemplary life. 
Consequently, how can this image of the Qur’anic Jesus and the Jesus of the NT Gospels 
become contexts for Christian-Muslim dialogue of life and the dialogue of common 
action? Before we enter into the heart of this praxis of dialogue, let us first of all 
understand what we mean by the dialogue of life and the dialogue of common action. 
6.4. Understanding the Dialogue of Life and the Dialogue of Common Action 
In chapter one, we defined interreligious dialogue as “the constructive and positive 
conversation between people of different religious traditions on issues of religious 
significance for the purpose of mutual understanding, learning and enrichment”. Even 
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though there are different ways of engaging in dialogue such as reciprocal communications 
and interpersonal communions, we argued that Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology 
could be more positive and constructive if it is structured against the background of 
dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the other. By “positive and 
constructive”, we mean that form of conversation in which one opens oneself up to the 
other, truly accepts his points of view as valid and seeks to grasp the substantive rightness 
of the other’s views on the subject matter of the dialogue.
713
 As we indicated in chapter 
three, this form of dialogical attitude is a necessary condition for dialogue as an exercise in 
learning. 
 In considering the different forms of dialogue, the “Pontifical Council for 
Interreligious Dialogue” listed the following: “dialogue of life”, the “dialogue of common 
action”, the “dialogue of theological exchange” and the “dialogue of religious 
experience”.
714
 While the Council views the dialogue of life as the context where people 
strive to live in an open and neighbourly spirit, sharing together their joys and sorrows, 
their human problems and concerns; it considered the dialogue of common action as that 
area of interreligious endeavour where the religions collaborate on issues of integral 
development and human flourishing. Whereas the dialogue of theological exchange 
focuses on the work of specialists who seek to deepen their understanding of their 
respective religious heritages and those of the other, through theological exchanges in 
conferences and colloquia; the dialogue of religious experience defines the context where 
persons, rooted in their own religious traditions, share their spiritual riches e.g. with regard 
to prayer and contemplation, faith and ways of searching for God.
715
 
 While it could be said that the preceding discourses on Christian-Muslim dialogue 
on Christology are more akin to the dialogue of theological exchanges on the identity and 
mission of Jesus Christ, the focus of this chapter is to see how these theological issues 
provide the appropriate contexts for engaging Christians and Muslims in the dialogues of 
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life, of action and of religious experience. Since the thesis of this chapter is “Christian-
Muslim Dialogue on Christology for the Promotion of Common Values”, our explicit 
focus would be how the life and messages of Jesus the “prophet of Allah” (in Islam) and 
the “Son of God” (in Christianity) provide the appropriate contexts for Christian-Muslim 
dialogues of life, of common action and of religious experience. 
While the praxis of dialogue is often associated with the dialogue of common 
action, it must be said that the dialogue of common action must not be dissociated from the 
other forms of dialogue, lest it loses not only its theological foundations but also its 
connections to the believer’s experience of God and reality. In other words, a Christian-
Muslim response to issues of human flourishing would bear little fruit if these actions were 
not sustained and inspired by the adherents’ knowledge and experience of God and the 
forms of life these experiences have given rise to in both traditions. In this way, while the 
dialogue of theological exchange provides the context for engaging in this area of 
Christian-Muslim dialogue of common action, this form of dialogue cannot succeed if it is 
without due consideration of the dialogues of life and that of religious experience.  
In this way, one could say that the different forms of interreligious dialogue are 
interconnected such that contacts in daily life and common commitment to action 
sometimes open up to cooperation in promoting ethical and spiritual values. This could 
“eventually lead to the dialogue of religious experience in response to the great questions 
which the circumstances of life do not fail to arouse in the minds of people”.
716
 
Furthermore, “exchanges at the level of religious experience can give more life to 
theological discussions. These in turn can enlighten experience and encourage closer 
contacts”.
717
 Thus, what follows below is an attempt to see how the person and message of 
Jesus Christ in both the Qur’an and in the NT Gospels provides the context for Christian-
Muslim conversations in response to God and issues of human flourishing.  
It must be however noted here that though the message of Jesus in the Qur’an 
appears to be directed towards Christians and Jews, this message could be relevant to 
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Muslims on two grounds. First of all, Muslims believe that the Qur’an is the revealed 
Word of Allah to the prophet Muhammad through the Angel Gabriel. As the revealed 
Word of Allah, the Qur’an provides divine guidance to all who seek to submit themselves 
to the will of Allah. It is in this revealed Book of Allah that one finds the message of the 
Qur’anic Jesus – a message centered on total submission to the will of Allah – “God is my 
Lord and your Lord, so serve Him – that is the straight path” (Surah 3:51). In this way, the 
message of the Qur’anic Jesus could be relevant for Muslims since it also focuses on 
submission of the believer to the will of Allah. Secondly, the Qur’an emphasizes that 
Muslims should not differentiate among the prophets of Allah since each prophet was sent 
by Allah with the same message about the submission of believers to the will of Allah 
(Surah 2:136, 2:285, 3:84). Thus, if Jesus is numbered as one of these prophets of Allah, 
then his message could be useful to the good Muslim who desires to submit himself to 
Allah. So, what values can Christians and Muslims learn from each other about the person 
and message of Jesus Christ in the Qur’an and in the NT Gospels?  
6.5. Christology and Christian-Muslim Common Values  
The acknowledgement that Jesus Christ towers differently in significance in Christianity 
and Islam brings us closer to the values he could inspire by his way of life and his 
teachings, both in the Qur’an and the NT Gospels. From the discourses in chapters four 
and five which set in defining clarity the Christian and Islamic understandings of Jesus 
Christ, we find that the overarching focus of Jesus Christ was service to “God and to issues 
of human flourishing”. One finds these two interests in the Qur’an and in the NT Gospels 
through his message on the submission of the believer to the will of God on the one hand 
(Surah 3:51 and Mk 1:15 or Mt 3:2) and on the other, his interest in the poor and the less 
privileged through the feeding of the hungry, the healing of the sick and deliverance of the 
possessed and other miracles which brought relief to their beneficiaries (Surah 5:112-114, 
3:49 and Mk 6:31-44, 7:31ff, 8:22ff).  
Hence, the interest in this section is to see how the person and message of Jesus 
Christ elicit common values for Christian-Muslim dialogue of life and dialogue of 
common action. By dialogue of life we mean the interest of Christians and Muslims in 
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living in an open and neighbourly spirit; sharing together their joys and sorrows, their 
human problems and concerns. By dialogue of common action, we mean that collective 
endeavour where Christians and Muslims work together in response to issues of social 
justice and integral human development.  
Since the fundamental focus of this chapter is Christian-Muslim dialogue for the 
promotion of common values inspire by Jesus Christ, we shall approach this area of 
dialogue by first of all exploring the Christian-Muslim understandings of these values in 
the light of their different philosophical and theological traditions. Secondly, we will try to 
see how Jesus Christ the “prophet of Allah” and the “Son of God” espouses these values 
within the Qur’an and the NT Gospels. Thirdly, we shall then try to see the common 
context within which Christians and Muslims could work together to promote these values 
through the dialogues of life and of common action. Let us now consider some of these 
values. 
6.5.1. The Value of Interreligious Prayer and Submission to God 
As we indicated earlier, Islam is a religion of belief which essentially centres on the 
submission of the believer to the will of God. Here, the oneness of God remains the key 
focus in all Muslim religiosity. To take the Oneness of God (the Tawhid) out of the 
doctrinal equation of the religion is to totally annihilate the religion. In the Shahada (which 
means to testify or bear witness) therefore, one finds the fundamental act by which all 
Islamic activities depend. In the Shahada the believer affirms that “there is no god but one 
God (la ilaha illa’llah) and that Muhammad is God’s messenger (Muhammadum rasul 
Allah)”. Here, Murata and Chittick point out that the Shahada is particularly important to 
Muslims in that it is “the ritual whereby one submits oneself to God i.e. becomes a 
Muslim”.
718
 Though, theoretically one is obliged to recite the Shahada once in one’s 
lifetime, practically the Shahada is incorporated into the daily required prayers (Salat) such 
that observing these prayers defines the daily life of the Muslim.  
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Consequently, though “pronouncing the Shahada is all that is necessary for one’s 
Islam to be acceptable to God”,
719
 performing the Salat (the ritual prayers) is seen as the 
“centre-pole” of the religion. As Murata and Chittick puts it, “the Koran commands 
performance of the Salat more than it commands any other activity and the prophetic 
sayings suggest that God loves the Salat more than every other human act”.
720
 Salat here 
means “to pray or bless”. As a pillar of Islam, Salat concerns the five daily ritual prayers 
which every good Muslim must perform every day. Because of the central place Salat 
occupies in Islam, “the rhythm of life in a traditional Islamic society is largely determined 
by the five daily prayers.”
721
  
According to the Islamic time-reckoning, the first prayer begins at Sunset (in the 
evening) and the last ends in the afternoon. This means that the whole day in the Muslim’s 
life is a constant submission to the will of Allah through prayer. Not only does the Muslim 
submit himself/herself to the will of God through the daily prayers, but these prayers also 
set the Muslim on the path to holiness: purifying him/her from evil (Surah 11:114), 
shielding him/her against evil (Surah 29:45), enriching the soul (Surah 13:28) and hence 
must be performed at the required time (Surah 2:238). All the prophets are said to have 
performed the Salat (Surah 21:71-73). 
Having seen the significant place prayer occupies in the life of the Muslim, what 
can we learn from the image of Jesus in the Qur’an in respect of prayer and submission to 
the will of God? For the Qur’anic Jesus, prayer and submission to God is central to his life. 
In terms of submission to God, he says in the Qur’an “Be mindful of God and obey me: 
God is my Lord and your Lord, so worship Him – that is the straight path” (Surah 3:50-51 
and 19:36). In these texts, the Qur’anic Jesus affirms the central place God occupies in 
human life and the human obligation to submit to him. He demonstrates this by his own 
submission to the will of God which he considered as “the straight path” (Surah 19:36). 
Hence, in the Qur’anic Jesus, we find one who surrendered himself to God and invited 
others to do likewise. He achieves this through his commitment to his prophetic role, his 
life of prayer and works of charity. This is confirmed in the Qur’an when he said “I am a 
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servant of God. He has granted me the Scriptures and made me a prophet... He commanded 
me to pray, to give alms as long as I live” (Surah 19:30-31).  
Jesus is therefore presented in the Qur’an as one who perfectly fulfilled his role as 
the prophet of Allah, especially in his submission to God through prayer and charity, and 
in his provision of guidance for those who also seek to submit themselves to the will of 
God. Since the desire of Islam is that all might be submitted to the will of the one God 
through acts of prayer and charity, Jesus therefore functions as an example, par excellence, 
to all who wish to be good Muslims. As Ayoub puts it, “indeed the Christ of Muslim piety 
has continued to be a living personality, humble and pious, forever thundering against the 
wrongs of society and full of wisdom and the Holy Spirit”.
722
 Jesus appears in the Qur’an 
as a holy prophet of Allah and a model for the believer. As the Qur’an itself affirms “the 
Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary will be held in honour in this world and the next” (Surah 
3:45). 
Within Christianity, Jesus Christ is God or the “Son of God”. Thus, he instructs 
Christians in respect of the worship of God and love of neighbour. At the start of his public 
ministry Jesus’ central message was; “repent, for the kingdom of God is close at hand” 
(Mark 1:15). Apart from his proclamation of the “kingdom of God” where one finds that 
intimate connection between him and God the Father, the Gospels also present a picture of 
Jesus Christ who is very committed to prayer and emphasizes its importance to the life of 
the disciple. For instance, in the prologue of Mark’s Gospel, one sees the intimate 
connection between Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit and God the Father (Mk 1:9-11). In this 
text, the voice from heaven which says “this is my son, the beloved, in whom I am well 
pleased” (1:11) demonstrates how committed Jesus was to the divine plan as conceived by 
the Godhead.  
After the baptism, Jesus goes to the desert and spends 40 days and nights in fasting 
and prayer alone with God (Mk 1:12-13). This will prepare him for his victorious 
encounter with Satan in the wilderness. After overcoming the devil’s temptations and 
beginning his ministry, Jesus would always find time to be by himself in a lonely place to 
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pray (Mk 1:35, Lk 5:16). Before choosing the twelve apostles Jesus went to the mountains 
to pray about this decision (Mk 3:13 and Lk 6:12-16). Though there are many other 
occasions whereby Jesus Christ gives significant attention to prayer (see John 17:1-24), 
what these acts of prayer point to is the example Jesus sets out for the Christian life i.e. one 
sees in the Gospels that Jesus always found time to pray before making any significant 
decision or undertaking any significant task in his ministry. By so doing, not only did Jesus 
demonstrate to his disciples the significance of prayer – “watch and pray so that you do not 
fall into temptation” (Mt 26:41), but he also taught his disciples how to pray (Lk 11:1-4). 
By this constant recourse to prayer at every significant stage of his ministry and by 
teaching and encouraging the disciples to pray, Jesus Christ demonstrates the significance 
of prayer in the Christian life. From this exemplary life of Jesus Christ, one could say that 
not only is daily prayer the best medium of communication with God, but it also reaps 
benefits for the Christian in the following ways: first of all, it is a means of placing one’s 
needs and concerns before God (supplication and intercession) who has the power to grant 
them; secondly, prayer is a means of showing gratitude to God for all the graces and 
blessings received (thanksgiving); thirdly, prayer provides the platform for living a 
virtuous life through the confession of one’s sins and the seeking of God’s grace to be 
good Christians; fourthly, the daily prayer of the Christian is a way of acknowledging the 
importance of God in his/her life. Thus, one can say that prayer is an important component 
in the life of every good Christian. For this reason St Paul would tell the Thessalonians to 
“pray at all times” (1Thess 5:17).   
From the above discourses concerning the place and importance of prayer and 
submission to God in Islam and Christianity on the one hand and how Jesus Christ 
functions within these two religious traditions on the other, one could say that the 
significance of prayer and submission to God in the lives of Muslims and Christians cannot 
be discounted. For instance, while submission to the one God (Tawhid) is the essence of 
Islam, prayer (the Salat) is one of the concrete means of demonstrating one’s submission to 
God. Not only does it purify the soul of the Muslim, it also protects him/her from evil and 
serves as a means to the blessings of Allah. For Christianity, prayer is not just the key that 
unlocks the blessings of God to the believer, but it also demonstrates the believer’s 
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acknowledgement of God as his/her source of being and provident provider. St Paul 
affirmed this when he said; “it is in him we live and move and have our being” (Acts 
17:28).  
Jesus Christ as a “prophet of Allah” in Islam and as the “Son of God” in 
Christianity demonstrates in the Qur’an and in the Gospels the significance of prayer and 
the submission of the believer to the will of God. In both traditions, Jesus achieves this 
through the message he proclaimed (Surah 19:36 and Mk 1:15) and through his exemplary 
life (Surah 19:31 and Mk 3:13). Having lived a life worthy of emulation as a prophet of 
Allah and as the “Son of God”, Jesus Christ, in both Islam and Christianity, demonstrates 
that belief in God and fidelity to prayer is capable of bringing the best out of Muslims and 
Christians, and thus contribute in transforming the world into a better place for all. 
However, within our contemporary context, there is the strong force of 
secularism
723
 which thinks otherwise of the significance of faith in God and the relevance 
of prayer to contemporary society. While in the past, secularism emerged through the 
demands to be free from any imposition of religious beliefs and practices on those who do 
not necessarily share them, it has today moved from the level of seeking freedom from 
religious beliefs and practices to becoming, to puts it rather strongly, “a fierce contender” 
against everything religious.
724
 Today, what secularism seeks to achieve is a Godless 
society, a society that emphasizes the will of man over that of God.  
In his considerations of C. G. Brown’s book on The Death of Christian Britain, 
Hakim Murad emphasize that the fact that he finds himself tragically part of this Godless 
society hurts him deeply, because “what is dying is a set of monotheistic convictions and a 
life of prayer and human giving”.
725
 For Murad, secularism is the reason for the death of 
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Christianity in Europe. Despite the fact that Christianity and Islam have different traditions 
in respect to religious doctrines and practices, Murad asserts that a Christian Europe would 
be a better place for Islam than a secular Europe because a Christian Europe offers the 
space for religious beliefs while a secular Europe seeks to erase the trace of God in it.
726
 
For Murad therefore, secularism poses a mutual challenge to Christianity and Islam and 




As Pratt equally noted, secularism with its sequel constitutes a mutual challenge to 
Christianity and Islam today.
728
 This challenge lies in how first of all, it denies Christians, 
Muslims and other religious communities the opportunity to realize themselves and 
contribute to society through the practice of their religions. Consider for instance, how the 
National Secular Society (NSS – Britain) recently fought to scrap Council prayers before 
and after meetings and to abolish the wearing of religious articles in public space. For 
instance, Nadia Eweida (the British Airways employee) who was asked not to wear her 
Cross visibly at the check-in counter is a typical example of the powerful influence of a 
secular society.
729
 In furtherance to this interest, the British National Secularists Society is 
campaigning for the abolition of hospital chaplaincies in the National Health Scheme 
(NHS) and against the teaching of Religious Education (RE) in schools.
730
 Even though 
these cases are particular to Britain, they nonetheless point to the agenda every secularist 
society seek to achieve – the erasure of the trace of religion in society.  
Secularism therefore poses a challenge to the existence of Christianity and Islam. 
This challenge appears to be gaining grounds in the minds of people partly because people 
are gradually losing faith in the goodness of the religions, not because of the content of 
their doctrines, but in the living out of these doctrines. The understanding that the religions 
do not only inculcate and promote social virtues and solidarity in society, but that they also 
promote socialization, social control, welfare and social cohesion is fast disappearing. This 
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is because people have long grown tired of seeing how the religions contribute to conflict, 
wars and social disintegration when they are supposed to be restorers of peace. There are 
numerous examples of how Christian-Muslim conflicts have destroyed human lives and 
whole societies.
731
 It is this state of affair which also gives reason to the success of the 
secularist campaigns.  
Consequently, though religions are an invaluable part of the life of man and can 
contribute significantly in bringing about transformation to society through the virtues they 
inculcate in the lives of their adherents, they have nonetheless been occasions for wars and 
conflicts. Thus, how can the exemplary life of Jesus inspire Christians and Muslims to 
work together to bring transformation to human society? To meet the challenge of 
secularism today demands mutual efforts between Christianity and Islam. Apart from 
becoming faithful witnesses to the living out of their respective religious beliefs, Christian-
Muslim mutual efforts could be directed towards common actions in response to issues of 
primal concern to society today. Taking cue from the prayerful life of Jesus, a Christian-
Muslim interfaith action could be directed towards Interreligious prayer for peace.  
By “Christian-Muslim interreligious prayers”, we mean Christians and Muslims 
setting aside a period of time to be together to pray for a shared intention. It connotes the 
sense of being together to pray to God for the needs of the world. The “Interreligious 
prayer” we propose here takes on the theme of the 1986 World Day of Prayer in Assisi: 
“Being Together to Pray”. As Pope John Paul II indicated “being together to pray” does 
not mean saying a common prayer, but being present with others to pray.
732
 In other words, 
unlike George Dardess and Krier Mich who worked out the possibility of Christian-
Muslim common prayers (praying in one voice) through the Encounter between St Francis 
and the Sultan of Egypt, thereby eliminating the significance of Jesus Christ in the 
process,
733
 we emphasize that Christian-Muslim prayers cannot be said in one voice.  
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Praying in one voice – the kind proposed by Dardess and Krier Mich – is rather 
problematic. Such prayers demand a unitary content, a common form and language which 
is impossible considering the fact that there are stark differences between the Christian and 
Muslim ways of praying. Whereas Christian prayers (for instance Roman Catholic) are 
very often made through Jesus Christ as the “Son of God”, Muslims do not believe in the 
divinity of Jesus Christ. Secondly, Arabic is the medium of Islamic prayer which many 
Christians may not understand. Thus, what becomes of those who do not understand 
Arabic when Christians and Muslims meet to “pray in one voice”?  
Hence, in talking about Christian-Muslim interreligious prayers, we mean the 
engagement of Christians and Muslims with different liturgical prayers but with a common 
prayer intention – for instance praying for peace. Here, Christians and Muslims set aside a 
day for praying for their shared intentions. While sharing the same space and prayer 
intention they can either pray differently at organized comfort zones or pray in turns. As 
Pope John Paul II indicated, being together to pray in this manner “takes on a particularly 
deep and eloquent meaning insofar as all will be there, one next to the other to implore 
God for the gift that all of humankind most need today in order to survive”.
734
  
It must be noted that though this kind of interreligious prayer could be done 
without reference to the life and mission of Jesus Christ, it also offers another opportunity 
for engaging Christians and Muslims in concrete forms of dialogue through Jesus’ 
exemplary life of prayer. Fostering this form of inter-faith action could lead to the 
establishment of peace and peaceful co-existence between Christians and Muslims, thereby 
transforming the communities in which they live. As Pope John Paul II puts it, by being 
together to pray, we “manifest our respect for the prayer of the others and the stance of the 
others towards the divine. At the same time, we offer them the humble and sincere 
testimony of our faith”.
735
 
In this way, when the two religions are seen to be visibly working together in 
practical contributions to issues of public concern, they would be reasserting their 
significance in society and thereby counteracting the secularist propaganda about the 
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irrelevance of religion in human society. This could be done without recourse to Jesus 
Christ, but when the life and mission of Jesus Christ becomes the inspiration for 
undertaking this kind of inter-faith action, it will not only reduce the tensions between the 
communities as a result of their differences in understanding Jesus Christ, but it will also 
introduce a sense of respect and trust in the other who shares the same prayer concerns 
with me presenting them to God on behalf of me and of the world. Such a Christian-
Muslim assent to “being together to pray” could be the greatest source of inter-faith 
witnessing to the goodness of these religions. Let us now consider “peace and peaceful co-
existence” as a common religious value to Christianity and Islam. 
6.5.2. The Value of Peace and Peaceful Co-existence 
The word “peace” is said to come from the Latin word “pax” which means “freedom from 
civil disturbance”. “Peace” is a form of personal greetings as in the Hebrew Shalom or the 
Arabic Salaam. In these usages, “peace” reinforces the sense of or interest, in establishing 
harmony in relationships between those who share it. Today, the word “peace” is used 
variously to suggest a sense of harmony in personal relationships, the absence of conflict 
or violence, a state of tranquillity, a formal pact to end war between two enemy bodies and 
so forth. In all its interpersonal, institutional or international usages, what the concept 
defines is a state of tranquillity and harmony that is informed by a mutual trust and 
confidence in the other. Whereas this sense of “peace” involves the absence of war, 
conflict and violence, it is also grounded on the goodwill to promote tranquillity, cordiality 
and amity. Thus, if “co-existence” means “the willingness to live together despite 
fundamental differences”, then “peaceful co-existence” denotes the willingness to live 
together in peace despite differences. How is this sense of peace upheld in the 
philosophical and theological traditions of Islam and Christianity? How does Jesus Christ 
espouse it in the Qur’an and in the NT Gospels and how do these serve as contexts for 
Christian-Muslim collaborations for the promotion of peace and peaceful co-existence? 
These are the questions which will engage our deliberations in this section. 
 Islam is said to be a religion of “peace”. This is partly because the word Islam, 
which is derived from the Arabic Salama (Š-L-M) means “to be safe, secure or at peace”. 
Though religiously, “Islam” is taken to mean “submission to the will of Allah”, when one 
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considers its Arabic roots, it also connotes the sense of “purity or wholeness”, “security” 
and “peacefulness”. However, it appears that the concepts “submission” and “peace” are 
more popular in the use of the term than any other meaning. This popularity lies in the fact 
that as a religion, the word “Islam” refers to the submission of the believer to the will of 
Allah. To submit oneself to the will of Allah, is to conform to Allah’s divine plan, and to 
conform to Allah’s divine plan is to fulfil the purpose for which one was created. Fulfilling 
the purpose for which one is created is to find happiness, peace and tranquillity. Hence, 
submission to the will of Allah leads to peace. 
Within the domain of interpersonal relationships however, “Islam” as Salama finds 
its popularity in the Muslim greetings al-Salamu ‘alaykum which means “Peace be upon 
you”. Here, one could interpret this form of greetings as a reminder to Muslims about their 
fundamental duty to be agents of peace which finds its fulfilment in being submissive to 
the will of Allah. But what does “peace” here mean? According to Admet Akgunduz,
736
 
the concept of “peace” in Islam connotes three senses: the eschatological, the 
psychological and the universal sense. In the eschatological sense, “peace” refers to the 
ultimate goal of human life, almost synonymous with salvation (Surah 10:25-27). In the 
psychological sense, “peace” means the “tranquility and peace of mind, an inner 
confidence born of faith that enables the religious believer to face adversity without 
anxiety or despair”.
737
 From the universal sense, it reflects the widespread conviction that 
a time will come when all sorts of evil and destruction in the world will give way to 
prosperity and human flourishing.
738
 These three distinctions of peace can only be realized, 
as it were, by the utter submission of the believer to the will of God. It is in submitting 
oneself to the will of God that the individual finds happiness and peace.
739
 Even though 
some people conceive that the Qur’an perceives the ideal society to be Dar as-Salam (the 
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 many Muslims nonetheless understand that the “house of peace” is the 
abode of all who submit themselves to the Will of Allah. 
If in Islam “ideal peace” consists in submitting oneself to the will of Allah, then 
Jesus was a man of peace par excellence. In the Qur’an one sees that Jesus’ preoccupation 
was both on his submission to the will of the one God and his proclamation on the human 
need to submit to God (Surah 19:36, 3:50-51). In other words, as a prophet of Allah, he 
provided guidance on the need to submit oneself to God as a means of attaining peace.
741
 
In this way, one could see Jesus as the epitome of peacefulness because the Qur’an affirms 
that his entire life was marked by peace: “peace was on me the day I was born and will be 
on me the day I will die and the day I am raised to life again” (Surah 19:33). Thus, though 
the miracles he performed were meant to be signs pointing to the authenticity of his 
prophetic calling, these miracles nonetheless contributed to re-establishing harmony and 
peace in the lives of those who were beneficiaries of them (Surah 3:49, 19:31). In the 
Qur’anic Jesus one finds an “icon of peace”. 
The Christian conception of “peace” rests largely on the Hebrew roots of the word 
slm (shalom) which means “to be complete” or “to live well”. As a Hebraic OT concept, 
Shalom could therefore be understood in four different ways, namely (1) as the wholeness 
of life and body (health), (2) as the harmonious relationship between people (friendship), 
(3) as prosperity, success and fulfilment in life (wealth) and (4) as the absence of war or 
victory over one’s enemies which brings war to an end.
742
 When used in both greetings and 
farewell, shalom is used as a form of blessings on the one to whom it is conferred on 
(1Samuel 25:6) – i.e. “may your life be filled with health, prosperity, wealth and safety”  
In the NT however, the Greek word eirene is often used as peace. But this sense of 
“peace” is greatly influenced by the OT concept of shalom. However, what is remarkable 
in all its usage is that “peace” finds its source from God (Judges 6:24). It is God who takes 
the first step to bring this sense of “peace” – first to the Jews through Abraham and his 
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descendants, and then to both Jews and Gentiles through Jesus Christ. Through the 
covenant of peace God established, all who are faithful to this covenant are rewarded with 
peace. Hence, “peace” is the result of being faithful to God. Peace is an indication of God’s 
blessings for one’s obedience (Isaiah 48:18 and Luke 7:50). 
Since “peace” is attained through one’s obedience to God, the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ brought about the peace of God to fallen humanity. As Paul 
puts it, “just as one man’s disobedience many are made sinners, so also by one man’s 
obedience, many are made righteous” (Romans 5: 17-19). In this way, “peace” is viewed 
as an essential hallmark of Christian virtue. To be a “Christian” means to be a follower of 
Christ, and to be a follower of Christ is to observe the divine command to “love God above 
all things and love one’s neighbour as oneself (Mark 12:30-31). This command to love 
demands obedience, and it is this obedience which brings peace to the believer. As the 
Scriptures imply, “there can be no peace for the wicked (Isaiah 48:22), but “glory, honour 
and peace comes to everyone who does good” (Romans 2:9-10). 
In the NT, Jesus Christ demonstrated in both word and deed his desire to bring 
peace to the world and to the hearts of all who were troubled (Mt 11:27). Referred to as the 
“Prince of Peace” (Isaiah 9:6), Jesus Christ was preoccupied with proclaiming and 
establishing “the kingdom of God” through repentance (Mt 4:12-17). The purpose was to 
establish a state of relationships wherein persons, societies and nations can live together in 
harmony and tranquillity. For St. Paul says “He himself is our peace” (Eph 2:14). Thus, 
from the accounts of the Gospels, one sees a Jesus who was a lover of peace, a promoter of 
peace and the giver of it. He says in John’s Gospel: “peace I bequeath to you, my own 
peace I give you, a peace which the world cannot give, this is my gift to you” (Jn 14:28).  
As we indicated earlier in chapter four, Jesus’ message of repentance and 
forgiveness in the Gospels was meant to re-establish the peace destroyed by sin and evil. 
He healed the sick, set captives free, raised the dead and stood against the oppressive 
structures of society – all in view of re-establishing harmony and tranquillity in it. After his 
resurrection from the dead his first gift to the disciples was peace: “Peace be with you!” (Jn 
20:19-21). For this reason, Christianity conceives living peacefully and promoting peace in 
society as essentially part of its evangelizing mission. As Pope John Paul II puts it in his 
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address at the Assisi World Day of Prayer for peace; “in Jesus Christ, as Saviour of all, 
true peace is to be found, ‘peace to those who are far off and peace to those who are near.’ 
His birth was greeted by the angels’ song: ‘Glory to God in the highest and peace among 
men with whom he is pleased.’ He preached love among all, even among foes, proclaimed 
blessed those who work for peace and through his Death and Resurrection he brought 
about reconciliation between heaven and earth”.
743
 
In response to the call to promote peace in the world, the Church continues to 
preach the message of peace in the manner handed down to her by Jesus Christ in the 
Gospels through her interpretations of the “signs of the times” and her provision of the 
road map to world peace and peaceful co-existence. In the Roman Catholic Church, one 
finds some of these peace proposals in Papal encyclicals such as Pacem in Terris (Peace on 
Earth -1963) and Populorum Progressio (The Development of Peoples – 1967).
744
 In 
Pacem in Terris, Pope John XXIII outlined the blueprint of peace for the world. According 
to him, if we want peace for the world, then there is a moral order which we must all strive 
to pursue.
745
 This moral order which prevails in society is to be grounded on truth, it must 
function according to the norms of justice, be inspired and perfected by mutual love and 
brought to an ever more refined and human balance in freedom.
746
 This moral order 
“whose principles are universal, absolute and unchangeable has its ultimate source in the 
one true God, who is personal and transcends human nature”.
747
 If human society is to find 
lasting peace, it would need to order its ways according to the ways of God who has made 
himself known in Jesus Christ. So as followers of Christ, Christians are called both to live 
and to promote peace according to the example of Jesus Christ. 
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  From the above discourses on “peace”, one could conceptually say that Islam and 
Christianity are religions of peace. Though each tradition understands “the gift of peace” as 
essentially part of faith practice, can one however boast of the existence of “peace” within 
and between them in the midst of the many conflicts which are partly created by Christians 
and Muslims? According to Pratt, “all too often it seems that religions, especially – but not 
only – Christianity and Islam, are caught in an apparent hypocrisy. For even as religions 
actively promote peace, they nevertheless can be found endorsing and blessing the battle-
tanks of military might”.
748
 Whereas Islam and Christianity are supposed to be religions of 
peace, there are records in their historical annals where Muslims and Christians endorsed 
directly or indirectly, wars and conflicts.
749
 There are instances aplenty where Muslims and 
Christians engage in very destructive conflicts and violence against themselves 
(intrareligious conflicts) and against each other (interreligious conflicts).  
Typical examples of Christian-Muslim intrareligious conflicts include the age-old 
conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland
750
 and the current conflicts 
between the Shi’ites and Sunni in Iraq. Consider also the interreligious conflicts 
demonstrated in the oppression of Christians in Pakistan and the burning of Christian 
Churches in places like Egypt and Iraq. In Sub-Saharan Africa, one needs to only look at 
Sudan where Arab Muslims in the North slaughtered more than one million black 
Christians from the South.
751
 The statistics in Nigeria are even more alarming. More 
recently, a renewed wave of conflicts between Christians and Muslims in central Nigeria 
has claimed the lives of thousands of people. For instance, Angela Kariuki reports that 
from January 2010 to 2015 more than ten thousand people lost their lives through 
Christian-Muslim conflicts in Nigeria.
752
 It is also reported that in July 2013, an Islamic 
classroom in which 5 to 8 year-olds were studying Arabic and the Qur’an in Southern 
Nigeria was bombed. Seven pupils were injured.   
                                                          
748
 Douglas Pratt. The Challenge of Islam. 2005, p189 
749
 Ibid, p101-116 
750
 Joseph Liechty. “Testing the depth of Catholic/Protestant Enmity: the Case of Thomas Leland’s History of 
Ireland 1773,” in Reconciling Memories. 1998, p108-124 
751
 John Pontifex (editor). Roll Back the Stone of Fear. 2005, p56-58 
752





Though one must not be too quick to identify all these conflicts as religious by 
nature, the fact that most of them assume a religious turn in the end is a cause for worry. In 
other words, the fact that Muslims and Christians who are supposed to be people of peace, 
rather participate in these conflicts makes one wonder whether the essence of the religions 
are being upheld by their respective adherents. As Pratt puts it, “the world looks on aghast 
at the terror and havoc that are once again wrought in the name of religion or a religious 
ideology”.
753
 In the eyes of the world, these instances of Christian-Muslim conflicts are 
huge dents (counter-witnesses) in the image of Christianity and Islam which are suppose to 
be religions of peace.  
Consequently, some scholars believe that “if there is ever to be a lasting peaceful 
cohabitation of human communities, not to mention the prospects of a just and ecologically 
sustainable future for all, then religion is going to have to back off”.
754
 For Kung, 
however, there can be “no world peace without peace among the religions, no peace among 
the religions without dialogue between the religions and no dialogue between the religions 
without accurate knowledge of one another”.
755
 Christianity and Islam together make up 
over half of the world’s population. “Without peace and justice between these two 
religious communities, there can be no meaningful peace in the world. The future of the 
world depends on peace between Christians and Muslims”.
756
  
If there is to be peace between Christians and Muslims, then this has to come 
through dialogue between them, and dialogue creates the opportunity for the religions to 
find meaningful ways by which religious communities can live in peace and become 
agents of peace and peaceful co-existence. This explains why we propose the person and 
mission of Jesus Christ as the context for these peace initiatives. From the image of the 
Qur’anic Jesus and that of the Jesus of the NT Gospels, we find common elements of 
“peace” and “working for peace”. Not only did Jesus say in the Qur’an that ““peace was 
on me the day I was born and will be on me the day I will die and the day I am raised to 
life again” (Surah 19:33), but his first gift after the resurrection was “peace” which he 
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offered to the Apostles who were caught up in fear of the Jews – “peace be with you” (Jn 
20:19). Hence, what one finds common between the Qur’anic Jesus and the Jesus of the 
NT is the emphasis on the significance and need for peace.  
In today’s world where there is growing injustice, ethnic and religious conflicts, 
civil wars, terrorism, national and international conflicts within which Christians and 
Muslims are sometimes the protagonists, the message and person of Jesus could become a 
wakeup call to these two religious to rethink their essence and relevance as religions of 
peace. How then can the life and message of Jesus Christ provide a context for Christian-
Muslim collaborations in response to the need for peace and peaceful co-existence? It is 
here that interreligious prayers for peace could be a useful tool. As we indicated earlier on, 
by “interreligious prayer”, we mean Christians and Muslims coming together to pray in 
different ways but with a shared intention i.e. the gift of peace which only resides in God 
and is freely bestowed on those who submit themselves to him. 
By praying together for world peace, not only will this form of interfaith action 
lead to the nurturing of trust and respect between Christians and Muslims, but it could also 
bring about peace in their communities and in the wider world. Additionally, when 
Christians and Muslims are seen to share a common space with common prayer intentions 
for peace in the world, it could be a means of demonstrating to the world the peaceful 
relationships between two faith traditions. In other words, praying together for “world 
peace” could be a source of witness to the world about the Christian-Muslim resolve to 
contribute to the greatest gift the world needs, peace. Let us now consider another value of 
great significance i.e. solidarity with the poor and the marginalized. 
6.5.3. The Value of Solidarity with the Poor and the Marginalized 
The concept solidarity generally refers to ties which bind people together whether as a 
group, a community or a society. The bases for these social ties vary from kinship to 
shared values. By using the concept in relation to offering support to the poor and the 
marginalized, solidarity finds its basis from “our common humanity”.
757
 It is about valuing 
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other people and respecting their dignity and integrity. In his encyclical letter “Sollicitudo 
rei socialis – ‘On Social Concern’ 1987”, Pope John Paul II indicated that solidarity “is not 
a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, 
both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit 
oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual, 
because we are all really responsible for all”.
758
 In connection with this sense of solidarity, 
Gaudium et Spes also emphasizes that “the joy and hope, the grief and anguish of men of 
our time, especially of those who are poor or afflicted in any way, are the joy and hope, the 
grief and anguish of the followers of Christ as well”.
759
 
The understanding of human solidarity in Islam is not different from the sense of 
solidarity noted above. Accordingly, the prophet Muhammad once said: “in the sight of 
God, all people are equal like the teeth of a comb and nobody may be deemed better than 
another except based on piety and good works”.
760
 This Sunnah of the prophet points to 
the universal dignity of all human beings. This sense of equality in dignity emanates, on 
the one hand, from God’s breath of life into Adam (Surah 7:11) and on the other, his 
appointment of Adam as the vicegerent (Khalifa) to the rest of creation (Surah 2:30-33). 
Adam and Eve are known to be the first human beings God created. They are the prototype 
of the human race. What is therefore said about them in the Qur’an has something to do 
with the whole of humanity.
761
 God did not only create them, but he also entrusted the care 
of creation to them and their descendants (Amana). Hence, the equality of human dignity 
comes from this “common humanity”. As Mona Siddiqui puts it, “in the Qur’an, at least 
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In Islam therefore, through Adam and Eve, Allah bestows a common dignity (the 
gift of life) and vocation (Amana)
763
 to the rest of humanity. As Allah declared in the 
Qur’an: “We have bestowed dignity on the progeny of Adam (wa laqad karramna bani 
Adama) and conferred on them special favours above a great part of our creation” (Surah 
17:70). This sense of dignity is seen as the basis of human solidarity. In Islam, though 
solidarity begins from kinship and extends to neighbours,
764
 the aim is nonetheless the 
recognition of the ties that bind human beings together and the need to “take care of the 
other” as a consequence of these human ties and responsibilities. Here, when human 
solidarity is directed towards ending poverty and achieving shared prosperity this is 
concretely expressed through Sadaqa and Zakat – the third pillar of the religion. 
 In respect to Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology, Christian-Muslim 
solidarity in support of the poor and marginalized in society, could therefore focus on 
retrieving internal resources from the words and deeds of Jesus as a basis for collective 
actions in response to the needs and concerns of the poor and marginalized. Here, the two 
relevant questions which might guide this discourse are: what are the philosophical and 
theological foundations of Islamic charity? How does the Qur’anic Jesus function within 
this context in terms of the response to the needs of the poor and marginalized and how do 
such accounts serve to motivate a Muslim response to the needs of the poor and 
marginalized? While these questions equally apply to Christianity and Christian living, the 
attention would be to see how Jesus’ fundamental option for the poor and the marginalized 
could become a context for Christian-Muslim collective action in response to situations of 
poverty and marginalization in society. 
 The Islamic institutional action in response to the needs of the poor and the 
marginalized in society is captured in zakat and sadaqa. Zakat is the third pillar of Islam 
                                                          
763
 Amana refers to “the Trust” i.e. the moral responsibility of fulfilling one’s obligations due to Allah and 
fulfilling one's obligations due to the rest of creation (Surah 33:72). (See Murata, S. & Chittick, W, C. The 
Vision of Islam. 1994, p134-137) 
764
 Whereas kinship connotes blood affinity, Tafsir al-Manar quotes a hadith which says: “There are three 
kinds of neighbours. A neighbour who enjoys three rights: neighbourhood rights, kinship rights and the 
rights of Islam; a neighbour who enjoys two rights: neighbourhood rights and the rights of Islam; and the 
neighbour who enjoys only the rights of neighbourhood” (see Bouhdiha, Abdelwahab & Muhammad Ma’ruf 




and it concerns the payment of some percentage of an individual’s wealth, property or 
profits in lieu of helping the poor and needy in the community. According to the Qur’an, 
beneficiaries of this charity are: the needy, the poor, the collectors of the zakat, those 
whose hearts are to be reconciled to Islam, captives, debtors, those fighting in God’s path 
and travellers (Surah Surah 9:60). To emphasize the importance of this religious exercise, 
the Qur’an emphasizes that “goodness does not consist in turning your face to the East or 
the West. The truly good are those who believe in God and the Last Day ...those who give 
away some of their wealth to orphans, the needy, the traveller and beggars and to liberate 
those in bondage” (Surah 2:177). Zakat therefore represents the Muslim obligation to give 
alms to the poor and needy in society.
765
  
However, sadaqa represents beneficent giving. It is an act of giving which is done 
out of compassion, love, generosity and friendship. Sadaqa is given voluntarily out of love 
for God and for his creation.
766
 As the Qur’an says, “prophet, have you considered the 
person who denies the judgement? It is he who pushes aside the orphan and does not urge 
others to feed the needy” (Surah 107:1-2). For Amy Singer, these verses “present the 
orphan as the paradigmatic needy figure and food as the most fundamental form of 
assistance”.
767
 Whereas paying the zakat is considered incumbent on every Muslim, 
offering sadaqa is however a voluntary act of charity. Yet, both are directed towards God 
in intent.
768
 Whereas Murata and Chittick indicate that, “just as ablution purifies the body 
and Salat purifies the soul, so also zakat purifies possessions and makes them pleasing to 
God,”
769
 the failure to pay one’s zakat is however considered as a form of apostasy and 
defaulters are punished for it.
770
 However, sadaqa serves as expiation for sin and grants 
rewards to the giver in the next life (Surah 57:18). 
As a consequence, to be a good Muslim does not only consist in confessing the 
Shahada and observing the ritual daily prayers (Salat), but it also consists of helping the 
poor and the needy in society through the payments of the zakat and beneficent giving 
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(sadaqa). Here, it is said that zakat makes it possible to achieve two goals simultaneously: 
the first is material and immediate (i.e. the economic autonomy of the individual who 
receives it); the second is the spiritual and long term (i.e. helping the individual beneficiary 
to become a fully fledged Muslim who can in turn pay the zakat).
771
 In this way, zakat 
“introduces a new form of solidarity which maintains social peace while upholding the 
dignity of man”.
772
 Here, the recipients zakat and sadaqa are the poor, the needy, slaves, 
the collectors of zakat, converts to Islam, debtors, jihadists and wayfarers (Surah 9:60). 
How does this form of solidarity play out in the life of the Qur’anic Jesus? 
Jesus in the Qur’an states that “I am a servant of God... He commanded me to pray, 
to give alms as long as I live and to cherish my mother” (Surah 19:30-31). Furthermore, 
even though the Qur’anic interpretations of the miracles of Jesus (Surah 3:49) are seen as 
signs meant to authenticate his prophetic claims, these miracles were nonetheless the 
concrete expression of Jesus’ response to the needs of those who benefited from them 
(Surah 10:28-30) through the provision of food to the hungry (Surah 5:113-115), sight to 
the blind, healing to the leprous and life to the dead (Surah 3:49-50). Thus, according to 
Ayoub, “the miracles that the Qur’an attributes to Jesus during his ministry are miracles of 
life and healing... The Qur’an credits Jesus alone among the prophets with raising the dead, 
giving sight to those born blind and healing the lepers and the sick”.
773
 The basis of these 
miracles is the transmission of life, love and healing in view of promoting human 
flourishing. 
From a Christian perspective, man (i.e. humanity) is viewed as created in the image 
of God (Imago Dei – Genesis 1:27)).
774
 Man is also by nature a social being who realizes 
himself by living in solidarity with others.
775
 According to Gaudium et Spes, by his 
Fatherly care for all of us “God desired that all men should form one family and deal with 
each other in a spirit of brotherhood… since they have been created in the likeness of 
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 Consequently, love of God translated into tangible acts of love for one’s 
neighbour remains an essential hallmark of Christian identity. Christian love is not one of 
mere theoretical expression without practical orientations, it is a love based on self-
sacrifice for the sake of the beloved. It is a love measured by Jesus’ statement that “Greater 
love has no man than this, that a man lays down his life for his friends” (Jn 15:13). Jesus 
will later demonstrate this by his own sacrifice on the cross.  
It is on the basis of the above sense of love that Christian charity understood as 
“giving assistance to the needy” is derived. Here, charity concerns the love shared with the 
needy, and hence to God through beneficent acts of kindness. This act of giving is different 
from philanthropic acts in that, while philanthropic acts are done out of the sheer 
commitment to enhance the quality of another’s life, Christian charity is an act of mercy 
performed to relieve the suffering of others. Here, God is the source of the motivation to 
give to the other because the giver knows that the help given is also in a way given to 
God.
777
   
From the section concerning Jesus as the “Son of God” in chapter three, we 
indicated that most of the miracles Jesus performed were not just for the sake of 
demonstrating his divine power, but were intended to ameliorate the sufferings of the 
people concerned. This is ascertained by Jesus’ own “mission statement” in Luke’s 
Gospel:  “The Spirit of the Lord is on me, because he has anointed me to proclaim good 
news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim freedom for the prisoners and recovery of 
sight for the blind, to set the oppressed free, to proclaim the year of the Lord’s favour” (Lk 
4:18-21). The Gospels therefore present the whole life of Jesus as predominantly marked 
by this attention to the needs of the poor, the less privileged, the social outcast and the 
down trodden (see Mk 1:29, 40; 3:1; 4:35; 5:1).
778
 This mission statement of Jesus Christ is 
also the mission statement of the Church’s evangelizing mission: “to proclaim the good 
news to the poor, to bring liberty to the captives, sight to the blind, to set the downtrodden 
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free and to proclaim God’s year of favour”. It is a mission which is geared towards 
promoting the integral development of the human person. 
Today, poverty and disease have become globalized and threaten the very survival 
of the human race and the dignity of the human person. As our communities and cities are 
fast becoming multicultural and multi-religious, so is poverty and disease sweeping 
through these communities and cities – reducing many families to subhuman lives.
779
 As 
Knitter puts it, “if Jesus reminded us that the poor are always among us (Mt 26:11), they 
are with us today in ever greater and staggering numbers and with a presence that insists 
on having a place in our awareness”.
780
 Over the centuries, Christians and Muslims have 
worked independently in response to the needs of the poor and marginalized in their 
respective communities of faith – very often directing their acts of kindness and charity to 
those who belong to their respective communities.  
However, many societies today are fast becoming multicultural and multi-religious 
whereby Christians and Muslims find themselves sharing the same space and being 
confronted by similar economic, social and political challenges. The growth of capitalism 
today has seen an upper surge in the number of people who have fallen below the poverty 
line even in developed countries. This has made the cry of the poor and the marginalized 
an insurmountable one. In most of these multi-religious societies where “the rivalries of 
whole continents are forced to live cheek by jowl within single blocks,”
781
 the face of the 
suffering other may not always be a Muslim or Christian face and likewise the benevolent 
giver. This poses mutual challenges to Christians and Muslims.  
The challenge first of all lies in the fact that the suffering other who genuinely 
stands in need of help from either a Christian or Muslim may not bear the same religious 
badge of identity. Must their needs be ignored because they do not share the belief-
systems? The second challenge concerns the situation where demand outgrows supply in 
one religious community and not another. Must not the privileged community help the 
overwhelmed one to respond to the needs of the suffering other even though they do not 
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share the same traditions? Thus, the increasing numbers of the cries of the poor and the 
marginalized and the religious duty to respond to them poses mutual challenges to Islam 
and Christianity. These mutual challenges call for mutual efforts through collaborative 
actions in response to the needs of the poor and the marginalized.  
It is in the light of the above need for collective action in response to the needs of 
the poor and the marginalized that the life and mission of Jesus Christ could inspire such 
actions. As we saw earlier, Jesus in both the Qur’an and in the Gospels never overlooked 
the cry of the poor and the marginalized irrespective of their religious affiliations. He fed 
them, healed them and gave them life. If Jesus was so attentive to the needs of the poor, the 
sick and the marginalized in this manner both in the Qur’an and in the Gospels, then 
Christians and Muslims who make up more than 50% of the world’s population,
782
 could 
bring about positive changes to society if they embark on such collective actions in 
response to the suffering other in the communities they find themselves.  
By engaging in such collective works of charity, not only would Christians and 
Muslims be fulfilling the responsibility of caring for the other entrusted to them by  God, 
these acts would also bring relief to the suffering others who live at the margins of society. 
In this way, not only will society be transformed through these services but these collective 
actions could further lead to trust and respect for the religious other who does not share 
one’s religious beliefs, but with whom one can humbly stand together, offering help to a 
suffering other despite the differences in beliefs. Though these forms of collaborative 
actions need to be carefully planned by the communities concerned, they could nonetheless 
become a great source of witnessing to the goodness of the religions.  
Collective actions have greater force of effect than isolated ones. As Pope John 
Paul II once puts it, “the obligation to commit oneself to the development of peoples is not 
just an individual duty and still less an individualistic one, as if it was possible to achieve 
this development through the isolated efforts of each individual”.
783
 This form of 
Christian-Muslim interfaith action could be undertaken without recourse to a “Jesus-
                                                          
782
 It is estimated that there are 2.1 billion Christians and 1.6 billion Muslims in the world – representing 
about 54% of the world’s population. 
783
 Pope John Paul II. Sollicitudo rei socialis – “On Social Concern” 1987, #32 
243 
 
catalyst” or the conscious efforts to see such actions as inspired by Jesus. However, where 
this is done, it may have the potential to further mend the already fractured relations 
between Christians and Muslims partly because of their different christological 
understandings.  
6.6. Conclusion 
Leirvik Oddbjørn asserts that in Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology “what is called 
for is rather a dialogue among partners that are willing to dive into the depths of the other’s 
well-spring, not for the rebirth of some kind of universal religion, but for the sake of 
deeper understanding not only of the other, but equally of oneself”.
784
 Whereas, we do 
agree with Leirvik that the right approach to Christian-Muslim conversations on 
Christology is dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the other, it is our 
conviction that such dialogues could also be directed to the promotion of common values 
where possible.  
The attention to this common-values-goal is because, even though Jesus Christ is 
differently construed in Islam and Christianity, he nonetheless plays significant roles in 
both religions. Hence, Jesus functions in varying degrees of significance in Islam and 
Christianity. On the one hand, he appears a barrier to Christian-Muslim relations, yet on 
the other he could be a bridge to these relations. Thus, dialogue needs to engage this 
dialectics of bridge and barrier in order to learn about the traditions of the other more 
authentically, to reach a profound understanding of the home tradition and hence live more 
creatively with other.  
While the rest of the chapters focused on the first two goals of dialogue (i.e. to 
know oneself more profoundly and to know the other more authentically), the efforts in 
this chapter have been geared towards the interest to live more creatively with the other 
through dialogue of life and dialogue of common action. We sought to do this through 
what we consider as common Christian-Muslim values inspired by Jesus the “prophet of 
Allah” and Jesus the “Son of God”. These values included: “interreligious prayer and 
submission to God”, “peace and peaceful co-existence” and “solidarity with the poor and 
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the marginalized”. Not only does Jesus live out these values in the Qur’an and the Gospels, 























7. CONCLUSION, EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1.   Conclusion 
At the start of this dialogical journey, we indicated that while Christology is contentious in 
Christian-Muslim conversations, such contentions will continue to grow and escalate if the 
three traditional paradigms of dialogue continue to define and shape the nature of dialogue 
today. As it were, not only does exclusivism privilege one’s tradition against all others, but 
inclusivism patronises other traditions as less or partial versions of what is realized in only 
one, and pluralism argues for the relativizing of all others including one’s own.
785
 If 
mutual learning and understanding and peaceful co-existence are listed among the intended 
goals of dialogue today, then these paradigms need to give way to new and better ways of 
dialoguing with the other. 
Consequently, it was in response to the need for new and better ways of engaging 
the other in meaningful and beneficial dialogues which take the self and the other’s views 
seriously that we proposed Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise in 
learning. The interest to learn from the other implies letting the other tell me something 
about themselves. It implies a sense of openness to the other where one does not privilege 
one’s views over other’s (exclusivism) or consider the other’s views as partial versions of 
one’s own (inclusivism) or presuppose that the other’s views are more or less the same as 
one’s own (pluralism). Dialogue as an exercise in learning is also about being open to 
listen to what the other has to say about themselves.  
To achieve this end, we proposed comparative theology and Paul Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of the self as the theological approach and hermeneutic framework which 
support reflections on this form of dialogue as an exercise in learning. Not only does 
comparative theology deal with the correlation of the theological themes, concepts and 
methods of the other religions in order to learn and understand them, it also asserts that a 
deeper interest and learning of the traditions of the religious other through shared 
experience is necessary for an understanding of the religious other. It emphasizes on one’s 
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commitment to the home tradition and respect for the traditions of the other. Thus, we 
argued in chapter two that comparative theology is both confessional and constructive. 
However, in its work of crossing over to other religions to compare theological themes and 
doctrines, comparative theology also faces questions which involve the epistemological 
validity and the ethical “allowability” for such crossings.  
In response to these questions, we turned to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self 
(narrative identity). Through Oneself As Another, we demonstrated how Ricoeur’s 
mediation of the tensions between Descartes “exalted cogito” and Nietzsche’s demolition 
of it led to his concept of “attestation” as the equidistance between the two polarities. As 
the “wounded cogito” which is capable of affirming itself as oneself acting and suffering, 
we presented attestation as establishing a gesture of trust and belief-in oneself. Understood 
interreligiously, it conveys the sense of the mutual sharing of testimonies of faith between 
the self and the other. Thus, we argued that when dialogue as an exercise in learning is 
structured on Ricoeurean notion of attestation as the sharing of mutual testimonies of faith, 
it removes dialogue from the contentions of “claim and counterclaim” and places it within 
the context of mutual sharing, listening and learning.  
Here, learning takes place when one narrates or shares with the other, one’s stories 
about the identity and mission of Jesus Christ as they pertain to one’s tradition. But this 
learning from the other involves crossing-over to their tradition to learn and understand 
concepts and practices. In response to the question what is the epistemological and ethical 
allowability for such crossing, we argued that Ricoeur shows how sometimes the narration 
of the stories of our lives (narrative identity) discloses the contributions others make to our 
narratives and we theirs. Thus, we argued that this possibility of narrative intertwinements 
serves as the epistemological basis for crossing over to learn from the traditions of the 
other because of the potential enrichment this might bring to oneself. Where questions of 
intratextuality are raised, Ricoeur proposes translation as the means of understanding texts 
and doctrines that are other than one’s own.  
On the ethical plane, we relied on Ricoeur’s “little ethics” as the basis for reflecting 
on the ethical issues which arise when engaging in dialogue with the other as an exercise in 
learning. Here, we identified commitment, openness, respect and equality as the necessary 
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conditions (appropriate dialogical attitudes) for dialogue as an exercise in learning. We 
used Ricoeur’s notion of the “ethical intention” as the hermeneutic framework for 
reflecting on the challenges posed by the above conditions. Ricoeur’s “ethical intention” 
has three components: (1) the Good life, (2) with and for others, (3) in just institutions. 
While the first component provided the context for reflecting on the meaning and 
significance of commitment, the second component set the framework for reflecting on the 
challenges of respect and openness in dialogue. “Just institutions” provided the context for 
reflecting on the principle of equal-partners-in-dialogue.  
In the final analysis, our emphasis has been that comparative theology and 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self make meaningful and constructive contributions to 
Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning. As an exercise in 
learning, not only does dialogue take seriously the “tradition-specific understandings” of 
the Christologies of the interlocutors concern, it is also guided by the principles of respect 
and openness to learn from these traditions while viewing the other as equal-partner-in-
dialogue. To achieve this end, we committed chapter four as the platform for engaging the 
Christian and Islamic tradition-specific perspectives on Christology. Here, we focused 
specifically on the Christology of Mark’s Gospel and “Qur’anic Christology”.   
By engaging these two forms of Christology, we discovered that though different, 
they demonstrate how Jesus Christ could be seen as both bridge and barrier to Christian-
Muslim relations: bridge because Christianity and Islam share similar theological concepts 
and  themes which relate to the life and mission of Jesus Christ and barrier because most 
of these concept are understood differently in the light of the fact that Jesus is a “prophet of 
Allah” in Islam and the “Son of God” in Christianity. Hence, in chapter five, we focused 
on comparative theological exercises on common christological themes such as: word of 
God, spirit of God, Messiah, the virginal conception, the miracles Jesus performed, the 
crucifixion, death and resurrection, the Ascension and second coming of Jesus. These 
christological themes are correlated in their tradition-specific contexts. In doing so, we 
discovered that though understood as a “prophet of Allah” in Islam and “Son of God” in 
Christianity, Jesus nonetheless occupies significant places in Islam and Christianity.  
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For instance, while he is the historical point of departure and culmination for 
Christian faith and theology, Jesus is also seen in Islam as the closest friend of Allah 
(Surah 3:45) and the guarantor of the coming of the prophet Muhammad (Surah 61:6). 
With these varying degrees of “Jesus-significance” in both religions, the questions then 
were: what values does the Qur’anic Jesus (the prophet of Allah) inspire within Islam as a 
religion and what might Christians learn from these values? What values does Jesus Christ 
(the Son of God) inspire in Christianity and what might Muslims learn from these values? 
It was in response to the above questions that we discerned values such as “prayer 
and submission to God”, “peace and peaceful co-existence” and “solidarity with the poor 
and the marginalized” and proposed them for Christian-Muslim dialogues of life and of 
common action in chapter six. Reflections on these values are based on how they are 
understood in the philosophical and theological traditions of both faiths, their significance 
within the traditions, how they are related to Jesus Christ in the Qur’an and in the NT 
Gospels and how they offer common grounds for Christian-Muslim collective actions in 
response to God and to issues of human flourishing. 
7.2. The Evaluation of the Thesis  
This area examines and judges as to whether or not the thesis fulfilled the intended purpose 
for which it was started. We undertake this task on the basis of the two research questions 
which were formulated at the introductory chapter of the study. These questions were:  
what theological and hermeneutic approach to dialogue is appropriate for constructive 
Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning? How can this form 
of dialogue lead to the discovery and promotion of common values inspired by Jesus 
Christ? The focus here is to find out the extent to which the thesis responded to these 
research questions i.e. what is the thesis’ response to the stated problem in the study? Does 
it contribute to making Christian-Muslim dialogue more constructive and positive? What is 






7.2.1. The Thesis’ Response to the Stated Problem 
The stated problem of the study was the general understanding that Christology is a 
contentious subject for Christian Muslim relations. Most of these contentious 
disagreements have often been the cause for Christian-Muslim conflicts in varying degrees 
in many parts of the world. While some scholars focused on the traditional paradigms and 
thought it is impossible to engage Christians and Muslims on a constructive dialogue on 
Christology, our interest was to re-orient Christian-Muslim dialogues from the traditional 
models of dialogue to dialogue as an exercise in learning. We argued that dialogue as an 
exercise in learning from and about the other respects the views of the religious other 
through the interest to learn from them.  
In this way, dialogue as an exercise in learning offers Christians and Muslims the 
opportunity to listen to each other and learn from what the other has to say about Jesus 
Christ, thereby clarifying the underlying ideological, philosophical and theological 
prejudices one may hold about the other. Not only does it lead to these clarifications, but it 
also has the potential to unearth common values between the interlocutors. To achieve this 
end, we relied on comparative theology as our theological approach to the problem and 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics on narrative identity as the hermeneutic context for reflecting on 
the challenges posed by dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the other.  
As a theological approach, comparative theology engages in correlating theological 
themes, concepts and beliefs between two different religious traditions in order to learn and 
understand them. In doing this, it emphasizes on the commitment of the theologian to the 
home tradition and respect for and openness to the traditions of the other. Since its 
fundamental goal is that of learning, we found it a compelling theological approach to our 
understanding of dialogue as an exercise in learning. Through narrative identity, Ricoeur 
helped us to understand that in narrating the story of one’s life, one finds that others 
contribute to our narratives and we theirs.  
Since this possibility of narrative intertwinement establishes some form of 
relationship between the self and the other in contexts where they are considered estranged, 
we argued that this sense of intersubjectivity provides the hermeneutic framework for 
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reflecting on Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning. For this 
form of mutual sharing to be constructive and positive, we argued that it has to be guided 
by what we called “appropriate dialogical attitudes” namely: commitment, respect, 
openness and the principle of equality. Here, Ricoeur’s “little ethics” provided the 
hermeneutic context for reflecting on the meaning of and significance of these dialogical 
attitudes.  
As a consequence, the whole methodology of the thesis is centred on the argument 
that for Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology to be constructive and positive, it needs 
to be oriented towards dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the other. Here, 
difference is respected at the same time that similarities are affirmed where possible. From 
the entire study therefore, we can say that whereas the stated problem centred on the 
context of “claim and counterclaim” which often render Christian-Muslim dialogue on 
Christology impossible, we argued for the case of Christian-Muslim dialogue on 
Christology as an exercise in learning which makes dialogues possible.  
7.2.2. Significance of the Thesis to Current Debates on Dialogue 
The significance of the thesis to current debates in Christian-Muslim dialogue is located in 
its approach, method and goal. The approach of the thesis is to be found in the 
understanding of “dialogue as an exercise in learning”. It is a form of dialogue which 
engages the narrative discourses of both religious traditions, with the view to learn from 
and about the other. Consequently, it builds on and encourages commitment to one’s 
tradition and the openness to listen to, learn and understand the traditions of the other on 
Christology. Its theological method and hermeneutic approach is that of comparative 
theology and Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self (narrative identity).  
While comparative theology focuses on learning across traditions, Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics on narrative identity demonstrates how the narratives of others contribute to 
our narratives and we theirs. This form of narrative interconnection builds a hermeneutic 
confidence about the possibility of learning from and about the other. The goal here is to 
reach a profound knowledge of oneself, acquire an authentic knowledge of the other, and 
hence be able to live with the other more creatively. Thus, the approach, the method and 
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the goal of the study sets it out differently from other forms of interfaith dialogue 
scholarship.   
While acknowledging that there are volumes of scholarly contributions on 
Christian-Muslim dialogues (both Muslim and Christian), most of these works only give 
tangential treatments to the specific topic of Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology. 
Even in context where specific attention is paid to the subject of Christology, few of these 
are oriented towards dialogue as an exercise in learning. In this way, one could therefore 
say that there are very few scholarly contributions on Christian-Muslim dialogue on 
Christology as an exercise in learning – the kind of dialogue which engages the 
Christologies of both Christianity and Islam in conversations that are directed towards the 
promotion of common values inspired by Jesus.  
Consequently, the dialogical relevance of this approach to Christian-Muslim 
dialogue on Christology is first informed by its ability to engage the two traditions on 
conversations about Jesus Christ outside of the “claim and counterclaim” polemics that are 
usually characteristic of these forms of dialogue. Secondly, not only does dialogue as an 
exercise in learning emphasize on commitment to the home tradition, it also stresses on the 
importance of respect and openness to the other’s tradition if one is to learn from and about 
them. Thirdly, dialogue as an exercise in learning also brings in further freshness to 
Christian-Muslim dialogues in the way it engages and guides both traditions in a dialogical 
process which leads to the promotion of common values such as: “prayer and submission 
to God”, “peace and peaceful co-existence” and “solidarity with the poor and the 
marginalized”.  
7.3. Recommendations for Further Study 
At the start of this research work, we reckoned that the entire process was a Christian-
Muslim dialogical journey whose goal was about learning from and about the other. Just as 
the methodological framework provided the roadmap that guided the journey, so also the 
splendour of the point of destination provided the motivation to keep striving towards the 
goal. However, having arrived at the goal, we find that the goal of the journey has no 
definitive end to itself. It rather opens up new beginnings that point to others goals which 
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beckon for further attention. As Pratt conceptualized, “I often find, in my research and 
thinking, that where I arrive at is where I should really begin... The end of one journey 
brings me, but to the start of another”.
786
  
It is therefore in view of the new vistas of hope and opportunity for further research 
in this area that we recommend some other pressing values for further reflections on 
Christian-Muslim dialogues of life and of common action. These values include: “marriage 
and family life” in the light of same-sex marriages, “human rights and gender equality” in 
the light of human rights abuses and gender discrimination, “the integrity of creation” in 
the light of environmental degradation and “the life of chastity” in the light of prostitution 
and pornography. These are issues which specifically relate to social and moral values 
which Christianity and Islam uphold and which the message, life and mission of Jesus 
Christ could help to clarify and provide common contexts for inter-faith action.  
If Christianity and Islam are to be partners in the public discourse on how to make 
the world a better place, then developing these values will not be out of place. As Ziauddin 
Sardar puts it, Christian-Muslim actions that are “designed to generate adoptive and 
pragmatic intellectual responses to the problems of our age would be the most appropriate 
response of the believers to the postmodernist age”.
787
  In the nutshell, the work that has 
been accomplished in the thesis is but the foretaste of a work yet to be completed with 
greater prospects for Christian-Muslim relations. Recourse to praxis is that which can 
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